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The thesis begins with a short section on the nature of neutrality in Europe 
in the 1930s, and briefly introduces the political circumstances of the six nations 
that remained neutral throughout the war. The primary subject of the paper deals 
with the relationship between the belligerents and the neutral states, especially the 
extent to which military strength and preparedness was responsible for the latter 
maintaining their neutrality. 
The degree to which military preparedness enabled the European neutrals 
to remain non-belligerents in World War II varied, of course, country by country. 
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But each of the six undertook expensive rearmament programs that were 
substantially out of proportion to their prewar spending on arms. Certainly in the 
cases of Switzerland and Sweden such arming played a major role in Germany's 
decision to respect their neutrality. Spain and Portugal relied more on their status 
of understood goodwill toward the Axis to protect themselves against aggression. 
Ireland stood in the greatest danger of having its neutrality violated by the Allies; 
none of the others were meaningfully threatened from this quarter. Turkey's 
position on the geographical edge of the war eventually became its primary 
guarantor of neutrality. 
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obtained from the libraries of Portland State University and the University of 
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PREFACE 
Though the major historical emphasis of World War II is, of course, vested in 
the two great warring blocs, one of the most interesting though least reported 
aspects of the war deals with the half dozen European states that managed to 
remain neutral. 1 This paper looks at the relationship between the belligerents and 
these neutral states, and examines the extent to which their military capabilities or 
preparedness was instrumental in the maintenance of their neutrality. 
The position of neutrality within the contemporary imperialist 
system is, under all conditions, not only a dangerous illusion which in 
no way prevents a neutral state from being drawn into war, but is in 
fact a justification of aggression, and a contributing factor to the 
unleashing of war. 
So said the 1939 edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 2 and the Machiavellian 
pragmatism of this statement speaks to the problems shared by those European 
states which in 1939, when intracontinental war broke out, tried to remain free of 
the struggle between opposing blocs. 
Discussed in this paper will be the nature of neutrality and how this political 
stance was so generally precariously maintained in Europe after September 1939, 
followed by a brief review of the political circumstances of the six states - Spain, 
Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Turkey - that remained neutral. The 
thesis will examine most closely the extent to which each of these states was able 
to control its own destiny as to participation in the war, or, conversely, whether 
circumstances beyond each's control were the decisive factors in their neutrality. 
• 1 Only five remained formally neutral throughout the war; Turkey made a last 
minute declaration of war against Germany in early 1945. 
2 quoted in Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Leicester, 1963. 
v 
Though the subject covered in this paper does not include those states 
whose neutrality failed - Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Hungary, 
Greece to list a few - it is important to understand that neutrality always represented 
an often unreachable aspiration rather than an absolute. The two countries which 
came out of the war as the most powerful of the victors - the United States and the 
Soviet Union - had in 1939 been most vocal in their declarations of neutrality.3 
The subject of the successful World War II neutrals has been relatively little 
treated. The best single reference source is Arnold and Veronica Toynbee's 1956 
survey, The War and the Neutrals (Oxford University Press), in which a number of 
scholarly authorities discuss the six countries' wartime experiences. The Hidden 
Weapon by David Gordon and Royden Dangerfield (Harper & Bros., 1947) is 
another important work on the subject, directed primarily at the nature of economic 
warfare as waged on the neutrals; the authors were chiefs of the Blockade Division 
of the wartime U.S. Foreign Economic Administration. The role of the neutrals in 
locally-available war literature - histories, diaries, biographies - is sparse, as is 
periodical literature on the subject. The Documents on German Foreign Policy, 
available through 1942 at both the University of Oregon library and the Portland 
State University library, are a useful source of information on German diplomatic 
relations with the neutral states. 
"3 Dennis J. Fodor, The Neutrals, Alexandria, 1982, 27. 
CHAPTER I 
NEUTRALITY 
"Neutrality is rather like virginity" 
Everybody starts off with it. .. 
Roderick Ogley 1 
When the European war broke out in 1939, more than thirty independent 
states stretched across the continent. By the end of 1941, only six of them - Spain, 
Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Turkey2 - had managed to remain at 
peace. None of these non-belligerents was completely "neutral" in practice, each 
swinging precariously from one camp to the other in attempts, often frantic, to 
appease its warring neighbors. 3 Through most of 1941, it was Germany's interests 
that were usually favored for the understandable reason that Hitler seemed to be 
winning. After 1941, the neutrals came more and more to hedge their bets in favor 
of the Allied side as Germany's military edge began to dull. 
As we'll discuss, all six occupied, to varying degrees, geographical positions 
that were strategically important to the belligerents. Though each was peripheral to 
Europe's center, none was a backwater that might remain impervious to external 
pressure while it safely rode out the conflict - each had something both sides 
wanted, whether it was raw or finished materials, ports, manpower, or an important 
land or water passageway. The neutrals' locations and resources gave them an 
1 Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth 
Century("The World Studies Series"), N.Y. Barnes & Noble, 1970. 
2 Plus the tiny enclaves of Andorra and Vatican City. 
3 J. Lee Ready, Forgotten Allies: Vol. 1 - The European Theater - The Military 
Contribution of the Colonies, Exiled Governments and Lesser Powers to the Allied 
Victory in World War II, Jefferson, N.C., 1985, 60-ff. 
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importance highly disproportionate to their sizes or military capabilities. Though no 
neutral was itself an economic powerhouse, their combined assets could 
contribute very materially to a belligerent's war machine, as they would, in the 
aggregate, for Germany. All had an appreciation of the value of their neutral status 
to both blocs, and throughout the war each capitalized on this to the maximum 
extent possible. In the first two or three years of the fighting many high-placed 
persons in each of these countries believed in the inevitability of a German victory, 
or, at minimum, that a stalemate would develop between the belligerents, leaving 
Germany the dominant continental power. Of critical importance to their behavior, 
all were either deeply suspicious of or outright antagonistic toward the Soviet 
Union. Most would give way, in the early war years, to German demands - if only 
slowly nonetheless steadily and in strategically important ways. 4 
It should be stressed that even though states can, and often do, declare 
their permanent neutrality, the concept itself logically exists only in a setting of war. 
Though states are routinely allied to one another in peacetime, and some demand 
their neighbors' alliance through military threats, 5 it is during armed conflicts that 
professed neutral states stand most likely to lose their unaligned status. 6 
According to Professor Roderick Ogley of the University of Sussex, 
neutrality takes four different forms. The first is where it is imposed on a state, such 
as on Belgium at its early 19th century inception, or on Austria in 1955 by the World 
War II victors; second, there are the "traditional" neutrals, most notably Sweden 
and Switzerland; third are the so-called "ad hoc" neutrals, the states that decide to 
4 David L. Gordon and Royden Dangerfield, The Hidden Weapon -The Story 
of Economic Warfare, New York, 1947, 57, 74-75. 
5 It is, for example, difficult to imagine the Soviet Union allowing the German 
Democratic Republic to leave the Warsaw Pact. 
6 Ogley, Theory and Practice, 1. 
remain out of a particular war, such as Turkey in the Second World War; and, 
finally, there is the nonaligned state, typified today by India, and which is in fact a 
form professed by nearly all the new Asian and African nations. 7 
Irrespective of a nation's professed neutrality, such neutrality nonetheless 
stands in danger of violation when the interests of its war-making neighbors 
override the counter-balancing costs of warring against the neutral. To be 
effective, professions of neutrality have, in most cases, to be backed with the 
military capability and determination to deter a belligerent from using the neutral 
state's territory to further that belligerent's own war aims. 
3 
Throughout World War II, Iberia remained the one solidly neutral quadrant of 
Europe. The two peninsular states were each ruled by right-wing authoritarian 
leaders, men who had risen to power in the 1930s. In 1932 Portugal's conservative 
and scholarly finance minister, Antonio Salazar, became prime minister, redeeming 
years of political chaos with the relative civil orderliness provided by a military-
supported system, the so-called Estado Novo. Though Portugal retained its 
centuries-long alliance with Britain, Salazar's one-party "New State" self-
consciously modeled itself on Hitler's and Mussolini's examples. After the 
European war broke out, Salazar's cardinal principle of foreign policy was that 
Portugal should remain neutral and should do everything in its power to see that 
Spain also remained neutral; he reasoned that if the latter either entered the conflict 
as a co-belligerent with the Germans or was invaded by Hitler, Portugal would 
inevitably be dragged into its neighbor's war.8 He also calculated, being cognizant 
of Hitler's military strength, that he couldn't hope to maintain Portugal's colonial 
1 !bid, 4. 
8 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal-A Biography, N.Y., 1970, 124-ff. 
empire in the event of a British loss, the Royal Navy being the guarantor of 
Portugal's colonies against a German takeover. 9 
4 
Of the six neutrals, Spain came closest to actually entering the struggle on 
the German side. But having been ravaged from 1936 to 1939 by its own Civil War, 
Francisco Franco correctly judged his country was in no condition to fight in the 
broader European war. Franco's one-man rule was diluted when he was forced 
into domestic political concessions to the two main competing forces in his 
victorious coalition, the traditional right-wing groups -the army, landowners, 
monarchists - and the Falange, the mix of nationalists and socialists that was far 
more radical than any of its Nationalist-coalition competitors. One of the primary 
reasons for Spain's susceptibility to pressure from the belligerents both at the 
outset and throughout the European war was the administrative chaos engendered 
by Franco's attempts to pacify both sides of his often incompetent governing 
coalition. 10 
Franco, who held unprecedented fourfold authority in Spain - as 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and as head of the state, of the 
government, and of the Falangist party - considered himself and Spain under 
obligation to both Hitler and Mussolini, the Axis leaders who had helped his 
Nationalists achieve victory by providing critical military materiel and air support. 
Though it is indisputable that Franco sympathized ideologically with the dictators, 
especially after Germany attacked the hated Soviet Union in June 1941, he was 
able to successfully play a cat-and-mouse game with them by assuring both Berlin 
and Rome of his loyalty and support and promising to "eventually" join the Axis in 
-g Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 4. 
10 Arnold Toynbee ed., The War and the Neutrals, "Survey of International 
Affairs 1939-1946", Oxford, 1946, 258. 
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battle. Instead, he kept Spain out oftheirwar. 11 As Spanish writer Victor Morales 
Lezcano summarized Spain's course: 
The changing position of Franco's government during World War II 
from strict neutrality to non-belligerency to vigilant neutrality ... was 
dictated by the perception of the development of the war and by the 
resulting necessity to adjust Spain's relations with the Axis and Allied 
powers. 12 
Switzerland has been the European state most generally identified with the 
practice of neutrality in its foreign relations. 13 Landlocked and {after June 1940) 
surrounded by Axis-controlled territory, Switzerland could nonetheless ill-afford to 
assume its neutrality would be respected during the Second World War. Forced by 
Realpolitikto oblige Hitler, especially in providing critical transit routes between 
Germany and Italy, the German dictator was nonetheless made aware that any 
attempt to occupy Switzerland would result in the Swiss destruction of the three 
Alpine tunnels, the Loetschberg, the Simplon and the St-Gotthard. The three 
transalpine rail tunnels were of enormous strategic importance to the Axis. After 
Italy's entry into the war in 1940, when the Royal Navy effectively shut off Italy's 
normal channels of sea commerce, nearly all of the traffic formerly carried by ship, 
especially coal, had to be sent through the Swiss tunnels. Raw material carried via 
Switzerland's railroads represented 10% of the traffic in the last prewar year; by 
1944, the same category of freight, led by coal, made up almost 90% of the total. 14 
TI It should be noted that the tactic of delay was urged on him during the 
period of heaviest German pressure on Spain, the summer and fall of 1940, by 
Portugal's Salazar, whom Franco openly admired. Ibid, 258. 
12 Victor Morales Lezcano, "Las Causas de la No Beligerencia Espanola, 
Reconsideradas", Revista de Estudios lnternacionales, May 3, 1984, 609-631. 
13 Christopher Hughes, Switzerland, London, 1975, 149. 
14 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 81. 
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If Spain was the neutral that came closest to allying militarily with the Axis, 
Sweden was the neutral which most narrowly avoided German occupation. Since 
1870, strict neutrality had been raised to the level of a Swedish national doctrine, 
but after World War I the Swedes decided to participate in the League of Nations. 
The rise of Hitler and the disintegration of the League in the 1930s led to the 
country in the summer of 1938 renouncing its obligations to participate in League 
sanctions, the single self-imposed condition Sweden allowed on its otherwise 
theoretical impartiality between British and German interests. Instead, Sweden 
turned in the direction of greater inter-Nordic diplomatic cooperation based on 
achieving and maintaining a common policy of neutrality. 15 
The Wehrmacht's Plan Weseruebung, the operation which in the spring of 
1940 resulted in the occupation of neutral Denmark and Norway, had also originally 
included Sweden. Because two Swedish commodities were vital to Germany 
maintaining its war-footing - ball bearings and high grade iron ore, both purchased 
by the Reich in large amounts during Hitler's military build-up in the 1930s -
Germany could not allow any interruption in their delivery from Sweden. Stockholm 
explicitly warned Berlin that invasion of its territory would result in the immediate 
destruction of its iron-ore processing facilities. 
A further Swedish consideration related to Norway's Atlantic coast, the only 
easy access to which was across Swedish territory. After its neighbor's fall to Nazi 
occupiers, Sweden would agree, in a storm of domestic and international criticism, 
to German transshipments to Narvik, resulting in the ability of the Wehrmachtto 
relatively securely maintain its forces in northern Norway. 
10 Loenroth, Erik, "Sweden's Ambiguous Neutrality", Scandinavian Journal 
of History, February 1977, 89-105. 
7 
The only British Commonwealth dominion not to militarily take up Britain's 
cause in World War II was Ireland. The fact that Ireland's six northeastern counties 
continued to comprise a part of the United Kingdom, a partition seen by Dublin as 
British occupation of the North, was the single most important moral justification in 
Irish prime minister Eamon de Valera's determination not to join Britain's war 
against the Axis. In 1938, the government of Neville Chamberlain, a prime minister 
genuinely anxious for good relations between Britain and Ireland, 16 in order to 
assuage Irish nationalism let lapse the treaty by which Britain leased naval bases in 
three Irish ports - the so-called Treaty Ports of Cobh, Lough Swilly and 
Bereshaven. (He called the 1938 return of the Irish ports an "act of faith." 17) 
Chamberlain assumed that in the event of war Dublin would re-lease them to 
Britain. The British military chiefs of staff concurred with Chamberlain's 
assessment that a British division would be required to hold each port if Ireland 
were actively hostile, and that Britain's forward Atlantic sea lanes could always be 
protected by the use of French instead of Irish ports. 18 
To de Valera, the ports represented a major concern: foreseeing that 
Europe was headed for war, he equally foresaw that Ireland would not be able to 
maintain its neutrality if Britain had use of the ports. Accordingly, when war began 
in September 1939, de Valera steadfastly refused to allow Britain's naval re-access 
to the ports, a decision which in light of the immediate German submarine threat in 
the North Atlantic meant a grave danger to shipping in England's southwestern 
approaches. (The northern - Clyde and Mersey - approaches were protected by 
16 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 232. 
17 Ibid, 234. 
18 In June 1940, Churchill estimated it would take ten days to move a division 
from England to Ireland. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War - Their 
Finest Hour, Boston, 1949, 172. 
~-
Ulster bases.) A proposal would be put forth from Whitehall in early 1941 for 
Ireland to lease the bases to the still non-belligerent but pro-British United States. 
But de Valera vetoed the plan as the breach of Irish neutrality it would have 
represented to Germany. The prime minister reasoned that if either Britain orthe 
United States were allowed into the ports, Germany would disregard Dublin's 
protestations of neutrality and regard the entire island as a belligerent. 19 
Furthermore, the former IRA leader believed that once Britain regained the ports' 
use, it might never again leave.20 Ironically, the fact of Irish partition became the 
chief protection of Ireland's neutral status from British interference: if Britain had 
had no Ulster bases from which to protect its shipping, a British occupation of 
Ireland might very well have been implemented. 21 
8 
The last of Europe's neutrals was Turkey, the diplomatic skills of its leaders 
representing the critical factor that kept that country out of the war. Turkey's 
sympathy to the German cause was based chiefly on their joint hatred of Russia, 
the Turk's most powerful traditional enemy. But the British naval presence in the 
Mediterranean was the stimulus which finally convinced Ankara to negotiate a 
middle way between the belligerent camps rather than actively join either's side. 22 
The Turkish capital became a jousting ground, with a succession of Allied envoys 
doing diplomatic battle with Germany's Franz von Papen, one of the Reich's most 
m John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, Oxford, 
1982, 242. 
20 Ibid, 235. 
21 Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems of 
Wartime Cooperation and Post-War Change 1939-1952, London, 1958, 65. 
22 Turkey's 1914-1918 debacle on the Central Powers' side was also vividly 
remembered by Turkey's aging leadership. 
effective envoys as its ambassador in Ankara.23 A tantalizing what-if regarding 
Turkey is that if Franco's Spain had joined the Axis, a closed western entry to the 
Mediterranean would have been the undoubted result. Thus much of the sting 
would have been taken out of Britain's Mediterranean fleet, perhaps enough to 
persuade Turkey to join Germany's fight against Russia in the summer of 1941.24 
9 
In addition to the fighting war, the belligerents waged an economic struggle, 
and as a result all six neutrals would be held hostage by a vitally important Allied 
weapon: the blockade. Though not directed against the neutrals themselves and 
their own economic needs, it was these countries which represented the largest 
potential holes in the economic barrier Britain and the United States built around 
the Reich and the territory it controlled; to minimize these leaks in the barrier was a 
major Allied effort in its relations with the neutrals. 
Germany did not give the same emphasis to economic warfare as did Britain 
and its allies, although it was able to successfully threaten Sweden with import 
allowances over the transit issue (see p. 75). In the early war years, the victorious 
Germans evidently saw little need to concern themselves with an attempt to 
completely blockade the neutrals' strategic trade. In the later years, Germany lost 
its ability to do so, and more pressing defense needs occupied its attention. 25 
The threat of near-total embargo designed to force a neutral to halt trade 
with Germany and Axis-controlled territory - theoretically if not always realistically 
~ Frank G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral - Great Britain and the Quest tor a 
Turkish Alliance in the Second World War, Columbia, Mo., 1979, 217. 
24 Hitler's concern that his armies should not seem weak to Turkey was one 
of the reasons he wouldn't ordinarily allow tactical military retreats when the tide 
turned against Germany in southern Russia; he continued to hope Turkey would 
come in on the side of the Axis. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The 
Undeclared War 1940-1941, New York, 1953, 112-ff. 
25 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 82-83. 
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within the power of the Allies - had always to be considered in the neutral capitals, 
and it was implicit in nearly all Allied diplomatic relations with these states; in the 
next chapter we'll see how Allied ability and willingness to cut petroleum to Spain 
would in 1943 and 1944 force Franco to finally halt Spain's tungsten exports to the 
Axis. Cordell Hull justified the years of Allied economic warfare in a April 1944 radio 
broadcast: 
In the two years following Pearl Harbor, while we were mustering our 
strength and helping to restore that of our Allies, our relations with 
these neutral nations and their attitude toward our enemies were 
conditioned by the position in which we found ourselves. We have 
constantly sought to keep before them what they, of course, knew -
that upon our victory hangs their very existence and freedom as 
independent nations ... we are not asking these neutral nations to 
expose themselves to certain destruction when we ask them not to 
prolong the war, with its consequences of suffering and death, by 
sending aid to the enemy.26 
A complete Allied blockade of the neutrals was never undertaken, the 
reasons essentially involving the retention of the moral high ground: extending 
rights of belligerency to such lengths was, in 1939, an alien concept. What was of 
perhaps more concrete concern was the realization that the neutrals' trade went 
two ways, with both the Axis and with the Allies, and if the Allies stopped imports 
from entering these countries, they couldn't very well expect to get exports out of 
them. Before December 1941 there was also the not unimportant issue of U.S. 
neutrality: if America's profitable trade with the belligerents had been grossly 
interfered with by Washington and London, American isolationists would have 
been handed an effective club with which to berate the Allied cause. 27 
At the outset of the war, before Germany's spectacular continental victories 
,~ in 1940, Britain negotiated import quotas called War Trade Agreements with Spain, 
"2S Cordell Hull quoted in Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 13-14. 
27 Ibid, 183. 
11 
Portugal, Switzerland, and Sweden;28 Turkey, considered an ally, was treated 
somewhat differently, and Ireland wasn't held to be a potential conduit of goods to 
Germany. These agreements29 set quotas based on each countries' own needs, 
measured against normal prewar net imports of each commodity;30 products not 
normally imported by the neutral state and from which Germany might benefit were 
totally restricted. Each neutral agreed not to re-export goods allowed through the 
blockade, but in 1941 and 1942, with German power at its zenith, the War Trade 
Agreements were often violated by the neutrals. Britain's military position, and thus 
its ground forces' ability to maintain any land blockade, was at a low point, so the 
neutrals - particularly the Iberian states - sold to Germany in exchange of much-
needed goods, especially weaponry, rather than to Britain which because of its 
own depleted stocks could offer only cash.31 
In the summer of 1940, Lisbon hedged coming to terms with Britain on a 
quota for its oil needs. The Portuguese refused to set a tonnage amount which 
satisfied the British Ministry of Economic Warfare that allowed imports would be 
used domestically and not re-exported to Germany or Italy, both of which countries 
Britain knew were willing to buy oil from Portugal for considerably more than 
Portugal had had to pay for it. In February 1941, after the Royal Navy instituted an 
embargo of oil into Portugal, Lisbon and London agreed to a figure of 78,000 tons 
~These treaties recalled similar agreements between Britain and Europe's 
neutrals during the 1914-1918 war. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, London, 
1952, vol. 1, 7. 
29 They were set by a coordinated agency; the attempt at scattered 
·~ ministries negotiating separate agreements in the First World War had been a 
failure. Ibid, 15. 
30 Turkey's quotas were not formally set, but listed by "informal" quotas. 
31 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 33-40. 
per month, an increase over the 50,000 it had earlier been receiving. Britain also 
extracted solemn assurances from Salazar that none would be re-exported.32 
12 
Portugal also suffered the misfortune of having her colonies' products 
subjected to Allied quotas. Angola and Mozambique produced far more than 
Portugal could use domestically, but unfortunately most of the goods concerned -
fruit and other food products - were perishable, and thus routinely rotted on the 
docks because shippers wouldn't run the risk of the destruction or seizure of their 
ships by Allied naval vessels on reaching European waters. 33 
The coercion used by the Allies to enforce their economic blockade against 
the neutrals lay in their navies, but rather than guns, the navicert was the navies' 
most potent weapon. Both Britain and the United States employed the system, the 
latter beginning to do so many months before its active belligerency began. The 
navicert worked as follows: if a given country wished to sell goods to a European 
neutral, such as Argentina selling meat to Spain, or Venezuela oil to Portugal, that 
country's agent would consult with the local British or American consul to 
determine whether such a consignment was within the ration preset by the Allies 
for the receiving nation. If it was, the consul would issue the navicert, allowing the 
goods to pass through the Allied naval blockade guarding the sea lanes to the 
neutral country; if it was not, no navicert was issued, and if the consignment were 
still sent it would be subject to seizure by the Allied navy. 
The navicert provided an assurance to the ship owners that their vessels 
and cargoes wouldn't be seized as contraband as long as the navicert conditions 
were adhered to, although the ships were often searched to make sure of such 
adherence. British and American shipping agents around the world were 
32 Hugh Kay, Salazar and Modern Portugal, New York, 1970, 173. 
33 /bid, 174-175. 
... 
purchased at enormously inflated prices by both the United States and Britain for 
the purpose of keeping it out of German hands in a campaign of preemption. 
14 
During this period of intense wolfram supply and price inflation, the two 
Iberian governments followed quite different policies regarding its mining and sale. 
Ever-cautious where Portugal's neutrality was concern, Salazar had as his primary 
concern the orderly disposal of his country's supplies. In consequence, he 
intensified controls on both production and price in an effort to both restrain the 
inevitable inflationary pressures attached to the bidding war between the 
belligerents and to protect Portugal against the threat of military takeover of its 
supplies by either side. Franco, who was less worried, limited neither production 
nor prices, seemingly unconcerned about the inflationary effects or security risks 
as long as the Spanish treasury was the prime beneficiary. Nor did he share 
Salazar's concern that either side would risk a hostile Spain by threatening the 
peninsula over this issue. 38 
Because of the enormous profits involved - Portuguese prices increased 
from $1100 a ton in 1940 to nearly $20,000 in 1941, despite Salazar's controls -
illegal production became the breeder of widespread corruption; mines nears the 
Spanish border simply smuggled portions of their production into Spain for the 
even greater profits that could be realized in the less-controlled Spanish market. 
The effect of Portuguese policies, which included the stipulation that all domestic 
producers channel their production through an official sales commissariat, was to 
thwart Allied preemption of the mineral, regardless of Salazar's perhaps well-
intentioned policy of even-handed protection of his country's economy. Germany 
was able to buy nearly as much Portuguese ore as it wanted to transport by train to 
steel manufacturers in the Reich, and thus represented the favored side in 
38 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 106. 
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Salazar's arrangement, a situation which continued into 1943. Despite Allied efforts 
to thwart Portuguese wolfram sales to the Reich, Portugal remained the larger of 
Germany's two Iberian suppliers until June 1944, when Salazar felt he was freer to 
submit to Allied demands to stop sales to Germany because of what he now 
regarded as the weakened German retaliatory threat to Portugal.39 
In Spain, the Allied preemption policy ran into a different set of problems. 
Because of increased domestic mining as well as the Portuguese smuggling of the 
ore into the country to take advantage of Spanish prices and to thwart Salazar's 
allocation rules, Spain by 1941 had greatly increased its wolfram mining.40 The 
major difficulty the Allies faced was obtaining Spanish pesetas with which to buy 
wolfram, a problem which led to the transference of significant amounts of British 
gold bullion into the Spanish treasury. 
Finally, after July 1943, Germany's financial capacity to pay Spain's inflated 
prices for the metal collapsed, and Franco now bowed to Allied demands to limit 
wolfram sales to Germany at the same time not having to worry too much about 
Germany's retaliatory capacity, German armies now on the retreat in both the 
Mediterranean and eastern Europe. This same realization on the Allies' part led to 
demands in November 1943 that Spain embargo al/wolfram to Germany, in return 
the United States promising to increase goods quotas allowed to pass through its 
naval blockade of Spain. 
Germany - still not quite out of the picture - demanded that Spain supply it 
with wolfram against the Civil War debt the latter owed, and which Franco agreed 
despite Allied pressure to resist. In retaliation, the Allies embargoed all petroleum 
into Spain, soon bringing the now virtually fuel-less country to its senses, 
39 Ibid, 107-108. 
40 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 91. 
,. 
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economically-speaking. Spain gave in to Allied demands in the spring of 1944. 
Since Germany no longer received Spanish wolfram, the U.S. and Britain were free 
to halt their Spanish purchases as well. 41 
The wolfram war ended. Germany was forced to reduce the tungsten 
percentage in even critical tool tips from the normal 10-18% to around 2-3%, which 
necessitated slowing machinery speeds by up to 75%; tungsten tools in other vital 
industries, such as coal mining, had to be foregone. There was also a near 
abandonment of tungsten carbide cores in anti-tank ammunition, a deficiency to 
which German military experts attached great significance. 42 The cessation of 
Iberian supplies also forced the Germans to make the ore, from whatever source, 
their principal cargo in running the general Allied embargo of Nazi Europe, at 
enormous danger to its suppliers and in lieu of other desperately needed imports 
those ships could have carried. 43 
41 The Anglo/U.S. victory came only a short time before Germany would 
have been physically unable to get any wolfram through France, which was about 
to fall to the Allies. Ibid, 92. 
42 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 203. 
43 Ibid, 115. At war's end, the Allies had bought 15000 tons of Iberian 





"There is no country in Europe 
which is so easy to overrun as Spain; 
there is no country which is 
more difficult to conquer." 
Lord Macauley 1 
Of the six neutrals in World War II, it was Spain, under the dictatorial 
leadership of Francisco Franco, that would have presented the gravest danger to 
the Allies had it joined the Axis. The Spanish position vis-a-vis the belligerents 
arose most directly out of its own just-concluded civil war, but a key to 
understanding Franco's Spain and its attitude toward the general European war 
was that the Nationalist victors of the civil war considered Russia - not Germany - to 
be the real enemy of the civilized world. Furthermore, they detested the liberalism 
of the Western Alliance, the social doctrine they believed was responsible for 
Spain's decline from its nineteenth century imperial power role. This latter issue 
was magnified by Franco into a sort of recipe for isolation in his belief that Britain, 
France and America would do their utmost to overthrow his regime, a belief borne 
out by the pariah status assigned Spain after the war by the victorious Allies. 2 
There is little question that Spain's foreign policy, as well as its goodwill, was 
oriented toward Germany and Italy in 1939. 3 Paradoxically though, perhaps the 
1 John Gunther, Inside Europe, New York, Harper & Bros., 1940, 213. 
2 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 260. 
3 Stanley G. Payne, The Franco Regime 1936-1975, Madison, 1987, 253. 
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least-recognized facet of Spain's relationship to the belligerents is the fact that the 
Allied cause owed Franco an enormous debt for keeping his nation out of direct 
partnership with Germany. It would have been a partnership giving Germany 
control of Gibraltar - one of Britain's vitally important control points in its sea 
blockade of goods bound for Axis countries as well as a key communications link 
with India and the Orient.4 British loss of the Mediterranean would have meant a 
very different scenario for the European war.5 
At the end of June 1940 German tanks had reached the border between 
France and Spain. Many in the British government thought the Germans had an 
open road to Gibraltar.6 Hitler and the OKW General Staff regarded Spain 
unambiguously in the logic of their military aims: by bringing the country into the 
war on the Axis side, they reasoned Franco would open his border to German 
infantry and armored columns and permit them to march toward Gibraltar -
Britain's last toehold on the continent and the utterly critical guarantor of its ability 
to keep the Mediterranean open to the Royal Navy.7 Once in Gibraltar, Hitler 
planned to move his armies across the Strait into Spanish Morocco, and to 
persuade Franco to cede to Germany one of its Canary islands to serve as as a U-
boat base. To remunerate Spain, Germany would hand over parts of French North 
Africa in compensation for both the island and for German occupation of the more 
strategically important Spanish Morocco. In its final political configuration, Spain 
4 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 29. 
5 Willard L. Beaulac, Franco - Silent Ally in World War II, Carbondale, 
1986, 7. 
6 Ibid, 1-3. 
7 Hitler reportedly was going to turn the bastion over to Spanish sovereignty 
once German troops had seized and secured it. Walter Ansel, Hitler and the 
Middle Sea, Durham, 1972, 41. 
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itself would be virtually a German dominion and northern and middle Africa were to 
come under permanent German suzerainty.8 
Franco's response in light of the Reich's overwhelming military capability 
was to delay partnership with Germany for the longest time possible. Having lost 
600,000 people, and with countless acres of productive land and its industrial 
capacity crippled as a result of the three-year-long civil war, Spain's dictator knew 
his country was in no position to enter the war on the Axis side as anything 
approaching equality with Germany - or even of the rank of its Italian junior partner-
to-be. Furthermore, if Spain were forced by unilateral German action to join the 
Axis (the threat of an outright hostile German invasion of a resisting Spain was by 
no means negligible in the summer of 19409), Franco wanted it delayed until the 
last possible moment in the hope that Spain might gain maximum advantages in 
terms of African spoils and run the least risk in terms of casualties and damage. To 
help in his delaying tactics, from the war's outset Franco provided Germany with 
valuable military assistance, from allowing German pilots to photograph Allied 
shipping from Iberian airliners, to agreeing to permit the Reich's naval (mostly 
submarine) and merchant vessels to use the Spanish ports of Santander, Vigo, 
and Cadiz and harbors in the Canary Islands for refueling and resupply. The latter 
were an especially important refueling point for this critically important arm of the 
German war machine in the period before Germany's "milch cow" method of 
resupplying submarines at sea was initiated in December 1941. 10 
Long before the German armies had reached the Spanish border, Franco 
was readying arguments against joining the Axis - a position he knew Hitler would 
8 Beaulac, Silent Ally, 2. 
9 Ibid, 2, 3-5. 
10 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 266-267. 
consider ungrateful in light of the assistance the Nazis had given Franco's rebel 
forces in overcoming Spain's Republican government. Franco wrote to Hitler in 
June 1940: 
At the moment when the German armies, under your leadership, are 
bringing the greatest battle in history to a victorious close, I would like 
to express to you my admiration and enthusiasm ... when your 
soldiers shared with us in [our] war against the same, although 
concealed, enemies ... [However] the great upheavals which Spain 
underwent in the three years of war, where to our losses and wear 
and tear were added the innumerable losses inflicted in Red territory, 
have put us in a difficult position .. .! do not need to assure you how 
great is my desire not to remain aloof from your cares and how great 
is my satisfaction in renderin~ to you at all times those services which 
you regard as most valuable. 1 
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In this wily prose, Franco's real purpose was to lay the case for staying out of the 
war. He believed that joining the conflict would merely constitute a continuation of 
Spain's own deeply wounding civil war, a struggle that had not only left the nation's 
economy in shreds but also its reputation ruined among the democracies because 
of the support the Nationalists accepted from Europe's two leading fascist states. 12 
In June 1940, Franco "assured" Germany of his willingness to join the Axis as a co-
belligerent, but set an unacceptable list of demands he knew couldn't be met: in 
addition to Gibraltar, he insisted French Morocco and the department of Oran in 
Algeria be transferred to Spain, Rio de Oro and Spanish Guinea be enlarged, and 
huge economic and military aid grants be given which Franco told Hitler were 
absolutely necessary before the exhausted Spain could think of joining the 
European war at Germany's side. 
It was at the famous meeting of October 26, 1940 at Hendaye, on the 
Atlantic border of France and Spain, that Hitler's grand strategy for Spain was 
n Unsigned memorandum, Francisco Franco to Adolf Hitler, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy, v. IX, 509-510. 
12 Antonio de Figueiredo, Portugal - 50 Years of Dictatorship, New York, 
1976, 100. 
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checkmated by Franco. One of the demands he insisted be met before bringing 
Spain into co-belligerency was the promise of extensive French African 
possessions, a demand which if agreed to and then discovered by Vichy officials in 
Africa would have almost certainly led to their abandonment of Petain's 
government in favor of the Free French. A German diplomatic memorandum 
stated that 
there was the danger that, if the French were explicitly told they would 
have to get out of certain African areas, the African possessions 
would perhaps desert France, even with the concurrence of the 
government of Vichy. 13 
It was a risk Franco correctly judged Hitler wouldn't take. 14 
From the summer of 1940 to the end of 1941 Franco was under 
considerable domestic pressure to bring Spain into the Axis as a co-belligerent. 
Not only was there a body of Falangists publicly calling for a Spanish declaration of 
war against Britain, but a minority of party members personally opposed to Franco 
was willing to join any cause designed to embarrass the Caudillo. 15 Another 
source of internal difficulties was the major Spanish newspapers - Arriba and Diario 
de Burgos were the most prominent - which caused Franco political 
embarrassment by calling for a union, forced if need be, with Portugal. Their 
editorials jingoistically wrote of the two countries' "sharing of the same soul."16 
These outbursts in important Spanish papers not only gave Portugal's Salazar 
problems, they clearly were aimed at the more even-handed Portuguese policy of 
13 Unsigned memorandum, Record of the Conversation Between the 
Fuehrer and the Caudillo, in the Fuehrer's Parlor Car, at the Hendaye Railroad 
Station on October 23, 1940, italics mine, DGFP, v. XI, 375. 
14 Walter Ansel, Hitler and the Middle Sea, Durham, 1972, 37-ff. 
15 Juan Pablo Fusi, Franco-A Biography, Cambridge, 1985, 45; Kay, 
Salazar, 156. 
16 Kay, Salazar, 156. 
urging non-intervention in the war on Franco, 17 the latter favoring a "Good 
Neighbor" policy not laced with the kind of Pan-lberianism that was highly 
unpopular in Portugal. 18 
22 
During the summer of 1940 Franco attempted to sway Salazar from genuine 
neutrality by getting him to sign a Hispano-Portuguese military pact that would 
have had the effect of turning Lisbon into a kind of satellite of Madrid. Salazar 
refused, agreeing merely to sign a treaty providing for "mutual consultation" 
between the two Iberian nations in case of any foreign threat to either. 19 The treaty, 
a Salazar success, was read by an irritated Berlin as a "fairly substantial" distancing 
of mutual Iberian policy from the interests of the Axis. 20 
The relationship between Spain and the Allies followed an often stormy 
course, specifically in its American dealings. The U.S. government shared Britain's 
goal of Spanish neutrality, and it became a major policy objective whose 
maintenance was monitored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and supervised by the 
State Department.21 The primary players in U.S./Spanish relations were, on the 
American side, Alexander Weddell, the first ambassador to the new Nationalist 
Spain from the United States, and the man who succeeded him in mid-1942, 
Carlton Hayes. 22 While serving in Madrid, they interacted chiefly with Spanish 
17 It speaks of Spain's internal political problems that Franco permitted the 
normally heavily-controlled Spanish press to publish stories inimical to what he 
obviously considered the country's best interests. 
18 Kay, Salazar, 156. 
19 Payne, Franco Regime, 269. Franco's proposed pact would have 
required Portugal to formally detach itself from its British alliance, which would have 
left it only Spain to look to for support. 
20 Kay, Salazar, 125. 
21 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 100-101. 
22 Crozier, Franco, 363. 
foreign ministers Juan Beigbeder (who was especially anxious to help preserve 
Spain's neutrality by linking the country with Portugal's neutrality policy23), and 
Ramon Serrano Sun er. The personalities of the two Spaniards determined to a 
large extent the course of Washington's relations with Spain. 24 
23 
Especially after the fall of France, the chief concern of Washington paralleled 
London's - that Franco would bring Spain into the war on the side of the Axis. 
Although still neutral, the United States had become all but a co-belligerent with 
Britain in the anti-German alliance, and the fear of an Axis strengthened by a 
Spanish partner, with the inevitable loss of Gibraltar coming from such a 
partnership, was President Roosevelt's primary consideration in initiating an 
unprecedentedly blunt diplomatic line with Franco's government. 25 
This dropping of normal diplomatic politesse came when Franco named as 
Foreign Minister his brother-in-law and head of the Spanish Falange, the strongly 
(many say notoriously) pro-Axis Ramon Serrano Sufier.26 Ambassador Weddell 
was instructed by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to inform Serrano Suner that if 
Spain sided with Germany against Britain, no additional U.S. humanitarian supplies 
would be sent, a situation which because of Spain's critically low food reserves the 
Spaniards knew would result in famine. The more conciliatory British position, 
forwarded by its ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare, was to accept Serrano Suner's 
assurances that Spain would remain a non-belligerent, although the Spanish 
~ J. W. D. Trythall, El Caudillo -A Political Biography of Franco, New York, 
1970, 164. 
24 Beaulac, Franco - Silent Ally, vii. 
25 Langer, Undeclared War, 61. 
26 James W. Cortada, ed., Spain in the 20th Century World - Essays on 
Spanish Diplomacy 1898-1978, Westwood, 1980, 65. Beaulac does give Serrano 
Sulier credit comparable to Franco's for diplomatically allaying Hitler's demands for 
a co-belligerent Spain. Beaulac, Franco - Silent Ally, 74-ff. 
24 
minister told Hoare that its relation to Germany was merely the same as the U.S.'s 
toward Britain, "except that Spain had nothing to give the Axis. "27 In any event, 
London urged Washington to resume relief shipments, which by mid-1940 had 
been nearly totally halted, reasoning that to allow Spain to succumb to widespread 
starvation might push Franco to the point of co-belligerency with Germany. In 
November 1940, Serrano Suner finally assured, and apparently convinced, 
Weddell that Spain would resist "to the last man" a forced German invasion should 
it come, and U.S. food shipments were resumed.28 
Spain was further enjoined in 1940 from going to war on the Axis side - when 
German victory seemed most inevitable - by the realization that Britain's power to 
retaliate, especially its naval power, was by no means yet negligible. A British 
capture of the Canary or Balearic islands was held by Madrid to be a likely British 
move in the event of Spain joining the Axis. Another may have been a landing on 
Spain's northern coast, where the British might try to join forces with locally strong 
Asturian communists. It was clear that the Royal Navy would totally embargo a 
belligerent Spain from all overseas supplies, and further that the United States 
would fully support Britain in such a move. 29 
One of the arguments put forward by Hitler to Franco in urging Spanish 
cooperation in an attack on Gibraltar was the reasoning that once Britain lost 
Gibraltar, Spain's Mediterranean coast would be safe from naval and economic 
warfare, and Spain would thus have only its Atlantic coast to contend with in the 
war with Britain. Hitler promised to protect this front with German dive bombers, 
z; Ibid, 83. 
28 Ibid, 83. 
29 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 271. 
which "experience has shown are more effective than heavy coastal batteries. "30 
Germany reasoned that once Britain lost Gibraltar, the former would attempt to 
transfer its power to the Canaries by seizing a naval base there, in which 
eventuality Germany further promised Spain support in thwarting such an 
attempt.31 
25 
In 1940, it was assumed that a Britain without Gibraltar would consider the 
Canaries, Spain's Atlantic island chain off the African coast, its best base from 
which to regain some control over the approaches to the western entrance to the 
Mediterranean.32 But Carlton Hayes, Weddell's successor as American 
ambassador in Madrid, actively tried to dissuade either the U.S. or Britain from 
seizing these islands, a move which the State Department informed Hayes was 
under active consideration but which Hayes believed would be counter-
productive. 33 In light of Hayes' warning that Franco could still be pushed into the 
Axis if the Allies threatened Spanish soil (which Franco - and Spanish law - held the 
Canaries to be), Roosevelt gave assurances to the Spanish dictator-34 that the Allies 
had no intention to occupy the Canaries, a possibility Franco still thought existed. 
Roosevelt now knew that there was little likelihood of Hitler being able to take 
Gibraltar without Spanish acquiescence. 35 
~Adolf Hitler to Francisco Franco, September 18, 1940, DGFP, v. IX, 107. 
31 Ibid, v. IX, 107. 
32 Beaulac, Franco, 8. 
33 Ibid, 164. 
34 C.J.H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, quoted in Payne, Franco 
Regime, 313. Notably such assurances would from now on emanate from 
Washington, not from London. 
35 Payne, Franco Regime, 313-314. 
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Early in the war Franco and Serrano Suner recognized that if Spain didn't 
join the Axis while Spain could still be of critical strategic importance to Hitler, it 
might not be able to profit from Europe's coming "New Order." Franco worried that 
to wait until Britain was occupied might be disastrous to Spain's future. Yet while 
the German economy was self-sufficient in the months between the fall of France 
and the invasion of the Soviet Union, Spain's economy was not - and actions by the 
still-powerful Royal Navy could devastate it.36 For the time being, and to Britain's 
advantage, Franco continued to prevaricate. The British ambassador in Madrid, 
Sir Samuel Hoare, described Franco in May 1941 as "the Brer Rabbit of dictators. 
He lies very low, often so low and so long that people think he is dead or asleep. "37 
Though Franco himself refused to give assurances to Roosevelt that Spain 
would absolutely remain neutral, he continued through 1941 to stress that his 
country was in no position to join the Axis as a co-belligerent. Despite the 
Caudillo's antipathy to the democracies, the American ambassador advised 
Washington that food shipments to Spain should continue - a course the U.S. 
government followed even in the face of large parts of the American public 
indignant at the notion of supplying a regime it regarded as having been brought to 
power on the wings of the Luftwaffe and which still publicly and vociferously 
supported the German side in the war. 38 
~Ibid, 270. 
37 Ibid, 270. 
38 The United States continued to be concerned about relatively minor 
matters as well: as late as July 1943, Ambassador Hayes was warning the Spanish 
Foreign Ministry "if the Spanish Government is unable to control. .. the pro-Axis 
[press], my Government will of necessity be compelled to re-examine its attitude 
towards Spain ... " Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, 1943, vol. ii, 
610. 
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After the U.S. entry into the war, the more significant - and generally the 
harshest - Allied influence exerted on Franco shifted from London to Washington. 
More and more the threat of withholding navicerts - compulsory after 1940 - came 
to represent the primary diplomatic threat to ensure Spanish non-belligerency.39 
There is no certainty that American supplies were the decisive factor in Franco's 
decision to stay out of the European conflict, but they must have to a considerable 
degree weighed in that decision. In 1940 Germany could not supply the necessary 
foodstuffs and fuel to Spain. 40 Franco told Hitler that in the absence of such 
supplies Spain could not fight a long war without risking disastrous famine and 
collapse of internal order. It is clear that the exigencies of Spain's domestic needs 
and the realities of Anglo-American economic power created a relationship 
between Spain and the United States that was, according to historians William 
Langer and Everett Gleason "an important contributory factor in keeping Spain 
from closer identification with the Axis."41 
By the last half of 1941, Franco had good reasons to feel vindicated in his 
caution in the matter of co-belligerency with the Axis. Though German successes 
remained seemingly spectacular, the Reich was far from a final victory over either 
the West or the Soviet Union. And Franco understood that Spain owed its escape 
from greater famine misery not to Hitler's Europe, but to overseas supplies allowed 
through the blockade. Furthermore, the Caudillo had his hands full at home as he 
continued to experience political problems that were beginning to put cracks in the 
~Ibid, 332. 
40 Among the demands Spain made of the Germans as a price for its co-
belligerency were 800,000 tons of petroleum products, 100,000 tons of cotton, 
25,000 tons of rubber, and 625,000 tons of fertilizers - not all of which the Germans 
would agree to supply and none of which they could supply immediately. 
Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 278. 
41 Langer, Undeclared War, p. 85. 
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foundations of his authority. They came from, on one side, the disaffected and 
disappointed monarchists who had since 1939 hoped for a royal restoration, and, 
on the other, from the over-powerful Falanga that believed Spain was "abandoning" 
the debt it owed Germany.42 
By late 1942 Franco himself was apparently coming to the conclusion that 
Germany was passing its military zenith,43 and thus his country would probably not 
have to honor the "promises" of co-belligerency that he had made to Hitler in 
1940.44 Allied concerns thereafter centered not so much on the issue of Spain itself 
actually joining the Axis, but on the strategic value of Spain's Canary Islands, as 
well as any possible Spanish interference with the North African landings, and, 
mostly for symbolic reasons, Franco's Blue Division then fighting alongside the 
Germans on the Russian front. 45 The Allies clearly made known to Franco their 
continuing lack of intention to occupy Spain, an occupation dismissed by U.S. and 
British war planners as an overly-costly expansion of the European conflict.46 
Probably the single greatest mistake of Franco's diplomacy was the failure 
to return to a position of genuine neutrality in 1942, after the American entry into the 
~Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 284. 
43 Undoubtedly because of the Wehrmacht's stall in Russia and the Allied 
landings in North Africa, although Franco still thought Germany could fight to a 
stalemate. Cortada, Spain, 70. 
44 It wasn't until May 1943, historians later learned, that Hitler entirely 
abandoned his plan to seize Gibraltar, with or without Spanish help. Ansel, Hitler, 
p. 378. Among Hitler's reasons for taking the decision - going against Doenitz's 
recommendation that Spain and Gibraltar could still be occupied and which was 
preferable to defending Sicily and Sardinia - was that Hitler judged it would be 
"impossible without Spain's consent...they are the only tough Latin people, and 
would carry on guerrilla warfare from the rear." Quoted from "Fuehrer 
Conferences" in Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 298. 
45 Cortada, Spain, 70. 
46 Ibid, 71. 
war. But Franco, in a "sophisticated but improbable piece of casuistry"47 viewed 
the war in Europe as two conflicts. One was between Germany and the Allies, in 
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which Spain was neutral (although until 1943 or 1944 he didn't think his 
authoritarian regime could survive a German defeat48). The other was between 
Russia (which was a Western ally, regardless of Franco's contorted thinking) and 
Germany, in which Spain was anything butneutral. A Russian victory in this war 
was, in the clear consensus of his biographers, regarded by the Caudillo as the 
deathknell of Christian Europe: after the three-year-long slaughter in which Spain 
finally and overwhelmingly defeated the Moscow-backed Republic, his and his 
party's hatred of communism and the Soviet Union was visceral. This had been 
one of the justifications for sending the Blue Division to Germany, although the 
Division was, according to Willard Beaulac, primarily intended as a relatively 
inexpensive gesture to demonstrate friendship to Hitler and thus keep at bay the 
possibility of actually having to join the Axis.49 Franco also reasoned Britain and 
the United States would look on the "gesture" as doing relatively little to harm their 
cause. Sent to the Russian front just six days after the German invasion, the 
Division consisted of 18,000 Spanish volunteers under the command of General 
Agust~ Muhoz Grandes. 50 (East German historian Otfried Dankelmann notes that 
the Blue Division was, however, offered before it was requested.51 ) Franco justified 
the Division in a speech to National Council (the wartime Cortes), characterizing it 
47 Fusi, Franco, 52. 
48 Cortada, Spain, 7 4. 
49 Beaulac, Silent Ally, 20. 
50 Many thousands of additional volunteers were turned down - Franco sent 
only the best because he didn't want the Legion to "dishonor" Spain. Ibid, 20. 
51 Otfried Dankelmann, "Zur Spanischen 'Nichtkriegfuehrung' in Zweiten 
Weltkrieg", Zeitschrift fuer Militaergeschichte, Halle, September 6, 1970, 683-692. 
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as a token payment for the "debt of blood" owed by Spain to its German and Italian 
"Axis comrades." The gesture unsurprisingly resulted in a furthering tightening of 
Allied military supplies to Spain.52 
According to Stanley G. Payne, long into the war Franco had little doubt as 
to whom the eventual victor would be: Payne writes that the Caudillo continued to 
be convinced of a German victory until mid-1944, although the depth of his faith 
had "slowly eroded. "53 After Hitler's Blitzkrieg against Western Europe in the spring 
and summer of 1940, Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano54 had put pressure on 
Serrano Suher to change the Spanish position from one of theoretical neutrality to 
"non-belligerency." Franco's agreement and subsequent protestation that Spain's 
policy remained essentially unchanged rang expectedly hollow to Allied ears. In 
fact, the character of Spanish-Axis relations over the next year and a half made it 
clear that Franco's sympathies lay unmistakably in an Axis victory over the Soviet 
Union - coupled with a stand-off between Germany and the Allies. 
The expansion of the European war into a world war in December 1941 was 
the event that allowed Franco to breathe easier in terms of German pressure on 
Spain to join in its war against Britain. Though Hitler continued for a while to talk 
about eventually taking Gibraltar and blocking the western end of the 
Mediterranean to the Royal Navy (an interest he never brought to his staff's plans 
to seize the Suez Canal and cut off access to the eastern Mediterranean), the 
52 Fusi, Franco, 52. 
53 Payne, Franco Regime, 267. In an interview with Ambassador Hayes on 
July 29, 1943, Franco spoke of Germany's "toughness" and the "excellent state of 
its morale" in response to the ambassador's warning that Hitler was "clearly" losing 
the war. FRUS, vii, 1943, 612. 
54 Franco felt closer to Italy than to the senior Axis partner, and Berlin thus 
judged it was especially susceptible to Italian pleas for demonstrable solidarity 
between Spain and the Axis. Ibid, 267. 
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vision evaporated with the first winter of the Russian War.55 When Hitler's single-
mindedness switched to the Russian campaign in June, followed with the American 
entry into the war in December, Iberia became a relative backwater. 
If Franco had returned to genuine neutrality in 1942 - recalled the Blue 
Division,56 halted sales of wolfram to both sides, given firm and verifiable 
assurances that imports would not be transshipped to Germany - Spain's post-war 
international position would have been greatly improved.57 Even his fear of not 
surviving an Allied victory was ironically misguided as a justification to tilt toward the 
Axis: Franco's delaying tactics so infuriated Hitler that he vowed to eventually "get 
even" with the Spanish dictator, a prospect that if Hitler had been in a position to 
implement wouldn't have boded well for the Caudillo in an Axis-dominated 
Europe. 58 Though his consolidation of power during the war years was vital to his 
state's ability to survive the external isolation following the war, a U.S./British front 
friendlier to Franco after the war would have served his corporate state far better.59 
55 In 1942 the Germans developed two contingency plans for occupying 
Spain, both with the purpose of preventing invasion of the peninsula by the Allies. 
Neither plan "Ilona" nor "Gisela" ever came close to fruition; the latter was replaced 
in 1943 by plan "Nuernberg", which represented only the German military defense 
of the Pyrenee frontier between Spain and occupied France. Unsigned, "Los 
Planes Militares de Hitler Sabre Espana en 1942-43", Ejercito, 1964, 37-40. 
56 In July 1943, Ambassador Hayes told Franco that although Spain's 
"repugnance to Russian communism" was "understandable", it appeared to the 
American government that it was only in 1941 that "the Spanish Government 
suddenly discovered that Russian communism was a great menace." FAUS, vol. ii, 
1943, 613. 
57 Ibid, 341. 
58 Hitler had nebulous plans to use the Blue Division and the J)panish 
Gastarbeiters in Germany, both groups under the command of Munoz Grandes, as 
a means to overthrow Franco after the war. Beaulac, Franco, 57. 
59 It should be noted that Franco expected the Roosevelt/Churchill team to 
control the postwar west; instead, he got the much less sympathetic 
Truman/ Attlee pairing. Either Truman and Attlee never seemed to understand the 
value to the West of Spain having remained neutral during the war, or domestic 
It is difficult today to make one's thinking about Franco's actions in World 
War II conform to the realities that Spain had to face during what was for it an 
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exceedingly dangerous period. Though Stanley Payne cogently argues that Spain 
was "relatively" neutral only during the early war years (1939 and 1940), when a 
German victory was still uncertain, and the late phase of the war (1944 and 1945), 
when it was no longer possible, and in between was an active supporter of Axis 
victory60, other observers who were in responsible positions in Spain -Willard L. 
Beaulac, 61 perhaps most convincingly - paint a far different picture, one in which 
Franco's overriding desire to keep out of the war, despite his public ideological 
utterances and concessions to Germany, redounded to the favor of the Allies. If 
this latter view is the one which Franco wanted to be remembered for after the war, 
his detractors in turn respond that had Hitler met his price in the summer or fall of 
1940, Franco would most certainly have taken up arms as an active Axis member. 
Payne writes that it was Hitler, not Franco, who made the decision that Spain would 
stay out of the war: the cost of Spanish participation wasn't worth the opposite cost 
of alienating Vichy France by depriving it of its African territory to pay Franco's 
price.62 
The results seem best to be weighed not by the ideological sympathy 
toward Hitler and Mussolini, but of the concrete results of Franco's policies in the 
Second World War. Had Spain joined the Axis as a full co-belligerent, Gibraltar 
would have, in all probability, been lost and the Mediterranean War would have 
political realities after 1945 wouldn't allow them to acknowledge this contribution. 
Ibid, 207-208. 
60 Payne, Franco, 339. 
61 Beaulac was from June 1941 to May 1944 U.S. Counsellor of Embassy 
and - intermittently- Charg~ d'Affaires in Madrid. 
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been immensely more difficult for the Allied cause, both before and after direct 
American participation in the conflict. The North African landings would have been 
infinitely more formidable with Spain serving as a giant German base from which 
the Luftwaffe would have resisted the Allied landings. Certainly an Allied victory in 
the European war would have been greatly prolonged, if it would have been 
possible at all. 
In a speech to the House of Commons on May 25, 1944, Churchill noted the 
effects of the Spanish policy - not of Franco's pro-Axis propaganda but of the 
reality and results of his actions: 
There is no doubt that if Spain had yielded to German blandishments 
and pressure ... our burden would have been much heavier. In the 
dark days of the war the attitude of the Spanish Government in not 
giving our enemies passage through Spain was extremely helpful to 
us. It was especially so at the time of the North African liberation ... ! 
must say I shall always consider a service was rendered ... by Spain 
not only to the United Kingdom and to the British Empire and 
Commonwealth, but to the cause of the United Nations.63 
63 quoted in Beaulac, Franco, 207. 
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"It always costs more to 
buy a man of principle." 
David L. Gordon, of Salazar64 
The principal issues in the relationship between the belligerents and 
Portugal during World War II were wolfram and the Azores; the major points of the 
first issue were discussed in the first chapter. The second will be a chief topic of 
this section. 
Dr. Antonio Salazar, who during World War II ran the Portuguese 
government with near-ironclad authority, saw the war primarily as a threat to 
Portugal and its colonial interests - the larger moral and political issues involved 
being, according to his biographers, entirely secondary.65 Just as none of the 
wartime neutrals was genuinely "neutral", so it was with Portugal; in, for example, 
its vitally important wolfram dealings with the Axis and the Allies, the former 
received fully 75% of the ore, the latter only 25% of the total production between 
1939 and 1945 - this despite loud and long protestations of even-handedness 
toward the opposing blocs.66 Numerous other signs of pro-Axis sentiment in 
Portugal could be seen: unequal censorship of German and Anglo-American 
propaganda, or the observation that many of the country's social institutions were 
openly modeled on the fascist pattern. Nonetheless, Salazar's state did make a far 
64 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 103. 
65 Figueiredo, Portugal, 93. 
66 Ironically, while Germany never had to repay the unpaid portion of the 
funds owed Portugal for the ore, Britain's war debt to Portugal - mostly for the 
wolfram, which was sold at the rate of 300 pounds sterling for 16,000 tons each 
year - was after the war used by Salazar to pay for the take-over of the British 
owned commercial interests in the Portuguese colonies; officially, however, Britain 
held that the money was well-spent in that it represented an important contribution 
to Britain's preemptive economic campaign against Germany. Ibid, 92-93. 
greater effort to achieve something approaching true neutrality than did Franco 
until late in the war.67 With serious and conflicting pressures from both sides, 
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Salazar engaged in a "six-year piece of tightrope diplomacy and relentless 
bargaining"68 that at times infuriated both sides but at war's end left Portugal intact -
and not nearly the international pariah that Franco's Spain had become. 
The history of Anglo-Portuguese relations was a major factor in creating this 
distinction between the two Iberian states. Though the English-Portuguese alliance 
went back six centuries, the Methuen Treaty of 1703 underlay the concrete 
economic basis of the relationship. This treaty ensured that Portugal would enjoy 
with Britain "a greater trading balance than any other country whatsoever", making 
their relationship a very much closer one at the outbreak of World War II than that 
between Britain and Spain.69 But foreseeing the coming European conflict, Salazar 
in the late 1930s attempted to bolster his country's position by broadening its 
friendships into a wider circle of potential allies - particularly Brazil and Spain - in 
case of a serious Axis threat to Portugal's independence of action.70 
At the outbreak of war in September 1939, Britain didn't try to use its special 
relationship to bring Portugal into active co-belligerency; in fact, Portugal's 
neutrality at the outbreak of war was considered an advantage by the British. Had 
Salazar entered the war against Germany, the British government foresaw the 
strong possibility of Lisbon provoking a German invasion, which would have in turn 
57 Ibid, 93. 
68 Kay, Portugal, 122. 
69 Figueiredo, Portugal, 94. 
7° Kay, Portugal, 121. Salazar also reached out for stronger contacts with 
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given Salazar the prerogative to invoke the Alliance provisions and force Britain to 
fight for Portugal's territorial integrity.71 
With war closing in, Salazar received a not-too-subtle suggestion from 
Franco that Portugal's position in the upcoming conflict should be one of neutrality 
- that it should avoid favoring the British side. The German Charge d' Affaires in 
Portugal cabled the Foreign Ministry in Berlin on August 25, 1939: 
I learn from a most reliable source that the Spanish ambassador [the 
Caudillo's brother, Nicolas Franco y Bahamonde] inquired of Minister 
President Salazar yesterday whether Portugal would remain neutral 
in a general conflict. Salazar gave him to understand that he would 
do everything to ensure that Portugal remains neutral, but did not 
give him any binding declaration. Thereupon Franco's Ambassador 
gave him to understand that Spain would be compelled to revise her 
policy towards Portugal, if Portugal did not maintain her neutrality.72 
As we've seen, some of the more extreme elements of the Falange advocated an 
Iberian union, with or without Portugal's compliance: the influential Diario de 
Burgos, published in the city that had been the Nationalist headquarters in the Civil 
War, ominously editorialized on November 15, 1939: "without the meddling of Great 
Britain, the union of Spain and Portugal would have been achieved because it is a 
geographical necessity. "73 
Five days later, on August 30, the same German official reported to Berlin 
that he was told by Salazar's ambassador to Madrid that he had instructions to 
inform the Spanish government that Portugal "would try to remain neutral as long 
as possible, but would probably not be able to withstand excessive British pressure 
71 When the threat of a German invasion of Portugal seemed imminent in 
1940, Britain suggested to Salazar that his army put up only a token resistance 
while moving the government to the Azores, and Salazar did begin strengthening 
his military garrison in those islands. Ibid, 152 and 161. 
72 DGFP, v. VII, 290. 
73 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 323. 
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in the long run, especially in view of her [Portugal's] colonies." The following day, 
Ribbentrop wired his legation in Lisbon that Germany was 
determined, should hostilities break out, to refrain from any 
aggressive act toward Portugal.. .and to respect Portuguese 
possession, if Portugal maintains an impeccable neutrality towards 
us in any future conflict. Only if this condition should, contrary to our 
expectation, not be fulfilled, would we naturally be compelled ... to 
protect our interests in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the 
situation then prevailing might dictate. 74 
It would, however, soon be Salazar who would be urging Franco to stay out 
of the conflict for Iberia's sake.75 Salazar announced on October 9, 1939 that 
Germany had offered through diplomatic channels to respect Portugal's neutrality, 
and furthermore that Great Britain did not wish to invoke any obligations under the 
historic Anglo-Portuguese alliance in respect of Portugal entering the war. Britain's 
position as conveyed by its ambassador in Lisbon stated that the country's 
neutrality was the best way to serve British and Portuguese national interests. The 
British envoy in Lisbon, Sir Walford Selby, reported to London that he believed that 
"Salazar was fundamentally loyal to the Alliance", and that he "would answer the 
call to [co-belligerency with Britain] if it were made on the grounds of dire 
necessity. "76 
Even though Salazar held that Germany represented a bastion against 
communism, hatred for which he felt fully as strongly as Franco, the evidence is 
that the Portuguese government and people essentially supported the the Allied 
side, fearing that a British loss in the war would result in a Germanification of 
Europe and a consequent loss of Iberia's independence. 77 Nevertheless, Germans 
74 DGFP, v. VII, 441. 
75 Ibid, v. VII, 474. 
76 Kay, Salazar, 123. 
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in Portugal very successfully impressed the Portuguese upper classes as well as 
the organized youth movement with the Nazi point of view: though not necessarily 
embracing Hitler's methods, Portugal's upper social strata favorably compared 
Germany's orderly society and strong economy with the memory of poverty and 
social discord from which Salazar was slowly bringing the country.78 
In a sense, Portugal was at war's outbreak tied to Britain because of its 
colonial empire and their trade and investment relationship. Throughout the 
nineteenth century, British naval power had protected most of Portugal's overseas 
possessions from foreign encroachment, which had been the primary reason for 
Portugal entering the First World War on the Allied side. Many of its colonies were 
in close physical proximity to substantially stronger British possessions and nearly 
all were strategically important to Britain's war effort - and there was an implied 
British threat if they remained off-limits in that effort.79 
Salazar had had reason to mistrust British intentions in the late thirties, when 
leading members of the Chamberlain government had proposed a plan giving 
Germany economic rights and possibly even "living space" carved out of 
Portuguese Angola and the Belgian Congo, a proposal that was, of course, 
shelved after September 1939.80 But with the onset of war the Portuguese dictator 
believed a British loss would still likely mean a German takeover of its African 
possessions and thus the end of the enormous financial advantages its African 
empire brought home. If he voluntarily allied Portugal with Spain in military 
78 Ibid, 128. 
79 During World War II Portugal would lose one of its overseas colonial 
possessions, not to the British but to the Japanese. Portuguese Timar, an island in 
the Lesser Sundas in the Malay archipelago, which it shared with the Netherlands, 
was occupied by the Japanese army in February 1942. Ibid, 165. 
80 Tom G. Gallagher, Portugal -A Twentieth Century Interpretation, 
Manchester, 1983, 102. 
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partnership with Germany in the hope of finessing Hitler into letting Portugal's 
African possessions remain Portuguese, the result would have been, in Salazar's 
judgment, an eventual British invasion of Iberia and the collapse of his regime. 81 It 
was from this quandary that Salazar urged Franco to remain neutral. Though the 
precise effect of Salazar's advice to Franco is disputed among historians, it should 
be noted that when Franco had the least reason to deny Hitler's pleas that Spain 
militarily join the Reich in the summer and fall of 1940, the Spanish dictator, then 
coming under Salazar's most insistent protestations against belligerency, kept his 
country neutral. 
Though it would be an over-simplification to credit Salazar's influence alone 
for keeping Franco neutral, 82 substantial credit in this regard should nonetheless 
be given the Portuguese leader. The assurances of Iberian military solidarity 
Salazar proffered Franco, and the link Portugal represented between Spain and the 
Allies, also would help allay Franco's fears of Spain being used by the Allies as a 
site for future European landings: the promise that Salazar made of neutrality went 
a long way in 1940 and 1941 toward relieving Franco of fears of an Allied invasion 
of Iberia, one Franco thought would be directed primarily at Spain even though it 
might have involved an initial landing in Portugal. 83 
Unknown to the Portuguese, the British or the Americans, Germany had 
decided in late 1940 to indefinitely postpone its naval plans to seize the Azores, the 
most strategically important of Portugal's possessions. 84 Hitler judged that such a 
Bi Figueiredo, Portugal, 97. 
82 In 1942 the British ambassador in Lisbon made clear his own view that the 
greatest service the Portuguese could render the Allies was "if Salazar can keep 
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naval operation would draw-off an unacceptably large portion of his naval forces 
then engaged in destroying merchant shipping supplying Britain, and ordered the 
cessation of plans to occupy the islands. 85 But as late as May 1941, Hitler was 
apparently still hazily looking forward to eventually gaining a long-range bomber 
base in the Azores, saying as much to Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who 
responded with the same advice as that tendered at all earlier mentions of the 
subject - that at no foreseeable date could the German navy militarily hold the 
islands or keep them adequately supplied.86 
Germany did, however, develop a plan outlining a response to a British 
invasion of Iberia. 87 A May 1941 directive to the Army High Command from 
General Franz Halder noted that in the event of the German army being "tied down 
in the eastern theater of war in the summer of 1941" that it should 
not be excluded that England ... will try ... to create for herself a new 
continental position on the Iberian peninsula, with the aim of 
preventing Spain from joining the Axis Powers, compensating for the 
loss of prestige she has suffered, and offering the U.S.A. promising 
conditions for her entry into the war ... A landing in the Portuguese 
ports is to be expected primarily rather than in the ports of northern 
Spain. Portugal will resign herself, under protest, to an English 
landing.88 
The directive went on to outline in Operation Isabella the means by which the 
Wehrmachtwould respond by driving out the British force. 
Portugal's neutrality, already more nearly total than any of the other 
neutrals, 89 was important and useful to both sides, and thus restrained the 
~ Figueiredo, Portugal, 97. 
86 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 330. 
87 Stanley Payne has written that just as Germany had no concrete plans for 
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opposing belligerents in whatever occupation plans they had for Portugal or its 
colonies. If Portugal had become absolutely vital to one side or the other, the 
probability is that it would have been invaded. But the fact that both sides were free 
to come and go in wartime Portugal made it extraordinarily useful as an entry point 
for Europe, with, for example, the Lisbon-based Pan American Clipper flights 
serving both the Allies and the Axis - ironically, many believed, in equal measure.00 
Lisbon was also between 1940 and 1945 one of the world's major financial 
markets, its money black market an undeniable asset to both sides. 91 
Furthermore, Portugal's capital became the Red Cross' chief European distribution 
port. Less measurable perhaps but still noteworthy is the fact that the city and its 
outskirts represented Europe's brightest and most normal urban landscape: 
To travellers from countries at war, Portugal seemed an incredible 
oasis of peace and prosperity: no blackout, no ration cards till [late] 
in the war; shops full of food and luxuries, for those who could afford 
to buy them; hotels full of wealthy refugees killing time till they could 
get a place in the Pan-American Clipper; a skulking Rlace for spies 
(real, or more often fancied) of all the nations at war.92 
Salazar strongly continued to believe his country's only chance to come out 
of the European conflict unweakened and undamaged was to achieve and 
maintain complete neutrality,93 and just as strongly held that Portugal's future was 
inextricably tied to that of Spain: if Spain either joined the Axis, or was invaded by 
either belligerent side, Portugal would perforce be swept into the fray regardless of 
00 The Germans were notably able to infiltrate and exfiltrate their Britain-
based espionage agents via the Pan Am Clipper and the other international airlines 
that continued to serve Lisbon. Fodor, The Neutrals, 88. 
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the correctness of its behavior as a neutral. 94 Even after 1941, Salazar continued 
to hold that it would be an easy leap for Germany to move into Portugal with the 
rest of a Nazi-occupied Iberia. And a German-dominated Iberian Atlantic coastline 
was known to have been coveted by the German navy, though Hitler is reported to 
have always shown more interest in the Portuguese Atlantic island possessions 
than he did in the Portuguese mainland. 95 As a cornerstone of Portugal's foreign 
policy designed to keep Spain neutral, he continued unabated through 1944 to 
counsel patience to Franco. 96 But Salazar always recognized Franco's underlying 
fear - both dictators well knew what it would mean to their regimes if communism or 
communist-supported regimes were established in Iberia as a result of a German 
loss of the war. Salazar could neither understand Britain's moral antipathy to 
Franco's Spain - even in light of its membership in the Anti-Comintern Pact - nor the 
British failure to see that country as a barrier to such a political future for all of 
Europe.97 
Portugal might have had its own version of Spain's Blue Division fighting 
alongside the Wehrmachtin Russia if a proposal German Ambassador Huene 
made to Salazar had come to fruition. In a telegram dated July 2, 1941, Huene 
reported to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that 
in the course of today's conversation with Salazar the talk turned to 
the establishment of a corps of Spanish volunteers to fight 
Bolshevism [the Blue Division was at the time being organized in 
Spain] and to the question of carrying out a similar demonstration in 
Portugal. I informed Salazar that we received daily applications from 
Portuguese to be taken into the German army ... Salazar explained 
"g;f Fodor, The Neutrals, 78-79, 86. 
95 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 328. 
96 Kay, Salazar, 155-ff. 
97 Ibid, 124. 
that...in Spain it was somewhat different...that Spain had a debt of 
gratitude to pay for the help in the Civil War.98 
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Salazar managed to disengage himself thus, and said he would "perhaps" organize 
a "Portuguese Legion" demonstration on behalf of the German fight on the Russian 
front. Huene's response was that even this gesture would find a "strong response 
not only in Germany but all over the world." The subject was apparently dropped, 
except when it was raised one more time by Huene in October, which met with 
Salazar responding only that he hoped Huene didn't want an immediate reply. 
Nothing further came of the idea of Portuguese volunteers fighting Germany's 
fight.99 
Portugal's relationship to the United States between 1939 and 1945 was 
much less stressful than Spain's - though because of the strategic political 
considerations involving its Atlantic island possessions, the Portuguese professed 
to fear the Allies' intentions concerning the islands nearly as much as they did 
those of Germany. The Salazar government was held by Western opinion to be far 
less odious than that of Franco, not because it was any kind of a model Western-
style democracy but because it had neither been helped into power by Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy nor had it emanated from a military coup. But both 
before and after its entry into the war, the U.S./Portuguese relationship centered 
particularly on the inflammatory issue of the Azores, the islands whose whose 
utilization as an anti-submarine facility the British considered especially critical. 
Before December 1941, President Roosevelt constantly brought diplomatic 
pressure on Salazar to lease one of the islands to Britain, and even threatened, 
98 DGFP, v. XIII, 69-70. The telegram doesn't say which man broached the 
topic, but from the turn of the conversation it appears the German was the 
instigator. 
99 Ibid, 70. 
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through Cordell Hull to Portugal's Ambassador Bianchi in Washington, American 
occupation if Germany were seen to make any moves in their direction. 100 
In May 1941, Senator Claude Pepper gave a speech in the Senate 
advocating American occupation of the Azores on the basis that Hitler was known 
to regard them as a useful base from which Germany could launch air strikes 
against New York with an as-yet undeveloped long-range bomber. 101 Portugal 
was, understandably, indignant over Pepper's speech, and a series of notes from 
Lisbon to Washington was immediately initiated in which Portuguese neutrality for 
all Portuguese soil was emphasized. In spite of the fact that Roosevelt declared the 
Azores to be a part of the western hemisphere and thus under the protection of the 
Monroe Doctrine, thereby "justifying" a preemptive occupation to safeguard 
America from air attack, Hull was nonetheless authorized to assure Salazar that 
Portuguese sovereignty would not be infringed. The assurance evidently was 
given on the grounds that good relations with this useful neutral were more 
important than preempting an unlikely German occupation attempt on the 
islands. 102 
It was in July 1941 that the Germans apparently decided that a unilateral 
American intervention in the war - taking the Azores - was not in the United States' 
interests. In a telegram dated July 20, 1941, the German charg~ in Washington 
wired the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that 
according to all indications President Roosevelt has postponed for 
the moment his intention to occupy the the Azores .... This change in 
the President's opinion certainly was decisively influenced ... by 
"fO() Kay, Salazar, 161 . 
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102 The State Department had correctly judged German naval power 
inadequate to even try to capture the islands - a judgment later borne out by 
German naval records. Kay, Salazar, 163. 
reports which were heeded here regarding a strengthening of the 
Portuguese garrisons on the Azores. 103 
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After the fall of France in June 1940, when war appeared perilously close for the 
Iberian peninsula, Salazar had ordered the strengthening of the Portuguese army 
from 40,000 men to 80,000 men, in addition to new colonial manpower levies, most 
of which increases were sent to the vulnerable Atlantic islands. 104 Though at the 
time of Pepper's speech the American army's offensive combat strength was 
"negligible", an assessment General George Marshall conveyed to Roosevelt when 
a move against the Azores was still being officially considered, there is no evidence 
that "strengthened Portuguese garrisons" would actually have held off an American 
occupation if Roosevelt decided that essential U.S. security interests demanded 
it.105 
Later evidence, a German document, seems to question the interpretation: 
a German Political Office interoffice memorandum dated September 30, 1941, and 
based on reports from the Luftwaffe Attach~ in Lisbon, reported that 
the task of the Portuguese armed forces (which it [Portugal] no 
longer intends to strengthen to any substantial degree) was, first of 
all, to protect the islands and colonies until a greater military power 
could come to the aid of Portugal. The troops on the Atlantic islands 
could hold the islands from 3 to 4 days against the attack of a major 
power. Portugal intended to maintain strict neutrality. In case of an 
attempt to land by English or American troops she would call on 
Germany for help. In case of an invasion by Germaw or Spain on 
the other hand she would call on England for help. 1 
Til3' He added that "a further reason for Roosevelt's hesitation to push further 
into the Atlantic lies in the momentary lack of clarity about Japan's next steps." 
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In February 1942, Franco warned Salazar that he had information that the British 
were going to try to overthrow him in preparation for occupying the Atlantic islands; 
the Caudillo promised Salazar Spanish help in such an event, subject only to 
reciprocity from Portugal should Spain be attacked. Salazar reportedly didn't 
believe such were Britain's intentions.107 
Though Iberia itself began to recede in importance after the United States 
entered the war, the Azores did not. Allied shipping was still subject to devastating 
losses from submarines in the Atlantic, and the limited-range aircraft of the time 
were not able to attack the German submarines effectively from available 
continental bases. Not only would a more southerly, and thus presumably safer, 
shipping route be opened to the Allies, but naval escorts would have a refueling 
station and the aircraft from the islands would be an effective weapon against the 
U-boat threat to the convoys. 108 So where U.S. diplomatic efforts failed, the British 
decided to go forward - by asking rather than demanding, and in very polite 
diplomatic language, that Portugal cede to the Allies an Azore base. 109 
As long as substantive danger of a German invasion had hung over Salazar, 
he had hesitated to compromise Portuguese neutrality. But after the Torch 
landings and Iberia's apparent safety from future German attack, in August 1943 he 
finally gave in, not to the importunate Americans, but to the British. Salazar justified 
this obviously huge hole in Portugal's neutrality policy by invoking its ancient treaty 
obligations to Britain. Nonetheless the United States continued to threaten to take 
the Azores by force while these negotiations with Britain inched forward, the U.S. 
'f07 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 328. 
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ambassador archly informing the Portuguese foreign minister that "small nations 
depend on an Allied victory [too]."110 
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The German reaction to this reversal in Portuguese policy was noted 
succinctly by Goebbels in a diary entry: "Unfortunately [Salazar] has lost faith in us 
to some extent." For good measure, he added that "the same is true of Franco. 
The dictators would do far better if they openly took sides with us, for if our side 
does not win, they are lost anyway."111 In hindsight, Goebbels' prediction was 
erroneous, but in light of the attitudes that operated in both Iberian states even as 
late as 1943, it was assumed that if Germany did lose the war, both Iberian 
dictators would also fall. 
German Foreign Office records indicate that on May 14, 1943 Hitler finally 
decided that any kind of an Iberian invasion for the purpose of taking Gibraltar was 
no longer possible. The German dictator understood by this time that Franco 
would not enter the war at his side, his Spanish counterpart judging (correctly) that 
German military forces, while still lethal, were now simply too much consumed in 
the Russian war to be able to field a force capable of breaking through Spain or 
Portugal against the combined opposition of those countries' governments. Both 
Portugal and the Allies evidently came to the same conclusion at around the same 
time, and the realization in Lisbon that Germany no longer presented an 
overwhelming danger to Portugal was what caused Salazar to acquiesce to Allied 
demands regarding the Azores. Though he insisted that Portugal remained legally 
neutral, the move signaled the real end to all significant Portuguese concessions to 
rn Ibid, 168. 
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German war aims except that Portuguese wolfram would continue to go to 
Germany for another year. 112 
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The Royal Navy arrived in the Azores in October 1943. Immediately the 
American ambassador in Lisbon demanded that the United States be allowed to 
station a 10,000 man garrison on the islands. (For the time, the demand was 
ignored.) Britain had promised not only the maintenance of Portuguese 
sovereignty in the islands, but that it would remove its personnel at war's end. It 
also promised to come immediately to Portugal's military rescue if Germany should 
invade mainland Portugal because of this breach in Portuguese neutrality. The 
British further vowed, somewhat disingenuously, that this granting of Azores 
facilities in no way decreased its respect for Portugal's neutrality "on the European 
mainland." In payment for the bases, Britain supplied Portugal with war materiel 
worth 15 million pounds sterling, meant to substantially increase Portugal's 
defensive military capabilities. In the end, Germany took no retaliation on Portugal 
over the Azores.113 
For somewhat longer, Salazar maintained that he could not give the United 
States what he had given Britain only because of treaty obligations.114 Finally, 
Salazar gave in, but only on the condition that the Americans operate as an arm of 
the British force, and that American aircraft be marked with both U.S. and British 
insignia. As of July 1944, American naval squadrons were finally based in the 
Azores. 115 
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The granting of the Azores facilities to the Allies did much to assuage U.S. 
indignity over the continued sale of Portuguese wolfram to Germany. This last 
attempt at even-handedness Salazar felt was necessary to forestall German 
bombings of Portuguese cities: after the agreement with Britain over the islands, 
the Portuguese nervously awaited Luftwaffe bombers for several weeks. 116 
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The political effects of the Second World War on Portugal were similar to 
those experienced by Spain, in that the Salazar regime was required in the post-
war world to discard some of its less acceptable features of its authoritarian regime 
- less acceptable by the standards of the western democracies - and replace them 
with at least some of democratic standards of the states which, on the non-Soviet 
side of the Grand Alliance, won the war. Although the changes were perhaps more 
cosmetic than substantive - fascist salutes became less conspicuous, Salazar 
replaced his desk photograph of Mussolini with one of the British monarch, and he 
declared his state not "corporate" but "corporative", the latter distinction a fine 
one 117 - the result for Portugal was a step toward greater pragmatism and fewer of 
the repressive policies that had marked Salazar's pre-war domestic politics. 
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SWITZERLAND 
"Of all the neutrals, Switzerland 
has the greatest right to distinction." 
Winston Churchill118 
Since 1815, 119 Switzerland's foreign policy had been grounded on one 
unshakable rock: neutrality - which meant keeping out of other countries' wars, 
expecting other countries to stay out of its affairs, and treating all other nations 
theoretically evenly. When they joined the League of Nations in 1920, the Swiss 
abandoned their centuries-old policy of absolute neutrality in favor of one of 
"conditional neutrality", i.e. that under limited circumstances they would participate 
in coercive, but non-military, measures to thwart a breaker of the League's 
covenant. 120 But after the failure of the League, and seeing the road to war being 
taken by the Powers, Switzerland renounced this policy when it decided in October 
1938 to revert to absolute neutrality to relieve itself of any lingering legal obligation 
to enforce sanctions. 121 In light of its renewed scrupulous neutrality, in the summer 
of 1939 the Swiss government accordingly ceased any official public utterances 
designed to influence the about-to-be belligerents from altering their policies. 
Bern's fear was that any such course of action might be interpreted as taking sides 
as Europe's states moved along an inevitable path to war. 122 
m Fodor, The Neutrals, 46. 
119 This date is arbitrary; the Swiss Diet first declared neutrality in 1674; 
Switzerland "withdrew" from Europe's wars after the defeat at Marigno in 1515. 
Christopher Hughes, Switzerland, London, 1975, 149. 
120 Ibid, 150. 
121 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 200. 
122 Heinz K. Meier, Friendship Under Stress - U.S.jSwiss Relations 1900-
1950, Bern, 1970, 251. Fervently defended in the person of Guiseppe Motta, both 
a federal councillor and Switzerland's leading diplomat from 1920 until his death in 
1940, neutrality became the undisputed national ideal; it was Motta who convinced 
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Berlin viewed this policy as a deliberate rebuff by the Swiss, Germany being 
the racial and linguistic wellspring of over two thirds of Switzerland's people, as well 
as its largest trading partner. 123 It should be understood, however, that this Swiss 
posture of even-handedness came not from strong federal leadership, but was 
born of a deep-seated hatred for Nazi methods and ideology, a hatred loudly 
expressed by a substantial majority of the Swiss people in their unique and (in 
1939) still almost personal democracy. The nation's journalists (particularly those 
of the German-language press) and intellectuals, and, especially, the officer corps 
of the Swiss army were the chief guarantors that Switzerland would not gravitate 
toward National Socialism but instead continue to embrace the nation's "historic 
II 
values of independence, moderation and self-reliance. 124 
A primary factor determining Switzerland's relationship with as well as official 
attitudes toward the belligerents in World War II was the nation's absence of 
economic self-sufficiency.125 Legislative and administrative measures enacted in 
the late 1930s helped to alleviate difficulties arising out of the country's lack of 
needed materials, including the lack of sufficient domestic raw materials to keep 
open factories that needed them, the almost complete lack of significant oil 
reserves, and insufficient domestic food resources. But precautionary measures 
the League to release Switzerland from any policing obligations under its 
Covenant. George Soloveytchik, Switzerland in Perspective, London, 1954, 246. 
123 During the late 1930s Germany accounted for nearly twice the annual 
value of both imports from Germany to Switzerland and exports from Switzerland to 
Germany as Switzerland's second largest trading partner, France. J. Murray Luck, 
History of Switzerland, Palo Alto, 1985, 804-805. 
124 Alice Meyer, Anpassung oder Widerstand. Der Schweiz zur Zeit des 
deutschen Nationalsozialismus, in Friendship, Meier, 251. 
125 This was, of course, a factor in determining the attitude of each of the 
neutrals toward the belligerents. In Switzerland's case, however, it contravenes 
popular beliefs which at the time of the war and since have inaccurately held 
Switzerland to be self-sufficient, or nearly so. Ibid, 263-ff. 
alone were not enough to solve the problems that the economy faced once 
surrounded by a continent at war. With no sea coast of their own from which to 
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export or import materials, the Swiss were forced to depend on potentially hostile 
neighbors for shipment facilities. 126 
In the early stages of the war, before the German attack through the Low 
Countries in May 1940, the Swiss were also concerned, justifiably and seriously, 
about both sides dragging the Confederation into the war by outflanking the 
fortifications on the Franco-German frontier127 and invading each other through 
Swiss territory, especially via the Belfort hinge in France. 128 All these factors 
determined Switzerland's behavior at the outset of war, behavior that would prove 
to be far from neutral or even-handed but which allowed the Swiss economy to 
keep from either collapsing or reverting to a kind of agrarianism for which the 
majority of the highly industrialized Swiss population would have been ill-prepared 
to participate.129 
Before European hostilities broke out in September 1939, there was some 
fear, particularly in American intellectual circles, that Switzerland, which had 
seemingly overreacted to the Comintern threat at the time of the Spanish Civil War 
by partially outlawing the Communist party, would come under Nazi influence by 
permitting some kind of semi-Anschluss with Germany.130 It was out of the Swiss 
government's wish not to offend Berlin or Rome that these foreign fears emanated, 
~Meier, Friendship, 258. 
127 Fodor, The Neutrals, 49. The attack the Germans had indeed planned to 
go through Switzerland was called Tannenbaum; the end run around the Maginot 
Line's northern wing through Belgium obviated its need. 
128 Life, September 25, 1939, 32. 
129 Meier, Friendship, 258. 
130 Ibid, 272-tf. 
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and the government's efforts not to upset the Nazi colossus to its north was seen in 
more sympathetic circles as understandable Realpolitik. Nonetheless, during the 
war Switzerland continued to come under severe press criticism in the West for 
what was perceived as unseemly licking of German boots. 131 
In fact, the concerns in much of the West about the Swiss people's 
psychological incapacity to withstand the German siren appear to have been 
greatly exaggerated. The overwhelming majority of the Swiss rejected German 
demands for either union or Nazification of its institutions, despite government 
concessions to Germany regarding such matters as the importation of Nazi 
propaganda material or even the larger issue of stopping criticism of Germany in 
Switzerland's press. Heinz Meier wrote that in order to survive the ordeal of 
1939/1945, Switzerland 
hadto trade with Germany, had to black out its cities, made it difficult 
for refugees to enter the country, 132 lived under a constant threat of 
invasion, and had to submit to severe restrictions in the consumption 
of food, manufactures of all kinds, and gasoline 
in placating its "snarling enemies", yet the country "remained true to itself."133 
It is generally conceded today that had Germany wanted to occupy 
Switzerland in World War II, it could have done so - but at a huge price. Wringing 
that high price out of Germany was, as the Swiss government and people realized, 
the factor most responsible for its independence and neutrality. Following World 
m Ibid, 266. 
132 Switzerland's wartime behavior has been most severely criticized in 
regard to refugees, especially Jews, fleeing the Nazis. The number of refugees 
who found asylum in Switzerland between 1933 and 1945 - estimated at 300,000-
was pathetically small in proportion to the need, but the Swiss defended their 
actions (actions which met with approval by the majority of the Swiss people) as 
necessary to preserve the country from being swamped and thus threatening the 
"character of [its] insular society." Fodor, The Neutrals, 59. 
133 Ibid, 269. 
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War I, Switzerland had, like most pacific-oriented states, largely ignored military 
defense. But after Hitler came to power in 1933, the Federal Council, sensing the 
new danger from its powerful neighbor, began to undertake a limited military build-
up, albeit one engendering the criticism of Swiss socialists and the country's other 
left-wing political groups. In 1936, more substantive re-arming began, with new 
fortifications built on the northern and northeastern frontiers and in the strategic 
Alpine chokepoints. Two years later, following the Munich crisis, all tunnels, roads 
and bridges near the nation's borders were mined and put under permanent 
guard, 134 the government understanding that scrupulous neutrality was tied to the 
counterweight of an active and vigilant military back-up. 135 
The cornerstone of Switzerland's security was its army. Swiss military 
training was the most rigorous of any of the six European neutrals. Under the 
universal military training provision of its constitution, every able-bodied male 
without exception was called-up at 19 (lowered in 1939 from age 20), and was 
required to give from two to six weeks of active duty training every year until the 
age of forty; furthermore, all males were kept on the active reserve roles until 
reaching sixty. 136 Four hundred thousand Swiss were called-up under the first 
general mobilization of September 1939, and by May 1940, a total of 850,000 were 
engaged at least part-time in the country's defense, including women's auxiliaries 
and home guards. During the period from 1939 to 1945, there were never less 
than 100,000 men under arms at any given time. 137 
134 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 202. 
135 Ibid, 210. 
136 The normal peacetime army numbered about 50,000 men, including 
reservists. 1933 World Almanac of the "New York World Telegram." 
137 Georg Thueren, Free & Swiss - The Story of Switzerland, London, 1970, 
157. 
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The theory underlying Switzerland's mobilization plans in September 1939 
called for the border to be guarded by active military; if a general mobilization order 
went out, the entire military force could be brought into an active defense posture 
within 24 hours. Half a million troops were assigned to the Alpine regions; these 
represented the armed elite, the body whose military skills and general 
preparedness were meant to give pause to any aggressor, even the Wehrmacht 
Backing these troops were strongly-fortified borders and strategic sites: the area 
around the Swiss entrance to the St-Gotthard tunnel was in 1939 held to be the 
most heavily fortified place in the world, exceeding even the fortifications at the 
ends of the Panama Canal. 138 Though Germany very much coveted Switzerland's 
assets, the factor which kept the merits of an invasion from outweighing its costs 
was Germany's certain knowledge that the Swiss military would prove a tenacious 
enemy to defeat, and that the Swiss would unhesitatingly institute a kind of 
"scorched earth" defense by destroying their most valuable assets - the tunnels 
linking Germany to Italy. 
On August 22, 1939, an unsigned memorandum was prepared by State 
Minister Otto Koecher in Berlin that "would serve as guidance on language to be 
held for German Missions abroad." With reference to Switzerland, the 
memorandum stated "the intention to respect Swiss neutrality should be reiterated 
to the Swiss Government and reference made to the repeated unequivocal 
statements by the Fuehrer on this question. "139 Nine days layer, on September 1, 
the day Germany attacked Poland, the following memorandum by the State 
Secretary was filed with the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: 
m Fortune, September 1941, 114. 
139 DGFP, v. VII, 196-197. Similar statements were made to all the European 
states, excepting Poland of course, and the Soviet Union, which by this time had 
knowledge of Germany's forthcoming actions. 
I pointed out. .. that the German attitude toward Switzerland has been 
clearly defined to the Federal Counsellor a few days previously by 
Minister Koecher .... I noted with gratitude that...the Swiss 
Government declared their readiness to lend every assistance to 
furthering humanitarian work. [signed Weizsaecker] 140 
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But professed German respect for Swiss neutrality quickly began to take the 
form of demands that Switzerland voluntarily circumscribe much of its own freedom 
of action as a sovereign state. After the outbreak of hostilities, one of the points of 
contention between the Reich and Switzerland involved Germany's furor over the 
still relatively uncensored Swiss press.141 Berlin was affronted by the anti-Nazi tone 
of many of the Swiss papers, which finally caused Weizsaecker to threaten 
Switzerland's president, Henri Vallotton, with retaliation unless the situation were 
rectified. In a memorandum of February 12, 1940 from Weizsaecker to the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin, he reported that he "impressed upon [Vallotton] how necessary it 
was for the Swiss press to adopt a different attitude that that heretofore taken."142 
This would be followed by many more German demands that Switzerland 
recognize the futility of clinging to Europe's old order. 
When the Wehrmachtattacked the Low Countries in May 1940, the Swiss 
government's most immediate concern was that its own territory would be 
simultaneously violated by a German drive through Switzerland. In consequence, 
on May 1 O, the day after the German drive in the West began, the Swiss ordered a 
general mobilization of their army, bringing it to a high state of readiness if it should 
m Ibid, v. VII, 504-505. 
141 It might be noted that serious impediments on freedom of expression 
designed to assuage Germany were also implemented in Sweden. On several 
occasions, the Swedish government instituted proceedings against papers which 
"expressed themselves 'offensively' against a 'Foreign Power"'. In December 1939 
journalist Thure Nerman was sentenced to 90 days in jail for insulting Hitler in the 
Trotts A/It. Such restrictions, legislatively enacted, remained in force until 1944. 
Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 17 4. 
142 Ibid, v. VIII, 772. 
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have to defend the country's borders. Invasion fears peaked on the night of May 
14-15, when, because of German troop concentrations in the Black Forest, an 
invasion at the northern end of the country, through the Basel area, was held to be 
imminent. For the only time during World War II, a widespread civilian exodus 
ensued from towns in line of the expected invading Germans to the safer southern 
cantons and the Bernese Oberland. 143 
In the face of such an overwhelming threat from Germany, the Swiss 
government, though responding with military mobilization, adopted a political 
attitude that seemed defeatist to many Swiss. Throughout the war, the Federal 
Council wielded powers greatly exceeding those granted it by the country's 
constitution, and even though elections were held in 1939 and in 1943, 144 the role 
of the parliament was correspondingly extremely circumscribed. For example, the 
right of referendum was suspended except where the Federal Council specifically 
permitted it, and the nation's civilian security and police agencies were 
subordinated to the military, although martial law as such was never declared.145 
m Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 210-211. 
144 After the 1943 elections, opposition parties were again allowed to 
function, with the effect of politically isolating Swiss Nazis by balancing their 
extreme rightist views with those from the (non-communist) left. Roland Ruffieux, 
"La Suisse Pendant La Guerre: de L'Ordre Nouveau la Nouvelles Preoccupations 
- La Debat ldeologique en Suisse Romande", Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxixme 
Guerre Mondiale, 31 (121), 97-107. 
145 Georg Kreis, "La Suisse Pendant La Guerre: Etat Democratique en Etat 
de Siege?", Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxime Guerre Mondiale, 1899, 71-82. 
58 
Marcel Pilet-Golaz, the federal counsellor who was president in 1940, 146 
made a broadcast to the nation on June 25, 1940. France, had fallen a few days 
earlier, which meant that Switzerland was now effectively encircled by Axis-
occupied or Axis-controlled territory, making its situation ominous. In his address, 
Pilet seemed to castigate his fellow Swiss for their "relapse into the past" - in 
apparent reference to the country's resistance to what he believed was clearly 
going to be Europe's "New Order" -and for their "indolent, comfortable and snug 
mode of life which would now have to come to an end. "147 Using Nazi jargon, he 
called for Erneuerung (renewal) and Anpassung (adaptation) of Swiss institutions 
and policies. 148 The effect of the broadcast on the Swiss people was one of 
general amazement, particularly on those army commanders using the breather of 
the so-called Phony War - the period after the end of the Polish conflict and before 
the onset of the German attack in the West - to strengthen the country's defenses 
against the expected German attack. 
When Pilet ordered the army to be reduced by two-thirds in a last-minute 
attempt to propitiate the Germans, many Swiss took the view that the president 
was condemning their way of life, and in doing so had become a near-collaborator 
by easing the way for a German takeover. Though his role as a high official of a 
small country trying to chart its way through every conceivable kind of foreign 
threat would have brought criticism to Pilet in any case, the Swiss thereafter 
m The seven members of Switzerland's Federal Counsel are equal in 
authority and power; normally, the member who held the presidency (for a year at 
a time) enjoyed no greater authority than his fellow counsellors, except that he 
represented Switzerland internationally as Head of State. William Bennett Munro, 
Governments of Europe, New York, 1938, 783. Pilet was holding the presidency 
for the second time, having occupied the post once before in 1934. Soloveytchik, 
Switzerland in Perspective, 252-253. 
147 Ibid, 253. 
148 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 211. 
regarded the president (who would continue as a federal counsellor and foreign 
minister until 1944) as the country's leading symbol of appeasement. 
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But major Western newspapers and magazines also assumed that 
Switzerland would in the end have to succumb to Hitler's often-stated 
determination to force all ethnic Germans to return to the Reich, including 
presumably, the three million German-speaking Swiss. Time magazine had written 
in 1938 what was then commonly thought that because the German-speaking 
Swiss were "Germans", they must be considered "racial comrades of the Fuehrer" 
and thus subject to the inevitability of "Hitler ... gobbling up the nation whole."149 
But there was a very different reaction in Switzerland to the German threat, 
one embodied by Henri Guisan, the major Swiss hero to come out of the Second 
World War. He was a French-speaking gentleman-farmer and head of the 
confederation's armed forces who in the summer of 1940 became the "center and 
personification of resistance"150 to his countrymen. Exactly one month after Pilet's 
broadcast, Guisan took an action that shaped Switzerland's actions for the 
remainder of the war, and one which immediately drew from Germany a yelp of 
surprised indignation. Protected by a battalion of mountain infantry, Guisan 
convoked an unprecedented meeting with 650 of his officers at the Ruetli meadow 
on the Lake of Lucerne, the historic birthplace in 1291 of the Swiss Confederation. 
To combat what he saw as an "accommodation" to German demands that might 
lead to capitulation to Berlin's insistence that Switzerland merge its economy with 
the Reich's, 151 Guisan elicited from his officers a pledge to "unconditional 
resistance" should any invader threaten the nation's freedom. The general detailed 
149 Time, July 4, 1938. 
150 Meier, Friendship, 269. 
151 With German managers of all war-sensitive Swiss industry. 
the defense policy he had worked out, one utilizing and strengthening 
Switzerland's natural barriers, particularly its formidable mountains.152 
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Guisan and his staff officers drew the nation's system of defenses in as 
flexible a pattern as possible. The actual frontiers were set with elasticized forward-
defense measures to take up the brunt of an invasion while giving the main Swiss 
forces time to fall back into second and third lines of defense based on 
mountainous terrain studded with heavily fortified positions.153 The nucleus of 
Switzerland's military forces would retreat into this Alpine "redoubt", one virtually 
unreachable by any invading army and from which sanctuary they could continue 
to harass their pursuers indefinitely. Guisan also had as a plus the knowledge that 
Berlin knew it couldn't take Switzerland unaware, as it had done with, for example, 
Norway or the Netherlands. The Swiss military command expected a German 
invasion, and was fully prepared to thwart it. 154 
The single weak link in Switzerland's chain of natural defenses was the 
relatively flat plateau stretching from the southwest at Lake Geneva to the northeast 
at Lake Constance. But Guisan fortified this most exposed part of Switzerland's 
countryside with both a forward line behind Basel and a deeper one several 
kilometers behind this frontier area. Together they were designed to constitute a 
holding action while the bulk of the armed forces retreated to their ultimate position, 
the great central Alpine expanse in the center-south focused on the St-Gotthard 
tunnel. 155 
~ Fodor, Neutrals, 50. 
153 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 202-203. 
154 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 65. 
155 Admittedly, Guisan's plan left half of Switzerland, all the major cities and 
three quarters of the population outside this so-called "redoubt", but when Guisan 
later had public opinion sampled to ascertain popular acceptance of the plan, the 
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In this massively-fortified redoubt, which would in later years become 
virtually a Swiss legend, 156 the national identity was meant to be preserved, as 
were, more concretely, the two supremely important Alpine tunnels, the St.-
Gotthard and the Simplon. According to Fortune, a fortress-city had been built in 
the redoubt, one supplied with power plants, dormitories, stores for all kinds of 
necessities stocked with amounts calculated to last the defenders three years, 
hospitals, and "even a gymnasium", presumably in which the defending soldiers 
and managing bureaucrats would keep themselves fit. 157 Guisan calculated his 
army would be capable of holding out here indefinitely, but if the redoubt were 
seriously threatened, his trump card remained the destruction of the tunnels 
themselves, an action that would leave Italy linked to Germany by only a single 
connection, the Austrian Brenner Pass. Thus Guisan's strategy was that Germany 
would have to pay an enormous price for whatever satisfaction it would gain by 
incorporating Switzerland into the Reich.158 
The German yelp intensified when Berlin learned of Guisan's plan - much of 
which was openly publicized and a plan that was already serving to raise public 
morale. The German minister in Switzerland, Otto Koecher, wired the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin: 
The Army Staff reveals through the local morning press that on July 
25 General Guisan, on Mt. [sic] Ruetli, personally gave the order of 
the day to his troop commanders down to battalion commanders. In 
majority of the Swiss, evidently fed up with German threats, supported the 
Commander-in-Chief. Fodor, Neutrals, 50. 
156 "Impregnable in the midst of chaos, the Gotthard might become our 
modern myth, for it is both a symbol and a reality as hard and solid as its own 
granite." Denis de Rougement and Charlotte Muret, The Heart of Europe, in Meier, 
Friendship, 269. 
157 Fortune, September 1941, 114. 
158 Fodor, Neutrals, 50. 
-', 
his order General Guisan states that Switzerland is at a turning point 
in her history, that it is a matter of the preservation of Switzerland .... ! 
suggest considering whether joint or separate demarch~s of similar 
content by the Axis Powers would not be in order, expressing our 
surprise at renewed incitement of Swiss public opinion against 
Germany and Italy; if anything could make the allied Axis Powers 
vacillate in their resolve to maintain their previous attitude toward 
Switzerland, it is such an inopportune demonstration as that of the 
General. The German Government ought to remind Switzerland, in 
this connection, of the steps by which it called the attention of the 
Federal Council to the campaign against Germany and German 
nationals residing here. It would have to hold the Swiss Government 
responsible for any excesses which mi~ht arise from the official 
statements of the Swiss Army leader. 15 
62 
Nonetheless Germany scrapped any idea of an immediate invasion as too costly. 
Koecher's telegram occasioned no substantive demarch~ in either of the Axis 
members' diplomatic policies in respect to Switzerland. 160 
In surprising contrast to the usual American press denigration of Switzerland 
in the late 1930s because of its seeming subservience to German demands 
circumscribing its own freedom of actions, such carping began to ameliorate after 
Guisan's actions. In an admiring article in the September 1941 issue of Fortune 
magazine, 161 the measures the Swiss had undertaken since war's outbreak to build 
up their defenses against a German attack were set out. The same article 
editorially quashed the German "blood-to-blood" myth that had had many 
Americans believing the Swiss were somehow consigned by destiny to "return" to 
the Reich. 162 
m DGFP, v. IX, 364-365. 
160 Fodor, Neutrals, 51. 
161 The same issue stated that "the Swedes have already taken their place in 
the Nazi New Order without visible resistance" - a contention that is discussed 
below. Fortune, September 1941, 74-ff. 
162 Ibid, 74-ff. 
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After the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, renewed 
German pressure designed to soften up the Swiss for an eventual incorporation 
into Europe's "New Order" was brought to bear. Among other demands, Berlin 
insisted that Switzerland's traditionally free press report only positive stories 
regarding the Axis states and, conversely, only negative stories regarding the 
Allies, adding to the earlier insistence that only stories reflecting favorably on 
Germany be printed; that Switzerland's banned German Nazi and Italian Fascist 
parties be re-legalized; that all elements of the Swiss military demobilize; and that 
every significant Swiss industry be immediately turned over to German "advisers" 
who would control export policies. To most of these demands, Switzerland 
responded unequivocally in the negative, with the exception of the Nazi strictures 
on Switzerland's press freedom: the nation's papers were told to tone down anti-
German stories in the interests of assuaging Berlin, the Federal Council viewing 
concession to this relatively minor imposition on Swiss sovereignty as reasonable 
prudence. 163 A writer for the Basler Nachrichten had only recently created an 
incident by impudently commenting that Germany's "Kreuzzug [crusade] in the 
Soviet Union was at best a Hakenkreuzzug. "164 
Because Switzerland's economy was to a large extent tied to German 
sufferance as regarded imports of raw materials and exports of finished materials, 
the reality was that the country had lost a very material part of its economic 
sovereignty. Because Switzerland was surrounded by German, or German-
controlled, or German-allied territory, the September 1, 1940 Nazi decree that 
placed all Swiss exports under Axis control was an unavoidable reality for the 
Swiss, one that was faced daily by the Swiss business community which had to 
163 Ibid, 74-ff. No mention was made of anti-German exiles. 
164 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 212. 
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secure German permits for nearly everything the country exported. The effect was 
that trade with the Allies nearly stopped. For example, the 17% of the country's 
exports that had gone to Britain before the war was cut to virtually nothing by 
1940.165 With some irony, those products that the Germans would have permitted 
Switzerland to receive from Allied countries - primarily bulk foodstuffs - were denied 
entry by the Allies themselves who withheld navicerts (for shipment into Genoa, 
landlocked Switzerland's leased "homeport") for fear the products would be re-sold 
to Germany.166 
The German blockade forced Switzerland in the first months of the war to 
switch from civilian production intended for export to military production, goods 
which were bought by all the belligerents and which brought back 1938 export 
levels by the spring of 1940. With the fall of France in June of that year, exports 
again dropped dramatically, but within 12 months the Axis partners and their allies 
once again brought exports back to 1938 levels. Now that the blocs were no 
longer able to bid against each other, Germany effectively set prices after June 
1940, cutting Switzerland's profits and in some cases forcing the Swiss to sell 
armaments below costs, 167 a policy defended by the government on the basis that 
it kept Swiss factories in production, thus enabling the country to produce 
weapons for its own defense, the Swiss army's sting depending in large part on the 
quality of these locally-produced armaments. 168 After 1940, each battalion, 
besides being fully armed with high-quality automatic rifles and machine guns, was 
165 Fortune, September 1941, 7 4. 
166 Ibid, 74-ff. 
167 The Reich even demanded that the Swiss extend credit to German 
buyers, which practice the normally cash-and-carry Swiss sometimes were forced 
to accept. Ibid, 75. 
168 Ibid, 75. 
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further equipped with what was in in the early 1940s considered one of the world's 
best anti-tank guns, the 47-millimeter. 169 
Among the gravest wartime shortages Switzerland endured was gasoline, 
the last dribble of free access being cut off in spring 1941 when the Germans took 
over the Balkan oil fields. Of the 120,000 automobiles registered in the country in 
August 1939, by the fall of 1941 only 15,000 were still being used. The military had 
its own gasoline reserve, but was able to avoid drawing down on it by tapping the 
gasoline accumulations the government had astutely set aside in September 1939. 
Private motorists could use only their own private stocks, and only in rationed 
amounts; car owners without reserves were forced to put their vehicles in 
storage. 170 
One of the lessons the nation learned from the First World War was that the 
mobilization of so much of the nation's manpower could have a disastrous effect 
on the nation's economy if measures weren't taken to ameliorate the 
consequences. Hence, one difference between the two wars was that after 1940 
called-up reservists were paid an amount comparable to their civilian salaries out of 
a national compensation fund, a fund to which employers, employees, the cantons 
and the federal government contributed. A result of this compensatory policy was 
that the nation's economic difficulties were spread relatively evenly across the 
population. 171 
Switzerland's role vis-a-vis the United States in World War II was probably 
the least important of any of the neutrals. As a "listening post", though, it was 
valuable - but to both sides: in 1941, at least six spy networks operated out of 
169 Ibid, 114. 
170 Ibid, 112. 
171 Thueren, Free & Swiss, 157. 
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Switzerland, including two British-sponsored, pro-Soviet rings. 172 As late as March 
1943, the efficient Swiss military intelligence service reported to Bern that a German 
invasion was imminent, one possibly meant to preempt an Allied incursion through 
Switzerland Hitler wanted carried out as soon as the Wehrmacht was in a position 
to seize Switzerland's Alpine redoubt. 173 Though the government assured the 
Germans that the Swiss would defend their neutrality against a// invaders, the scare 
was nonetheless real in the late winter and early spring of 1943.174 In an 
extraordinary meeting with Waffen-SS General Walter Schellenberg at Biglen, in 
Swiss territory near Bern, Guisan warned the Nazi commander that he should have 
no doubts whatsoever that the Swiss would put up ferocious resistance to thwart a 
German attack, and that even at this late date in the war, when it was clear that 
Germany had no chance to defeat its enemies, the Swiss army would still destroy 
the three Alpine rail tunnels rather than let an invader have use of them. 175 In any 
event, after the collapse of his Italian ally, Hitler buried for good any notions of 
invading Switzerland, apparently reasoning that functioning Alpine tunnels, whose 
use the Swiss still freely allowed German military forces in occupied northern Italy, 
would best serve Germany's interests. 176 
172 John Lukacs,-The Last European War- September 1939/December 
1941, Garden City, 1976, 362. 
173 Germany feared that after 1943 the Swiss would allow their territory to be 
freely crossed by Allied armies chasing retreating Axis armies throughout Europe. 
174 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 221-222. 
175 In a telegram dated April 8, 1943, the American minister in Bern wired the 
Secretary of State: "Developments in the military situation with respect to Europe 
will put an increasing strain on the Axis partners. They will, in turn, make greater 
demands of the neutrals, which, in the case of Switzerland, may include passage of 
troops. The Swiss have assured us that any such demands will be refused and 
that the country will resist with its full strength any such attempt to violate Swiss 
neutrality." FAUS, v. ii, 1943, 901. 
176 Thueren, Free & Swiss, 158. 
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The most important Allied official in Switzerland during the war was Allen 
Dulles. Officially posted to Bern as assistant to the U.S. ambassador, Dulles' real 
role was chief of American intelligence operations for occupied Europe, his primary 
task to follow events inside the Third Reich itself. 177 Operating for the Office of 
Strategic Services, Dulles made special efforts to find out who in Germany 
opposed the Nazi regime, and whether such persons would actively cooperate 
with the Allies in an attempt to overthrow it. In carrying out his operations, Dulles 
received the close cooperation of the Swiss intelligence services. He was not, 
however, much surprised when he learned that the Swiss were providing exactly 
the same assistance to the German intelligence services - a situation Dulles judged 
beneficial to the Allied cause since it gave him broader and more accurate 
information than would otherwise have been possible. 178 
An area in which Swiss interests came up against those of the United States 
concerned Switzerland's airspace. Both U.S. and British military aircraft regularly 
overflew Switzerland on their wide-ranging bombing operations, particularly 
missions over Italian targets. The 300 Swiss air force pilots were under order to 
ignore what appeared to them to be accidental, single-craft incursions, but if entire 
formations were spotted the pilots were either to force them to land, or, if 
necessary, to shoot them down - irrespective of the origin of the aircraft involved. 
In April 1944 alone, 650 incursions were reported, most of them by then Allied. At 
war's end, some 150 American B-17s and B-24s were interned at Swiss air bases -
their crews the relatively pampered guests of the Swiss state. 179 
m Jozef Garlinski, The Swiss Corridor, (London, 1981), 120. 
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An especially unsettling incident for Swiss-American relations involved the 
accidental bombing of Schaffhausen, Switzerland's only major town on the 
northern, German side of the Rhine. The town had been mistaken by the American 
bombing crews for the German city of Tuttlingen, 21 miles from Schaffhausen. The 
1944 raid left 150 casualties and 50 buildings destroyed, for which in 1949 the 
United States paid Switzerland $62 million in compensation, a figure set by the 
Swiss during the war and which included interest from the day of the raid. 180 
There was an additional function filled by Switzerland during the war, one 
which was of great value to the Allies in respect of the importance of which 
American and British policy judged it wiser not to push the Swiss into difficult 
choices. The country served as the protecting power for Allied interests in 
Germany and in Japan. Most important in this regard was the role fulfilled by Swiss 
officials of inspecting enemy prisoner-of-war camps, reporting on the treatment of 
Allied internees and having the ability - most important late in the war - of 
uncovering and protesting, albeit on a limited basis, the frightening conditions they 
found. The Swiss also arranged prisoner-of-war exchanges between Allies and 
Axis, with the International Red Cross, headquartered in Geneva, serving as the 
clearance center for messages between prisoners and their families. 181 
TSO Ibid, 58. 
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"Every attack against the freedom 
and independence of the realm 
will be met with force .... Sweden 
can and will defend itself." 
Civil Defense pamphlet182 
Sweden was, with Switzerland, one of only two legally- and traditionally 
recognized neutral states in Europe. Its position of neutrality from the outbreak of 
war was in large part a result of its disappointments in the utility of the League of 
Nations and the growing realization that it could rely only on itself. In 
consequence, Swedish foreign policy took on an increasingly isolationist bent in 
the six years between Hitler's installation as chancellor and the start of the 
European war. 183 In the 1930s Sweden was the single Scandinavian state to have 
a military force of any real substance, 184 and was therefore compelled in the years 
just prior to the outbreak of World War II to play the central part in Scandinavia's 
relations with both belligerent blocs. The Scandinavian bloc policy that Sweden 
formulated in those years was designed to keep the North aloof from Europe's 
power plays, but the region was nevertheless brought into war in 1939 with the 
Russian attack on Finland, the latter becoming in 1940 a German ally; later that 
year, Norway and Denmark were invaded and occupied by the Germans, leaving 
Sweden on its own and surrounded by the Axis, its allies or its captives. 185 
182 Donald S. Connery, The Scandanavians, New York, 1966, 338. 
183 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 171. 
184 In 1940, the army consisted of four divisions, the navy of 49 ships 
(including two cruisers and ten destroyers), and an air force whose size was kept 
secret. Statesman's Year Book for 1941. 
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Sweden's successful neutrality in the Second World War was the result of 
three primary factors: its geographical position, its military preparedness and 
willingness of its government and citizens to fight if invaded, and - perhaps most 
importantly - its acquiescence to Germany's demands that it maintain at prewar 
levels shipments of essential military supplies to the Reich. This last factor included 
the high-grade iron ore vitally necessary to Germany's armaments factories: for the 
Germans to have converted steel production to their own low-grade ore would 
have placed a considerable, some say intolerable, burden on its war economy. 186 
Sweden underwent a critical test of its neutrality policies with the Russo-
Finnish winter war of 1939-40. The Soviet attack on Finland on November 30, 1939 
caused a public outcry among Swedes, a people with closer ties to Finland than 
any other Scandinavian state. Though many Swedes demanded active 
intervention on Finland's side, the Danish and Norwegian governments urged 
Sweden to realize that such intervention would inevitably involve all the powers in a 
general Scandinavian theater of war. In fact, Sweden's government did 
understand the danger to its status as a neutral by becoming too involved in the 
Finnish war, even its surreptitious and relatively minor military and humanitarian aid 
to its neighbor. Historian Ake Thulstrup characterized the new attitude of the 
Swedish government as essentially a negative one though: 
There arose early on an unhealthy ideology of neutrality, remote from 
reality, which put forward such ideas as that the war in actual fact was 
no concern of ours and that the neutrals were morally far superior to 
the Powers who were involved in the war .187 
Nonetheless, Sweden continued to quietly help Finland to the extent 
possible by terming its assistance "non-belligerent interventionism", even though 
186 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 97. Toynbee says in such a scenario 
"Sweden would have been unable to conduct a major industrial war effort." 
187 quoted in ibid, 17 4. 
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considerable quantities of materiel were involved and the recruitment of about 9000 
Swedish volunteers to help the Finns was permitted. Sweden realized, however, 
that eventually Finland would be forced to bow to the massive Russian superiority 
in numbers (if not in quality) of troops, and refused to jeopardize its own neutrality 
any further by acquiescing to Allied requests to allow troops to cross Sweden to 
come to Finland's assistance. 188 During most of this first Russo-Finnish war, 
Sweden's actions vis a vis Finland have been compared to American participation 
in 1940 and 1941 in the European war, when the United States was most active in 
supporting the British cause. 189 
As to its western flank, Sweden had made limited joint military preparations 
with Norway before April 1940, including joint military planning conferences. But in 
1939 Swedish defense strategists neither anticipated nor planned for a western 
war. When Germany invaded Norway, necessitating a defense of the entire 
Swedish-Norwegian border, Sweden was utterly unprepared for such an 
undertaking. 190 
On April 12, 1940, three days after the German invasion of neighboring 
Denmark and Norway, Swedish prime minister Per Albin Hansson went on the 
radio to outline his country's policy in regard to its warring neighbors: 
Sweden is firmly determined to continue to follow the line of strict 
neutrality. That implies that we must reserve for ourselves 
independence of judgment and independence of action in every 
direction. It is not consistent with strict neutrality to permit any 
belligerent to make use of Swedish territory for its activity. 
Fortunately no demands in such a direction have been made of us. 
Should any such demands be made they must be refused. 191 
lS8 Henning Friis, Scandinavia Between East and West, Ithaca, 1950, 278-
279. Some U.S. and French war materiel was allowed through. 
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From the very beginning of the war, official Swedish actions involved 
expanding the country's defense capabilities to ensure that Hansson's words 
could be supported. Speaking from the throne on September 9, 1939, King 
Gustav V expressed his government's determination to stay out of the conflict, and, 
to back up this determination, to greatly expand the country's armaments and 
defense expenditures. 192 For the remainder of the war, this military preparedness, 
tempered with the pragmatism to bend to bearable demands on its sovereignty, 
would be the policy Sweden would successfully follow. 
The reasons for Germany's failure to invade Sweden when Denmark and 
Norway were occupied have never been made completely clear. But it is known 
today that a German invasion of Sweden, while unquestionably within the Reich's 
military capabilities in 1940, would have upset Germany's carefully worked-out 
timetable had such an attempt been meaningfully contested - which Berlin fully 
believed it would be. The Norwegian and Danish occupations (the former meant 
specifically to counter a British occupation of northern Norway's coast) were to be 
followed within weeks by the attack in the West, and the Germans, accurately 
assessing the strength and resolve of the Swedish nation and its military defenses, 
must have reasoned that they could get what they wanted from Sweden by means 
far less burdensome than a military invasion and occupation. Berlin further knew 
that after the Weseruebung moves on its Scandinavian neighbors it could no 
longer surprise Sweden. Though Sweden's terrain is admittedly less formidable 
than that of Switzerland, the forested, lake-filled northern parts of the country, 
almost bereft of communication lines, would also have presented the Wehrmacht 
with a very difficult undertaking. Finally, the coveted and rich Kiruna iron ore 
192 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 172. 
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deposits lay in the north, allowing the Swedes plenty of time to fulfill their promise to 
destroy them in case of a German invasion. 193 
An additional, less measurable but still important factor was the attitude of 
Stalin, who - allied with Hitler at the time - let it be known that he would regard 
unfavorably an invasion of Sweden by Germany. The Soviet dictator evidently 
reasoned that Sweden was in the Soviet sphere of influence, thus presenting a 
constraint on German movements in the North that Berlin couldn't at the time 
entirely disregard. 194 
In 1940, the United States publicly announced that it considered Sweden's 
neutrality policy to be the realistic course for the country to take, 195 the State 
Department noting with approval Sweden's avowed intention to defend its territorial 
integrity against any invading force. 196 The United States further supported a 
nebulous plan for a Finno-Swedish union, designed to take Finland out of the war 
but which the Soviet Union resisted, as did the Germans.197 All in all, American 
policy looked more at the substance of Sweden's actions than at its necessary 
concessions to overwhelming German economic pressure. 198 
The most sensitive problem affecting relations between Sweden and both 
belligerent blocs was the famous issue involving transshipment of German soldiers 
and war materiel across Swedish territory to re-garrison and re-supply the 
193 Ibid, 173. 
194 Friis, Scandinavia, 279. 
195 W.M. Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy During the Second World War, 
New York, 1973, 119. 
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Wehrmachtin Norway.199 There were many breaches in Sweden's neutrality, but 
none would be so controversial, not to say odious, in Sweden itself or among the 
members of the anti-Nazi alliance. 
After the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, Germany 
demanded that Sweden allow the Wehrmachttransit facilities across Swedish 
territory so it could keep its northern Norwegian garrison centered on Narvik 
supplied. The undertaking would have been too costly - if not impossible - for the 
Germans to have carried out entirely by sea: though their control of the Skagerrak 
guaranteed them relatively safe access to southern Norway, getting to Narvik 
meant broaching the superior British naval forces in the North Sea.200 In response 
to these German demands for the use of its railroads, on April 12 the Swedish 
prime minister announced: "Sweden is firmly determined to continue to follow the 
line of strict neutrality ... lt is not consistent with strict neutrality to permit any 
belligerent to make use of Swedish territory for its activity."201 But Sweden, which 
had been expecting the demands, 202 concluded by late April that it had no realistic 
~It should be re-noted that Sweden and Norway had in January 1940, 
during the first Russo-Finnish war, agreed to an Allied request to allow war materiel 
- though not, as requested, troops - to pass through their territory bound for 
Finland. Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 175. 
200 John M. West, The German-Swedish Transit Agreement of 1940, 
Colorado, 1978, 76-ff. There was no land connection between Trondheim and 
Narvik in Norway itself, either by rail or road, and the OKW calculated that because 
of weather air transport was too unreliable to successfully connect them. Toynbee, 
The War & the Neutrals, 178-182. 
201 West, Transit Agreement, 77. 
202 A few days after the April 9 invasion of neighboring Norway, Swedish 
Chief of Staff Axel Ruppe outlined the situation: "To the extent the Germans can 
maintain their sea communications with Norway intact we may not be subjected to 
such heavy pressure, but if this is not possible there will certainly be immediate 
demand on us to make territory and railroads available to them .... The most 
immediate demand would probably be to ship supplies to their troops in Narvik." 
West, Transit Agreement, 76. 
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alternative but to partially accede to Germany's demands. It did stipulate, however, 
that shipments must be strictly limited to medical supplies until afterthe fall of 
Norway, when Stockholm would at least be able to justify its actions by rationalizing 
that nothing more could be done to help Norway in its fight against the Nazis. 203 
At first, a subterfuge was employed which seemed, in the narrowest 
technical sense, to get around the matter of violating Sweden's neutrality: Sweden 
would allow "Red Cross" trains, operating as regular commercial freight carriers, to 
transit its territory carrying "non-military" goods - food, clothing, gasoline, etc. - for 
the Narvik garrison. The German "medical personnel" on the trains were in reality 
critically needed military specialists, and the "non-military" goods were in fact lethal. 
As the price for this acquiescence, the Swedes demanded from the Reich 
substantial arms shipments for its own defense build-up, a price which Berlin 
met.204 
But the issue was far from permanently settled. Now the Germans began to 
demand the transit of undisguised and unlimited war materiel - which the Swedes 
refused. At first promises of reward were held out, but increasingly there were 
threats to restrict Sweden's allowable imports through the German-controlled 
shipping lanes. Before April 9 Germany had predictably demanded that Sweden 
remain strictly neutral. But after the Norwegian and Danish occupations and 
Sweden's removal from the possibility of help from the west, Germany205 insisted 
~Henrik S. Nissen ed, Scandinavia During the Second World War, 
Minneapolis, 1983, 105. 
204 DGFP, v. IX, 245-246. 
205 The threats often came from Hermann Goering himself, who because of 
his Swedish connections personally involved himself in these negotiations. 
Goering's first wife, Carin van Kantzow, nee Fack, was the member of an 
aristocratic Swedish family. Leonard Mosley, The Reich Marshal, Garden City, 
1974, 59. 
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that Sweden effectively relinquish its neutrality in what to the Reich had become the 
critically important matter of protecting its far-northern Atlantic flank. All through 
this, the Narvik commander, General Edouard Dietl, continued to urgently request 
more men and materiel to ward off the expected Allied landing, Dietl's pleas 
meaning ever-nastier demands that Sweden drop all restrictions on the use of its 
railroads. 
Even the proffered promise of additional war materiel to bolster its own 
defense needs didn't budge the Swedes from their negative position. On April 27, 
the German minister in Stockholm, Prince Victor zu Wied, reported to the Foreign 
Ministry in Berlin that "an expeditious way to take up the question of transit to 
Narvik ... without danger of an official rejection ... is receiving those deliveries of arms 
to which we have already committed ourselves", 206 but three days later he had to 
report to Berlin that "the impression of our negotiators is that offers of further 
German deliveries of arms are not regarded by the Swedish Government as 
compensation for [further] modification of its neutrality policy",207 and that "the 
German suggestion that transit of arms and ammunition to German troops in 
Norway be permitted in conjunction with the German supplies of arms to Sweden 
was rejected in these discussions. "208 
German policy now moved to undisguised force meant to budge Stockholm 
from its obstinacy. First came an embargo on any more arms, arms which Sweden 
needed to protect itself from the source from which they came. Concessions on 
overseas Swedish shipping - shipping controlled, of course, by Germany209 - were 
~ DGFP, v. IX, 245. 
207 West, Transit Agreement, 79. 
208 DGFP, v. IX, 258. 
209 The Germans had granted Sweden safe-conduct passes - their own 
navicerts - for a small number of ships to pass through the Straits to the North Sea, 
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canceled. While Dietl was expecting a British attack on Narvik at any moment, and 
wiring to Berlin his urgent pleas for artillery (he estimated he would be able to hold 
out against an Allied assault for only ten to fourteen days without it), Sweden 
remained firm in its refusal to permit the shipments to be expanded to meet 
Germany's demands. Neither, though, did Britain make its move, which resulted in 
giving Germany additional time to pressure Sweden for the transit rights. 
. Finally, Goering offered Sweden two options by which he held the 
"formalistic" Swedish objections could be successfully overcome.210 Either 
continue to send the military materiel in sealed railroad cars across Sweden, 
marked with the Red Cross symbol, or else allow the Swedes to appear to the 
Allies to have been duped by having the Germans seem to sneak it through by 
delivering it to a northern Swedish port as having been meant for Sweden. 211 After 
Goering openly blustered that the best way to change Swedish opinion would be a 
few bombing attacks, the Swedes responded by redeploying their armies, now at 
the highest state of combat preparedness, to the sites most likely to receive a 
German invasion. On May 13, the Swedish military command ordered mobilization 
preparatory to state of war with Germany. 
but goods bound for Allied countries were strictly banned. Both blocs closely 
checked this Swedish shipping (most of which was bound for Argentina): Germans 
to make sure no Swedish goods were bound for Britain or the U.S., the Allies to 
make sure no goods for Germany were sent on the return leg. Small amounts of 
material bound for Britain could get out through Petsamo, in Finland, but this 
represented a trickle of the 70% of Swedish exports that had been sent to the West 
before the war. Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 62, 75. 
210 Germans expressed their outrage at Sweden by stating it was "the 
unrealistic application of the - in itself commendable - [Swedish] neutrality policy." 
Italics mine. West, Transit Agreement, 78. 
211 Ribbentrop is thought to have come up with this last idea, but it was held 
to be so potentially cumbersome that it was meant only as a last resort. DGFP, v. 
IX, 259-260. 
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Ribbentrop now took over the negotiations. Summoning Arvid Richert, the 
Swedish minister in Berlin, he lectured the diplomat on the "factors of Realpolitik', 
that it was in Sweden's interests to allow the transit rights, by now specifically 
quantified to three trains, each with 30 to 40 sealed cars containing mostly artillery 
and anti-aircraft guns, with ammunition, so the British and French could be 
removed from Norway and thus would not represent a threat to Sweden. State 
Secretary Ernst von Weizsaecker added that although "Narvik was of no 
significance to the outcome of the war", nonetheless 
in spite of this it would, judging from my experience, affect the 
Fuehrer with his soldierly nature most unfavorably if the Swedish 
Government, unduly exaggerating its neutral feeling, did not fulfill the 
wishes .... Such an attitude on the part of the Swedish Government 
would be the more incomprehensible since the interests of Sweden 
and Germany were identical in this question.212 
Still the Swedish cabinet refused to accede to the German demands. 
Though Minister Richert urged the government to give in, it would not. Only the 
Commander-in-Chief of the army advised capitulation to avoid war with Germany, 
adding that in its present state of military strength the country had no hope of 
holding out against Germany for any length of time. Ironically, a Swedish 
agreement at this time - late May - might have led to Sweden being dragged into 
the war anyway, through an attack by the British, who coveted the prospect of 
cutting off Germany's iron ore supply from Sweden and who are known to have 
planned bombing raids on the ore shipments had Sweden acquiesced to the 
expanded transit demands at this juncture.213 
What continued to be the basis for the Swedish government's extremely 
dangerous thwarting of Germany's demands was its honor in the Nordic 
212 West, Transit Agreement, 82. 
213 Ibid, 84. 
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community, honor which it felt would be forfeit if it allowed Swedish territory to be 
used to harm its fellow Scandinavian state. The text of Richart's explanation to the 
German government for his own government's actions gave his view: 
In the eyes of the Swedes, it would ... be an almost dishonorable 
action. It would call forth the greatest indignation and would burden 
the government with a sense of shame which it, in view of the Nordic 
sense of community, would be able neither to shake off nor to 
bear.214 
The wrangling on the question was tempered in the last critical days before 
the Narvik campaign began by a Swedish offer to serve as a neutral protector and 
administrator of the Narvik area if all belligerents would abandon the area. The 
plan had little support from any quarter, but it did have some utility for the feint it 
provided at the height of the crisis. Finally, on May 28, the combined British, 
French, Polish and Norwegian assault on Narvik began, with Dietl immediately 
being pushed back into the coastal mountains along the Swedish border. For 
Sweden, though, the situation was resolved when the Allies were forced to 
withdraw their troops to stave off an expected invasion of Britain itself. While this 
took the immediate pressure off Sweden, it also meant that the Allies were now 
totally withdrawn from Scandinavia and Sweden no longer able to position herself 
diplomatically between two blocs: the country was now completely under the 
military and physical dominance of Germany, and was "thus more than ever 
dependent on Germany's goodwill."215 
Not only was Sweden wedged ever firmer in Germany's orbit with the Allied 
withdrawal, but it now also lost its primary reason - its stand of honor - for refusing 
German transit. With the collapse of Norwegian resistance on June 1 o, Germany 
realized, too, that Sweden would now have far less firm ground on which to 
m Ibid, 85. 
215 Ibid, 88. 
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continue its refusal. 216 And because Germany still wanted the Narvik area heavily 
fortified to protect its naval and military positions in the North Sea area, it continued 
pressure on Sweden to acquiesce. With its huge victories in the West - France 
having just been defeated - Germany's position seemed stronger than ever, and 
Sweden fewer options in resisting German demands. The last straw was a 
telegram received from Sweden's minister in Britain, Bjoern Prytz, who cabled that 
the British government would now accept a "reasonable" peace offer, and Halifax 
would replace Churchill as prime minister, if necessary, to accommodate these 
ends.217 
Thus, with Britain very possibly out of the picture, with Germany controlling 
Sweden's commercial links with the world, and with only diehard anti-Nazi 
optimists believing anything less than a complete German military victory was in the 
offing, Sweden decided it could no longer risk destruction and occupation. At a 
cabinet meeting on June 18, 1940, a unanimous decision was taken to accede to 
German demands. Neutrality "should not be maintained as an abstract idea, but 
rather as a practical policy aimed at keeping us out of war", wrote one observer. 
An acceptance of the German demand did not have to imply that we 
abandoned our policy of neutrality. In this difficult situation I had 
sought consolation in an image: a dead tree stands in the storm with 
rigid branches, which break, but a living tree [bends].218 
Sweden would henceforth permit transit facilities more than adequate for the 
Wehrmachtto keep Narvik garrisoned. 
For three years, Sweden was forced to give way to German military traffic 
across its territory. Transports increased in size during the early months, from one 
m Nissen, Scandinavia, 105. 
217 This telegram was suppressed for many years after the war at Britain's 
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a week at first, until finally the German demand for one train a day was agreed to. 
What one Swedish diplomat characterized as "the price Sweden paid for its peace" 
was summed up by a German diplomat visiting Stockholm a few months after the 
agreement was reached: 
... we expected not a rigid, but rather a living, constantly developing 
neutrality which realistically takes account of the changes in the 
military and political situation in Europe - in other words not an 
inflexible neutrali~ 'toward all sides' when ... today 'all sides' no longer 
exist for Sweden. 19 
Sweden continued to be beholden to other German demands, including the 
standard Nazi pressure applied more or less successfully to all neutrals to slant 
their press policy in favor of the Reich and against the Allies. In June 1941 , Minister 
Wied wired Berlin that the German effort "to reorient the Swedish press in our favor 
has apparently been successful. "220 
But the transit problem was the issue that continued to plague Sweden. A 
contretemps arose in June 1941 when Germany demanded that the Oslo Division 
(the 163rd Infantry Division) be allowed to cross Sweden, at which the cabinet 
finally balked. King Gustav is reported to have threatened abdication if his 
ministers didn't accede, which they finally did on June 25. Minister Wied wired the 
Foreign Ministry in Berlin of his meeting with the monarch that day: 
He [Gustav] has gone far in giving his personal support to the matter. 
He added confidentially that in doing so he had found it necessary to 
go even so far as to mention his abdication.221 The King then 
expressed the hope that Germany would make no demands on 
Sweden going beyond these limits. 222 
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But then Germany demanded transit in the opposite direction, meaning that 
15,200 Norwegian-based troops should be allowed to traverse Sweden to 
replenish German forces in Finland. Although another Swedish cabinet crisis 
nearly ensued over this last outrage, Hansson gave in on a "one-time" 
concession,223 not on the basis of helping Germany but rather of actively taking 
Finland's side in its own struggle.224 What it demanded of Germany in return was 
airplane engines, Messerschmitt 11 Os, French Twin Wasps, Daimler-Benz tanks, 
half-ton half-tracks from Demag, 21-cm. Skoda cannon together with their 
ammunition and equipment, and a long list of optical and radio equipment. Wied 
approved the "order" in gratitude for Sweden's transit cooperation.225 
There is some speculation that Germany planned to attack Sweden in 
August or September of 1941 to forestall any more Swedish equivocation, but the 
German foreign office and military records do not verify such accounts. In any 
event, it should be remembered that Sweden was still more important to Germany 
as an economic partner than as a conquered vassal, a realization that underlay 
Germany's actions toward Sweden throughout the war.226 
A legacy of the transit resolution was, of course, the bitterness it 
engendered in Norway. The Norwegian government-in-exile in London vehemently 
223 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 188. Further demands for troop 
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protested the concessions, refusing to concede the Swedish position that the war 
between Norway and Germany was over. Britain protested just as strongly, but in 
reality neither Norway nor the United Kingdom had any desire to see Sweden be 
dragged into the war. When Sweden instituted an unneutral act in the Allies' favor-
the leasing of the half of Sweden's fleet that had been cut off in Allied ports in April 
1940 - both Britain and the Norwegians were somewhat mollified.227 
Sweden's next invasion scare came in early 1942. After the American entry 
into the war, Hitler expected a joint Anglo-American attack on Norway, with 
Sweden joining the Allied cause, a scenario which led him to consider ordering a 
German preemptive occupation of Sweden. So alarmed was the Swedish 
government on learning of these plans from Richert that an emergency session of 
the cabinet was immediately convened to decide how best to react. King Gustav 
provided the German ambassador with solemn assurances that Sweden would 
totally resist any Allied incursions on Swedish territory, assurances which Hitler 
seems to have respected. In all likelihood however, the increased Swedish military 
preparedness that had gone hand in hand with the king's message probably 
influenced Hitler as much as the monarch's pledge.228 
There is evidence that in their negative decision for this 1942 invasion, the 
Germans also took into account the formidable obstacles Sweden's western terrain 
would have presented the Wehrmacht Swedish preparedness and the size and 
quality of its increased armed forces were a major factor, but the Germans' reputed 
plan to drive for the iron ore fields was probably dampened equally by the fact that 
only two divisions were available for the task - troops were needed far more badly 
for Russia and North Africa than for Scandinavia. Also, the Norwegian garrison's 
227 Friis, Scandinavia, 284. 
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relative inexperience was a factor in the Germans dropping serious planning for a 
Swedish invasion at this point in the war.229 The Swedish military response to this 
threat, drawn up as war plans "Shield" and "Sword", was to use border guards and 
home defense units to absorb the initial blow, a delaying action designed to allow 
Sweden's first-line troops to come fully into play. The Swedish general staff 
calculated 350,000 of its own troops, supported by 380 Swedish air force planes, 
would come up against 280,000 German troops.230 
After December 1941, Washington's earlier understanding position 
regarding Sweden's dilemma had begun to change. In 1942, the British started to 
pressure the Swedes to reduce German troop trains to Narvik, as well as to cut iron 
ore and ball bearing exports to Germany.231 In the wake of these demands, the 
Americans pushed even harder - indirectly threatening Sweden by withholding 
Swedish food and fuel imports through the navicert system. Stockholm promptly 
responded that Swedish foreign policy did not meet with "proper understanding 
from London or Washington."232 But American pressure on Sweden, especially in 
respect to ball bearing shipments to Germany, increased significantly in early 1944, 
when U.S. military planners became insistent that Germans not be able to replenish 
their supplies after the planned forthcoming invasion.233 Through the efforts of Erik 
Boheman, Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, who went to 
Washington in 1942 to argue his country's case, Sweden managed to convince 
229 Herman Muellern, ''Tyskt Anfall mot Jaemtland och Haerjedalen", Aktuellt 
och Historiskt, 1963, 25-60. 
230 Boerje Furtenbach and Herman Muellern, "Vi Var Beredda", Aktuel/t och 
Historiskt, May 1962, 67. 
231 West, Transit Agreement, 93. 
232 Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, 133. 
233 Nissen, Scandinavia, 289. 
Washington that its actions were justified to preclude a German invasion.234 Oil 
shipments to Sweden, totally embargoed for a short period, were subsequently 
resumed via the neutral Swedish shipping which the Germans allowed into the 
Baltic.235 
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Throughout the war, it was the avowed American foreign policy to act tough 
with the neutrals - a toughness usually missing from the more leniently-disposed 
British Foreign Office (except where Ireland was concerned).236 The United States 
declared that its primary interest in Sweden sprang from the serious breach it 
unquestionably represented in its strategic blockade of Nazi Europe. Fortunately 
for the Swedes, their country was never critically important to either side - at least 
not critical enough to invade or bomb. For Germany, so long as Sweden fulfilled its 
trade obligations (or what Germany thought of as "obligations"), there was never an 
overriding reason to invade it. Sweden found out that respect for the principles of 
neutrality was far less important to the Allies than were their own interests - a 
maxim it found itself obliged to carry out in counterpoint. 237 
~ In Washington it was Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and the 
military chiefs who were least likely to accept Sweden's protestations, especially 
over ball bearing shipments to Germany; Roosevelt and his State Department 
advisers overrode them and decided to deal more leniently with Sweden. Carlgren, 
Swedish Foreign Policy, 138. 
235 Ibid, 138. 
236 The British continued in their sympathy for Sweden's plight. Erik 
Boheman, who would later be Swedish ambassador to the United Kingdom, in an 
October 1942 mission to London to press for oil deliveries Sweden needed for its 
defense, reported on advice Churchill gave him: "You want oil to defend yourselves 
and I think you should have it [the oil]. I advise you to arm, arm, and arm again. 
We don't want another German victim; all we ask is that you defend yourselves in 
the event of an attack, that you grant no unnecessary concessions and that you 
take back those that you have made as soon as you can." Toynbee, The War & the 
Neutrals, 190. 
237 Ibid, 229. 
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By 1943 it became apparent to the Swedes, as it did to the other neutrals, 
that Germany could no longer win the war, even though the Reich was still capable 
of inflicting a heavy penalty on states that thwarted it. At the end of July, Sweden 
notified Germany that the transit traffic had to stop in the following months, at the 
same time mobilizing its own reserve troops to counter possible German reprisals 
in retaliation for the new policy. On August 5, 1943, transit traffic was halted and 
Swedish exports to Germany- primarily iron ore -were reduced.238 
The Swedish general staff drew up plans to liberate Norway and Denmark 
late in the war (the plans for the Norwegian operation were more complete), but 
were not implemented, in part because of recognition that Swedish troops still 
wouldn't have arms superiority over the still-relatively fresh Wehrmachtelements in 
Norway and Denmark. 239 It might furthermore be noted that Sweden was probably 
influenced by the notable lack of enthusiasm on the part of the British to assist 
Norway to free itself at the war's end.240 
The services that Sweden was able to provide as a neutral to its 
Scandinavian neighbors - Denmark, Norway and Finland - far outweighed what it 
had cost them by its giving way to German demands on transit and materials. By 
~Ibid, 189. Alan Milward disagrees with the popular viewpoint in the matter 
of the importance of Sweden's iron ore to Germany, saying the ore was useful, but 
Germany could have, with little appreciable difference in the prosecution of the war, 
continued military production by utilizing its substantial high-grade iron-ore 
stockpiles, in conjunction with "more extensive exploitation" of the ore available in 
the occupied Low Countries, France and Eastern Europe. Alan S. Milward, "Could 
Sweden Have Stopped the Second World War?", Scandinavian Economic 
Historical Review, 1967, (1/2), 127-147. But the Allies believed throughout the war 
that "under no circumstances could Germany dispense entirely with Swedish 
supplies [of iron ore]." Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 9. 
239 Boerje Furtenbach, "Planlaeggingen RN-RD", Aktuellt och Historiskt, May 
1956, 25. 
240 Reidar Omang, "Norges Frigjoering 1945", lnternasjonal Politik, January 
1958, 16-18. 
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the end of the war, 43,000 Norwegians had found refuge in Sweden, as had 18,000 
Danes - including very nearly all of Denmark's Jewish citizens. Sweden actively 
and often interceded with Germany for the release of Scandinavian inmates in 
German concentration camps and prisons, traded wounded German soldiers from 
Finland, and sent supplies for all such persons through its own humanitarian relief 
services. Count Falke Bernadotte, a cousin of the king, personally arranged for the 
release from German concentration camps of 15,000 prisoners, including not only 
Danes and Norwegians, but also French, Polish, Dutch, Czech, British, American 
and even Argentine prisoners. None of this would have been possible had Sweden 
been occupied by the Germans.241 
m Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 193. 
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IRELAND 
"Who are we neutral against?" 
Anonymous242 
On August 29, 1939 -two days before Germany's attack on Poland -
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop instructed the German minister resident 
in Dublin, Edouard Hempel, to clearly appraise the Irish government of Germany's 
offer of normal relations so long as Ireland remained neutral in the coming war. 
In accordance with the friendly relations between ourselves and 
Ireland we are determined to refrain from any hostile action against 
Irish territory and to respect her integrity, provided that Ireland, for 
her part, maintains unimpeachable neutrality towards us in any 
conflict. Only if this condition should no longer obtain as a result of a 
decision of the Irish Government themselves, or by pressure exerted 
on Ireland from other quarters, should we be compelled as a matter 
of course, as far as Ireland was concerned too, to safeguard our 
interests in the sphere of warfare in such a way as the situation then 
arising might demand of us. 243 
Two days later, Hempel wired back to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: 
I carried out my instructions ... De Valera repeated the statement that 
the Government's aim was to remain neutral. The final decision 
would have to be taken by the Irish Parliament in due course ... He 
said that in spite of the Irish Government's sincere desire to observe 
neutrality equally towards both belligerents, Ireland's dependence on 
Britain for trade vital to Ireland on one hand, and on the other the 
possibility of intervention by Britain if the independence of Ireland 
involved an immediate danger for Great Britain, rendered it inevitable 
for the Irish Government to show a certain consideration for Britain, 
which in similar circumstances they would also show for 
Germany .... My general impression was one of a sincere effort to 
keep Ireland out of the conflict, but of great fear, which de Valera 
discussed in the usual doctrinaire fashion. 244 
Ireland was during the Second World War, in theory at least, still a dominion 
in the British Commonwealth, the United Kingdom's configuration of colonies, 
fil Fodor, The Neutrals, 156. 
243 DGFP, v. VII, 422-423. 
244 Ibid, v. VII, 471-472. 
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former colonies and dependencies. But Ireland's dominion status did not, in the 
eyes of its government, require it to fight alongside Britain in its war against Nazi 
Germany. Dublin's determination to remain neutral in 1939 was received with 
sharp concern in Whitehall,245 and it came as a surprise even to the Irish people. It 
was, however, a decision firmly supported by the overwhelming majority of the 
country's people and virtually every interest group, including politicians, diplomats, 
writers, unionists, the press and the churches. 246 Given the peculiarities of Irish 
history, especially the festering sore of partition, political reality allowed no other 
course but neutrality. 
But even in Britain, many influential persons considered Ireland's neutrality 
probably the best course for both countries, reasoning that defending Ireland as a 
co-belligerent would require stretching even further the Allies' already over-
extended resources. 247 Other British voices however - most notably Winston 
Churchill's - advocated not neutrality, but an Allied occupation of Ireland so the 
island could serve as a forward base from which to protect Britain's sea 
approaches as well as to preempt a German occupation. 248 
The famous remark, "Who are we neutral against?", asked by some 
unknown Irishman at the war's outset,249 found its way into the international press 
and became during World War II a sort of epigrammatic symbol of Ireland's moral 
245 John Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, Oxford, 
1982, 208-ff. 
246 T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish Neutrality andthe U.S.A. 1937-1947, Dublin, 1977, 
220. 
247 Ibid, 208. 
248 In writing to.Roosevelt on June 2, 1940, Churchill said "an American 
squadron at Bereshaven would do no end of good." Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 
152. 
249 Fodor, The Neutrals, 156. 
dilemma. Because Ireland was almost entirely dependent on Britain for its 
overseas trade, it was a source of considerable anxiety for many Irish to 
contemplate their country not actively supporting Britain and its allies' cause 
against that of Germany.250 Yet it was the same Britain that many Irish hated 
because of the deeply-wounding partition of the island. 
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If during World War II Spain became to the United States the most 
reprehensible of the neutrals, it was Ireland that held that distinction for Britain. 
Ireland's dilemma in World War II was, at bottom, a result of the resistance of its 
prime minister, Eamon de Valera, to compromise Ireland's neutrality to a degree 
acceptable to Britain in the person of its prime minister, Winston Churchill. But de 
Valera regarded that neutrality as a test of Ireland's freedom from the United 
Kingdom, and came to virtually "sanctify it as a principle ... to abandon which would 
be apostasy."251 To the extent that Churchill's reaction to de Valera was tempered, 
it was Roosevelt's White House that urged such moderation, despite the generally 
anti-Irish attitude of David Gray (a relative by marriage to Roosevelt), the American 
ambassador appointed to Dublin in March 1940. As late as 1943, Gray urged on 
Washington the seizing of Irish bases by force, for which he would become virtually 
persona non grata in Ireland by the end of the war.252 
There wasn't in September 1939, and wouldn't be throughout the nearly six 
years of war, the slightest possibility that an unaided Ireland would be able to 
successfully militarily defend itself against invasion by either Axis or Allies. In 
September 1939, the total manpower of the Irish Army amounted to 7494 regular 
~Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the War Years, Newton Abbott, 1975, 11. 
251 Rosenberg, J.L., "The Consecration of Expediency: The Wartime 
Neutrality of Ireland", Australian Journal of Politics and History, 1979, 25 (3), 327-
331. 
252 Timothy Patrick Coogan, Ireland Since the Rising, New York, 1966, 119. 
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troops, 5066 reservists, and 7223 "volunteers", the latter a sort of home guard. 
This force was charged with guarding a coastline of 3000 miles and the 250 miles 
of intra-Irish border separating Ulster and the south, the latter popularly called the 
Twenty Six Counties. 253 The army had at its disposal two "serviceable" tanks and 
21 armored vehicles, most of which were in 1939 already antiques - 1920, and 
earlier, Rolls-Royce's. The air force, a branch of the army (as in the United States 
at the time), was equally toothless, with only 24 craft of which 10 might be called 
modern by the standards of the time. The Twenty Six Counties were just about 
completely defenseless in the terms of 1939 Europe. 254 But in a speech to the 
National Defense Council in May 1940 (by which date the situation had changed 
little from eight months earlier), de Valera put the best possible face on the situation 
when he said the country's greatest chance to escape the European conflict lie in 
mobilization and making the island too costly for any aggressor to attempt to 
invade.255 
The Irish government squandered the months before outbreak of war, when 
war was obviously imminent, as well as the period of the Phony War, to strengthen 
its utterly inadequate armed forces. As a consequence, after the blitzkrieg in 
western Europe in the spring of 1940, Dublin began making desperate appeals for 
weapons to the United States. The British government concurred with these pleas, 
253 There is some difficulty in what to call the non-Ulster part of the island at 
this time. "Eire" was the co-official Irish (Gaelic) language name, but officially it was 
theoretically meant to include Ulster as well. The south couldn't be called the 
"Republic", which it didn't become until 1949. Just calling it "Ireland" doesn't 
distinguish between the south and Ulster (officially Northern Ireland). Perhaps "the 
Twenty Six Counties" - a commonly used term in Ireland and Britain in 1939 - is the 
clearest name. 
254 Robert Fisk, In nme of War - Ireland, Ulster, and the Price of Neutrality 
1939-1945, Philadelphia, 1983, 66. 
255 Nicholas Mansergh, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs: Problems 
of Wartime Cooperation and Post-War Change 1939-1952, London, 1958, 66. 
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but with the proviso that any weapons sent to Ireland not take precedence over 
American arms committed to Britain. 256 Though it seems curious that Britain would 
approve aid to Ireland at a time when it was badgering de Valera's government 
over the former Treaty Ports, it is an indication of British concern that a German 
invasion of a weak Ireland would equally imperil Britain.257 But Washington hedged 
on Dublin's appeals, finally informing de Valera that any arms would have to come 
out of those sent to Britain and at Britain's discretion - Roosevelt's way of 
expressing his displeasure at Irish neutrality. He told Gray that Ireland was going to 
"have to fish or cut bait"258 - appease Britain in the matter of the ports or go its own 
way without American help. 
De Valera's government had rationalized the Treaty Ports' denial to the 
Royal Navy and to its de facto American ally in a way that received the full support 
of the Irish parliament and people. He declared that the ports had been returned 
by the British government at a time (1938) 
when war was evidently imminent and after consideration of the 
political and strategic factors involved ... there was, therefore, no 
constitutional or political claim which the United Kingdom could 
advance for their return. 259 
Such remained Irish policy throughout the war, even though it meant incurring 
London and Washington's undisguised wrath. 
In June 1940, Dublin began to undertake new defense measures against the 
increased threat posed by German-occupied France. It also feared a Britain 
desperate to protect its shipping and to whom violation of Ireland's neutrality was 
~Ibid, 69. 
257 Ibid, 69. 
2ss Ibid, 69. 
259 Ibid, 75. 
93 
far less worrisome than the specter - then deadly real - of losing the war at sea. 
New calls for army volunteers went out (there was no draft) and a Local Security 
Force was instituted for increased patrol and observation duties. Dublin's urban 
defenses were expanded, major roadways and beaches were fitted with anti-
aircraft landing obstacles, and major ports were placed under military authority. 
Most ominously, the government gave the violently anti-British Irish Republican 
Army a sharp warning not to engage in any treasonous activities designed to assist 
Germany in its war against Britain. 260 
Because Ireland chose to stay out of Britain's conflict, the Irish people faced 
real and serious hardships in a world in which the war had cut normal trade to a 
relative trickle. The government had to institute measures early in the conflict to 
ensure that the population would be fed, including nearly doubling the acreage 
under crops through a compulsory planting policy decreed by parliament. Bread 
nonetheless came under rationing from 1942 onward, as did tea, sugar and fuel. 
Industrial capacity fell as a result of the drop in imports of raw materials, which in 
turn resulted in higher unemployment. As in most of the world at war, a thriving 
black market developed. 261 
Like all the other successful neutrals except Switzerland, Ireland was 
concerned not only by the threat of German invasion, but also by the possibility of 
Anglo-American incursions or invasion to preempt the possibility of Axis use of its 
territory. Though Hempel had on the day the war broke out given assurances to 
the Irish government that Germany would respect Ireland's neutrality irrespective of 
its Commonwealth dominion status, Dublin was given no such assurances from 
~Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 239-240. 
261 Terence Brown, Ireland -A Social & Cultural History 1922 to the Present, 
Ithaca, 1975, 136-ff. 
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London that Britain would respect Ireland's neutrality.262 Nonetheless, de Valera 
informed Hempel that Ireland was bound to show "a certain consideration for 
Britain", 263 and subtly warned the envoy that any German violation of Ireland's 
neutrality - especially an attempt to coo pt the I RA to carry out espionage against 
Britain on Irish territory, including Ulster-would inevitably lead Ireland into closer 
cooperation with Britain. The "certain consideration for Britain" was eventually 
carried to very un-neutral lengths in favor of the Allied cause that Hempel - sure of 
Dublin's antipathy to London - couldn't have foreseen in 1939,264 and which will be 
discussed below. Hempel informed Berlin, though, that he thought it "improbable" 
that Britain would use force to regain use of the Treaty Ports - despite Irish fear that 
Britain might indeed do just that. 265 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden described the dilemma posed by Irish 
neutrality in a memorandum to the cabinet written two weeks after the war began: 
On the constitutional side the question of any formal recognition by 
this country of the neutrality of Eire266 presents a serious difficulty. 
We do not want formally to recognise Eire as a neutral while Eire 
remains a member of the British Commonwealth. To do this would 
~ Because of fundamental disagreement between London and Dublin 
regarding their legal relationship, there was no British diplomatic mission in Ireland 
at the war's outset. The British insisted that any diplomatic representation be 
headed by a High Commissioner, as was the case in the other dominions 
(Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa), but de Valera, wanting to discard 
what he considered "imperial trappings", demanded a full minister in what was in 
reality far more a republic than a "dominion." Carroll, Ireland, 14. The governments 
of the United Kingdom and of its other dominions all continued to regard Ireland as 
a full member of the Commonwealth after the External Relations Act of 1936 was 
confirmed in 1937 by Ireland's new Constitution -this despite Ireland's repudiation 
of any allegiance to the Crown itself. Mansergh, Survey, 58-59. 
263 Carroll, Ireland, 13. 
264 Ibid, 13. 
265 Mansergh, Survey, 65. 
266 Officially, "Eire" was the Gaelic name and "Ireland" the English name for 
the entire island set in the 1937 constitution. 
be to surrender the hitherto accepted constitutional theory of the 
indivisibility of the Crown. Equally we do not want to take the line that 
Eire is no longer a member of the British Commonwealth. This would 
involve the rejection of the policy followed with the assent of the other 
Dominions since the establishment of the new Constitution of Eire in 
1937 and would moreover have serious repercussions in many 
directions, e.g. the status under United Kingdom law of individual 
lrishmen.207 
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In the event, the advice tendered to the General Staff by Lord Chatfield, 
Chief of the Naval Staff, was clear cut: the practical alternatives regarding Ireland's 
role in the war were either a neutral Ireland or a hostile Ireland. 268 In 1941, Minister 
for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures Frank Aiken wrote of this policy from the 
Irish side: 
If America comes first we are determined to shoot down the 
Americans. If Britain comes first we will shoot them down with 
greater relish. If the Germans comes first we will shoot them also. If 
Britain genuinely believes that she is forestalling a German invasion 
and rushes her Northern [Ulster] troops down along our coast or her 
naval craft into our harbours, we are engaged immediately in bloody 
war with England. 269 
In 1940, at the most dangerous point in Britain's fight with Germany, 
shipping losses270 seemed so desperate to Whitehall that an offer was made to 
Ireland that Britain would unilaterally end the country's partition if Ireland would 
agree to come into the war on the Allied side. In the late spring of that year, after 
the German attacks on neutral Belgium and Holland, the British became convinced 
that Ireland was about to be subject to a German invasion attempt.271 Whitehall 
267 Carroll, Ireland, 19. 
268 Mansergh, Survey, 63. 
269 Fisk, In Time of War, 219. Italics the author's. 
270 By the spring of 1940, Britain had lost 460 merchant ships; after France's 
fall, the losses rose precipitously - rising to 350,000 tons in March 1941 alone. 
Fodor, The Battle of the Atlantic, 23-ff. 
271 Kevin T. Nowlan and T. Desmond Williams, Ireland in the War Years and 
After- 1939-1951, Dublin, 1969, 17. In his war memoirs, Churchill's papers show 
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tried to persuade de Valera's government to immediately allow British troops into 
Ireland to better enable those already in Ulster to repel the invasion in alliance with 
the Irish Army. 
In light of this situation, a formal British offer, signed by the Lord President of 
the Council Neville Chamberlain,272 was on June 28, 1940 conveyed to de Valera 
with the following proposal: 
A declaration to be made by the United Kingdom government 
accepting the principle of a United Ireland. This declaration would 
take the form of a solemn undertaking that the Union is to become at 
an early date an accomplished fact from which there shall be no 
turning back .... A joint Defence Council representative of Eire and 
Northern Ireland to be set up immediately .... The Government of Eire 
to invite British naval vessels to have the use of ports in Eire, and 
British troops and aeroplanes to cooperate with the Eire forces and 
to be stationed in such positions in Eire as may be agreed between 
the two Governments, for the purpose of increasing the security of 
Eire against the fate which has overcome neutral Norway, Denmark, 
Holland, Belgium and Luxemburg .... The Government of Eire to intern 
all German and Italian aliens in the country and to take any further 
steps necessary to suppress Fifth Column activities. 273 
Lord Craigavon, the British governor in Northern Ireland, lobbied against 
this proposal from the viewpoint of Ulster, which is to say of Ulster's Protestant 
majority. For his part, Churchill asserted he no wish to be "a party to the coercion 
of Ulster", but "had no objection to Ulster being persuaded. "274 Writing to 
Roosevelt on December 23, 1940, Churchill said: 
It is not possible for us to compel the people of Northern Ireland 
against their will to leave the United Kingdom and join southern 
Ireland. But I do not doubt that if the Government of Eire would show 
he had pondered on whether the Germans would "go to Ireland" invade the island. 
Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 161. 
272 Because Chamberlain had as prime minister been responsible for the 
return of the Treaty Ports, Churchill entrusted him with the responsibility for these 
negotiations. Bowman, De Valera, 220. 
273 Fisk, In Time of War, 486. 
274 Bowman, De Valera, 224. 
its solidarity with the democracies of the English-speaking world at 
this crisis, a Council of Defence of all Ireland could be set up which 
the unity of the island would probably in some form or other emerge 
after the war.275 
97 
Had this offer been accepted and later come into fruition, the history of 
Anglo-Irish relations in the second half of the twentieth century would, of course, 
have been greatly changed. But for many reasons, it was not accepted. For one, 
the Protestants of Ulster believed that an integration into the south would represent 
a desertion of the United Kingdom at a time when Britain and its commonwealth 
were in enormous peril. Neither did Britain really want to risk a postwar neutralized 
Ulster, the bases in that province providing its merchant shipping with forward 
protection that Ireland would not allow in the Treaty Ports stand-off. But perhaps 
most important, de Valera was utterly loath to send another generation of Irishmen 
to their deaths in a European war. It was in repayment for the Home Rule Bill 
before the first war that John Redmond had agreed to send to send thousands of 
Irishmen into the trenches and to their deaths between 1914 and 1918. De Valera 
had no wish to be his generation's Redmond. 276 And after centuries of English 
duplicity, the prime minister knew also there was no guarantee that Britain would 
honor its pledge of a united Ireland in the eventuality that it won the war.277 Robert 
Menzies, the Australian prime minister, in commenting on de Valera's actions in 
1941, summed up the Irish leader's pragmatism: 
... Great Britain could not possibly throw Ulster into Eire if that meant 
that Ulster was also to become neutral and that Great Britain was to 
be deprived of even those bases which she had then. In effect, [this] 
campaign for union could not usefully or sensibly be pursued during 
the war, assuming the neutrality of Eire.278 
m Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 564. 
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The value of Ireland's neutrality to Germany was put forward most strongly 
in the person of the German minister in Dublin. In October 1939, Hempel had told 
Berlin that consistent adherence to its neutrality was supported by the vast majority 
of the Irish, and had "strengthened Irish national self-consciousness."279 When 
Berlin was expressing fear in November 1940 that the IRA-German connection 
would give Britain an excuse for invading the dominion, Hempel said such an 
eventuality would cause the Irish first to seek aid from the still-neutral United States, 
and only if unsuccessful would they turn to Germany. But he warned Berlin that 
anyviolation of neutrality by Germany (most especially attempting to forcibly gain a 
port for U-boat repairs) would cause de Valera to make good on his promise to 
defend neutrality in the words: "if we must die for this then we will die for it. "280 It 
isn't recorded what effect this somewhat toothless threat had in Berlin, but Ireland's 
neutrality did in fact continue to be respected by Germany. 
In reference to Britain's concern about the IRA-German connection, Irish 
neutrality had been violated by Germany in a way that embarrassed Ireland and 
caused Germany to fear losing what tepid popular Irish sympathy it had. German 
agents were dropped by parachute and landed by submarines with instructions to 
make contact with anti-British IRA elements, but with express orders not to take 
any hostile actions against elements of the Irish army or of the Irish government. 
Two of the agents were caught and tried, causing Dublin to be concerned that 
relations with Germany would deteriorate dangerously, and causing Berlin to worry 
about loss of face in lreland.281 
279 Mansergh, Survey, 60. 
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The basis of Germany's strategic plans regarding Ireland continued to be 
that the island should not be driven into Britain's camp before a possible German 
invasion could take place, presumably after Britain's surrender. Such was the 
primary reason for Germany excluding the Twenty Six Counties from its naval 
blockade, a decision made on June 1, 1940 and for which the most pressing 
argument was that a blockade would make the Irish people think that it was still 
linked to Britain, "for better or for worse. "282 Though Hitler accepted this logic, 
active planning for an Irish invasion was put off.283 
A German invasion of Ireland was most cogently argued against by the 
German navy, which through its planning staff reasoned that as long as Britain 
remained paramount in naval strength, any German invasion could still be 
successfully thwarted by the Royal Navy. Britain's naval superiority remained 
overwhelming in comparison to Germany's: two to one in battleships and twenty to 
three in cruisers. Furthermore, surprise was out of the question because of 
Ireland's location. The hope of developing secure supply lines was equally slim, 
again because of Britain's superior naval strength. Even air support from 
Germany's theoretically stronger air force was judged not to be decisive, mostly 
because Ireland's notorious weather could at any time make air offense, defense 
or supply unreliable. And finally, Northern Ireland was armed to the teeth.284 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that at least preliminary plans for an invasion 
of Ireland were prepared by the Germans. Documents captured in Belgium in 
October 1944 included a set of maps of every town in Ireland as well as maps of 
the coastline and comments on conditions that the German troops could be 
282 Jbid, 70 and DGFP, v. IX, 500-501. 
283 Mansergh, Survey, 70. 
284 Ibid, 72. 
expected to encounter; the maps were printed in 1940 and 1941 , with the latest 
revisions made in 1943.285 But in the absence of Irish cooperation, which Hitler 
judged couldn't be expected because of de Valera's strong, consistent and 
popularly-supported pledge to defend Ireland against any aggressor, he never 
allowed any significant preparations for an Irish invasion to go forward. 
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One of the most pressing problems that faced de Valera throughout the war 
was the need to "neutralise"287 the Irish Republican Army, which saw in Britain's 
troubles the path to its own ends, namely the forcible political reintegration of Ulster 
into Eire. The Dublin government, of which several ministers had been in the Civil 
War period comrades of current IRA members, declared the organization illegal 
just before the war broke out, reasoning that it could jeopardize the country's 
neutrality policy.288 But the IRA saw the start of the war as a signal to step up its 
own war on Britain, a war taking the form of a bombing campaign in Britain that 
culminated in a famous explosion in Coventry killing five people and injuring 
sixty.289 Even on its home ground, the IRA was able to sabotage the Irish Army and 
de Valera's policy of even-handedness: on December 23, 1939, the outlawed 
organization broke into Dublin's Phoenix Park's armory and stole over a million and 
a half rounds of rifle and machine-gun ammunition. It was this exploit that 
prompted the prime minister to crack down on both the IRA and civil liberties, 
including instituting press censorship meant to keep political opinion "under 
285 Manchester Guardian, October 18, 1944, quoted in ibid, n. 72. 
286 Ibid, 73. 
287 Carroll, Ireland, 14. 
288 Ibid, 15. 
289 Fodor, The Neutrals, 179. 
control."290 The Abwehrmeanwhile set up its own courier and communication 
network with the IRA, a sabotage campaign in Ulster being one of the principal 
ends of this network of IRA agents abetted with German expertise and materials. 
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Ireland's diplomatic contest with the Allies was never an easy one, not even 
in relatively sympathetic Washington. Frank Aiken, Dublin's special envoy to the 
U.S., visited Roosevelt in April 1941 to explain his government's case against co-
belligerency with Britain. Aiken told Roosevelt that Ireland considered Britain as 
much an invasion threat as it did Germany, but promised to be more forthcoming 
to the British cause if Britain would give firm assurances that Ireland's neutrality 
would be respected. Roosevelt railed against what he thought to be a suggestion 
of moral equivalency between Britain and Germany,291 but the outcome remained 
that London would never at any time in the war assure Ireland that its borders 
would be respected by British military forces,292 a scenario de Valera believed 
would provoke a German military response and turn the South into the battlefield 
that Ulster had become. 293 
After America entered the war, Churchill renewed his pressure on Dublin for 
- as he phrased it - the "Orange and Green to unite", 294 proposing a reunification of 
Ireland within the Empire under the old Home Rule scheme, a suggestion to which 
his Irish counterpart didn't even deign to formally respond. De Valera's reaction 
was emotional: 
~ Mansergh, Survey, 60. 
291 Roosevelt asked "if the Nazis [win], would Irish freedom be permitted as 
an amazing pet exception in an unfree world?" W.Y. Elliott et al, The British 
Commonwealth at War, New York, 1943, 476. 
292 Fodor, The Neutrals, 182-183. 
293 Bowman, De Valera, 243. 
294 Nowlan, Ireland in the War Years, 23. 
from the moment that the war began there was for this state only one 
policy possible - neutrality. Our circumstances, our history, the 
incompleteness of our national freedom through the partition of our 
country made any other policy impracticable. Any other policy would 
have divided our people, and for a divided nation to fling itself into this 
war would be to commit suicide. 295 
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Churchill shifted the onus onto the now-belligerent United States to punish 
lreland.296 He persuaded Roosevelt (who evidently needed little persuasion after 
the interview with Aiken) to embargo food supplies from the U.S. to Ireland, adding 
greatly to the already-serious shortages. 297 Arms promised Ireland's Defense 
Force were also held back at Churchill's insistence. None of this changed de 
Valera's stand at all, Churchill as well as Roosevelt underestimating both the Prime 
Minister's commitment to neutrality and his fear that once Britain was back in 
Ireland, it would never again leave. Fortunately for de Valera, he was backed to the 
hilt in his recalcitrance by the vast majority of the Irish people, and, if anything, 
Churchill's maneuver hardened Irish resolve to remain neutral.298 
After American entry into the war, Ireland's value as a potential co-
belligerent with the Allies began to lose its appeal,299 its worth as a partner far 
295 Memoirs of Winston Churchill quoted in Mansergh, Survey, 160. 
296 In a letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, the former concluded "you will 
realise also that our merchant seamen, as well as public opinion generally, take it 
much amiss that we should carry Irish supplies through air and LI-boat attacks and 
subsidise them handsomely when de Valera is quite content to sit happy and see 
us strangled." Churchill, Their Finest Hour, 606-607. 
297 Churchill added " ... we are so hard-pressed at sea that we cannot 
undertake any longer the 400,000 tons of feeding-stuffs and fertilizers that we 
hitherto convoyed to lreland ... we need the tonnage for our own supply and we do 
not need the food which Eire has been sending us." Ibid, 606. Admittedly though, 
Ireland exported to Britain nearly all of its "exportable surplus of foodstuffs." Elliott, 
The British Commonwealth at War, 4 77. 
298 Ibid, 181. 
299 It became apparent at the same time to the Germans that Ireland's chief 
value to their cause was to remain neutral and thus withholding use of its ports to 
the Allies. Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 245. 
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outweighed by the estimated cost of supplying and defending it. But when forces 
of the now-belligerent U.S. landed in Ulster in January 1942, de Valera was still 
quick to protest: 
... it is our duty to make it clearly understood that, no matter what 
troops occupy the six counties, the Irish people's claim for the union 
of the whole of the national territory, and for supreme jurisdiction over 
it, will remain unabated ... the maintenance of the partition of Ireland is 
as indefensible as aggression against small nations elsewhere, which 
is the avowed purpose of Britain and the U.S. in this war to bring to 
an end.300 
For the remainder of the war, the stand-off between Allies and Ireland -
particularly between Churchill and de Valera - continued with a passion. The 
economic war of retaliation Britain waged with the U.S. 's help against its former 
possession went on, and Ireland learned to make do entirely with what it could 
grow on its own soil. It also lost much of the sympathy of formerly supportive 
American groups: thousands of Americans went down on ships that might not 
have been lost if Irish bases had been available for forward sealane protection.301 
The fact that nearly 100,000 Irish volunteers served (and were freely allowed by 
their government to serve) in the British army was discounted, as were the growing 
compromises Ireland made to base Allied sea rescue services from its soil and the 
fact that Ireland lent Ulster - particularly Belfast - great assistance throughout its 
trials from German bombing.302 
~ Mansergh, Survey, 161. These troops, together with the British troops, 
had as their official mission in Ulster to stay in "readiness to sweep down the entire 
length of Eire to destroy an enemy force landed on its southern coast." Elliott, The 
British Commonwealth at War, 4 79. 
301 Mary C. Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation, New York, 1956, 
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Before the war ended, Ireland would be subjected to one last broadside, this 
time from Washington. The issue that caused the U.S. government to present 
through its embassy in Dublin a formal demarch6 to the de Valera government was 
the continued presence of German diplomatic representation in the Irish capital, 
which Washington believed allowed Germany greater freedom in its spying on 
Allied activities. The following highly-charged diplomatic note was delivered to the 
Irish government on February 22, 1944: 
The neutrality of the Irish government has in fact operated and 
continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers and against the 
United Nations on whom your security and the maintenance of your 
national economy depend ... one of the gravest and most inequitable 
results of this situation is the opportunity for highly organized 
espionage which the geographical ROSition of Ireland afforded the 
Axis and denies the United Nations. 303 
But de Valera rejected without equivocation this American demand that Hempel 
and his staff be returned to Germany, a decision to which virtually all Irish political 
factions agreed on the rationale that the German and Japanese diplomats in 
Ireland were incapable, at this late date, of carrying out successful espionage 
activities in light of the Irish precautions taken to prevent them. 304 Privately, the 
response of the Irish prime minister to the American demand was one of shock - de 
Valera believed the aid given by Ireland to the Allied cause far outweighed the 
hardship it cost them by Ireland remaining neutral. His response to the demarch~ 
was that the Irish people had newfound respect for the British because of Britain's 
respect for Ireland's neutrality during the war, and it would be regretted if this latest 
American demand should mar these new feelings. With Dublin's promise to 
'303 Mansergh, Survey, 162. 
304 Ibid, 163. 
institute additional security measures against the Axis missions in Dublin, and on 
Churchill's advice, Washington dropped the matter.305 
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At the European war's end, in a victory speech reflecting the sentiments of 
his American and Soviet allies, Churchill showed no magnanimity toward Ireland 
and its policy of neutrality, the policy that had, in de Valera's view, saved Ireland's 
citizenry and its cities from the fate suffered by Europe's belligerents. Instead, the 
British prime minister heaped abuse on the Irish for not coming to the aid of the 
anti-Nazi alliance. But in a speech to the Dail shortly after learning of Churchill's 
words, de Valera quoted a letter he had received from a fellow Irishman. It 
, --:1~ither America nor the Soviet Union could justify their criticism of Ireland 
•, 
tor r en'°''· .1g neutral when they themselves had remained neutral at a time when 
their neighbors and allies were being attacked - both waiting to join the fray only 
after coming under the gun themselves. De Valera concluded that the difference 
was only that Ireland had not been attacked - but would have fought like a tiger had 
it been.306 
The war probably was the factor that most firmly set Britain's future course 
in Ulster. The debt the British owed the loyal Unionists in Northern Ireland gave the 
latter a security they wouldn't otherwise have gained, and drove a deep wedge 
between the two political parts of the island.307 
But the Twenty Six Counties were well-served by Eamon de Valera. Had he 
taken his country into war, he would have been thwarting the will of the vast 
majority of his countrymen. De Valera was right that most of the belligerents -
especially the United States - didn't come into the war until they themselves were 
~Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 251. 
306 Fodor, The Neutrals, 185. 
307 Bowman, De Valera, 255. 
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attacked, which was long after the depradations of Naziism were documented. 
Nonetheless, thousands of Irish citizens voluntarily fought - and many died - on the 
Allied side. Eight Victoria Crosses attest to their valor. 308 
"308 Duggan, Neutral Ireland, 259. 
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TURKEY 
"What we would like is for 
the Germans to destroy the 
Russians and the Allies then 
to destroy the Germans." 
Anonymous Turkish wartime quote309 
That Turkey remained a non-belligerent almost until the final days of World 
War II was the result, primarily, of a stand-off between the blocs due to a 
geographical position coveted by both, and, to a lesser but nonetheless significant 
degree, of its military capabilities and political determination to defend its own 
territory. It was Turkey that controlled the overland route from Europe to the 
Middle East, the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf, areas in which the Germans 
believed they could knock Britain out of the war and which Britain knew it had to 
control notto be knocked out of the war. For Turkey's neutrality, the British had in 
reality good reason to be grateful: with Turkey a German ally in 1940 or 1941, the 
Middle East may well have been lost to the British. 
Even though Turkey's military capacity and political will were lesser 
contributors to its neutrality than was its geography, there is evidence Hitler judged 
the Wehrmachtwould not be able to take Turkey against its will. 310 Though in no 
position to engage in state-of-the-art mechanized warfare, the Turkish army was in 
1939 reputed (accurately) to be of tenacious fighting capacities - a situation 
conversely abetted by the fact that Turkey's communications and supply lines 
were, at best, rudimentary. 311 Turkey's leaders knew the country was unable to 
ward off the Germans alone, but because of their well-trained and determined army 
309 Fodor, The Neutrals, 167. 
310 Weber, The Evasive Neutral, 214. 
311 Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 345. 
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(though one deficient in modern arms) they calculated that Germany wouldn't 
casually pay the very high price required for violating the country's neutrality. 
Furthermore, Turkey's leaders were loathe to damage the carefully-built framework 
of a modern state Ataturk had created on the Ottoman ruins. Finally, the 
experiences of the debacle between 1914 and 1918 were still very fresh in 
memory.312 
An important factor besides geography in the relationship of Turkey to the 
warring blocs was the country's chromite ore, of which in 1939 Turkey controlled 
16.4% of the world's production. 313 From chromite is derived both chromium and 
chrome: chromium, the more strategically important, is an essential component in 
the manufacture of high-grade steel. Germany obtained nearly its entire supply of 
chromite ore from Turkey during World War II, a factor which allowed the Turks to 
play their chromite card to great advantage: for critical materials which only 
Germany would supply, the Turks would pay in chromite, and any sense of 
disadvantage314 was swallowed by the Germans as they saw their stocks of this 
critical material steadily erode after June 1941. 315 
The Allies had tried to preempt Turkish chromite when in 1940 Britain 
negotiated an agreement with Turkey, contracting for the following two years' near-
total supply at highly inflated prices (and having to buy along with it some relatively 
unimportant foodstuffs) on the condition that none whatsoever be sold to 
m Ibid, 345. 
313 During the war years, Turkey's entire chromite production was exported. 
Lewis W. Thomas and Richard Frye, The US & Turkey & Iran, Cambridge, 1952, 
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314 90,000 tons of chrome paid for by RM100 million in arms. Gordon, The 
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315 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 
Princeton, 1979, 23. 
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Germany. Germany quickly felt the resulting tightening of supplies, and its special 
trade representative, Dr. Karl Clodius, went to Ankara to negotiate an end to 
Britain's monopoly of Turkey's production.316 Clodius was partially successful. In 
October 1941 the Turks agreed that when the British deal expired it would ship 
90,000 tons of chromite to Germany, providing Germany also buy, at grossly 
inflated prices, a large portion of the domestic farm commodities then glutting the 
Turkish market. But when the Germans couldn't wait until the beginning of 1943 
(when the agreement with Britain was scheduled to expire) and its ambassador, 
Franz von Papen,317 tried to arrange to smuggle ore out of the country, the 
offended Turks nearly canceled the deal.318 As it happened, after January 1943, 
Turkish chromite again was being openly sent to Germany.319 
A key in understanding the motivation behind Turkey's behavior - Turkey's 
"duplicity", as the belligerent blocs might have put it - during the war is 
understanding the traditional hatred felt by Turks for Russia and the Russians, a 
hatred going back three centuries and 13 wars. When the Ottoman Empire began 
to crumble in earnest in the early 19th century, the ascendent Russian Empire was, 
316 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 121. 
317 In his memoirs, Papen called the RM 100 million payment for the ore a 
"loan" which Turkey could pay off in "goods, particularly chromium." Franz von 
Papen, Memoirs, London, 1952, 488. 
318 Weber, Evasive Neutral, 129-131. 
319 Supply routes between Germany and Turkey weren't cut until 
September. Brigadier Peter Young, ed., World Almanac Book of World War II, New 
York, 1981, 296. The Turks were at this time concerned about the Balkan routes 
from Germany being cut, since it meant they would then be totally dependent on 
Allied goodwill for their imports. FRUS, v. v, 1944, 823. Not until April 20, 1944 
would lsmet Inonu, Turkey's president, order complete suspension of chromite 
shipments to Germany, when Allied pressure on the issue - and threats to embargo 
the country - finally became overwhelming. Two months later, Turkey decided to 
cut in half all other commodities it was selling the Reich, the Allies continuing to rail 
against any materials still going to Germany. 
along with Great Britain, the nation most concerned with picking up the broken 
pieces. The Russians yearned for guaranteed free passage through the Straits, 
and Britain worried that if Russia became a Mediterranean power its own newly-
acquired lifeline to the Orient through the Suez Canal would as a result be 
threatened. 320 
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In the Constantinople Agreement of March 18, 1915, between Great Britain, 
France and Russia, Russia was promised the capital, the Bosporus, the Sea of 
Marmara and the Dardanelles. The Bolshevik Revolution rendered the agreement 
void (Lenin specifically repudiated it), but the war's end nevertheless resulted, 
through the October 1918 Armistice of Mudros, in Allied-guaranteed free passage 
through the Straits to the new Soviet state. 321 Throughout the latter part of the 
1930s Turkey nonetheless felt relatively safe from Russian aggrandizement, having 
established normal diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1934; during this period the 
busy-elsewhere Soviets adopted a status quo policy with Ankara in which no 
demands on Turkish territory were made. But when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
was announced on August 29, 1939, the Turks were shaken to find the Soviets 
joining the Germans in their plan to redraw the map of Europe. Ankara's belief that 
a false military step might provoke the Soviets into invading Turkish territory led to a 
policy of realism vis-a-vis the Soviets, one that finally ended in a November 1940 
non-aggression pact with their old enemy. 322 
~ Some scholars take the view that rather than being primarily interested in 
expanding her power into the Mediterranean, Russia's most intense interest in the 
Straits in the 19th century was to exclude any of the Powers from gaining access to 
the Black Sea. Kuniholm, Origins, 9. 
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A prime part of German diplomatic policy in the period just before its attack 
on Poland was to keep Turkey from cooperating with Britain and France, with 
whom it expected to put together a series of encircling pacts and alliances in the 
Middle East. But the Soviets, too, wanted to ensure that Turkey stayed as isolated 
as possible from the western European allies, not only to appease Moscow's new 
German partners, but because a Turkey close to the Western powers would likely 
allow them use of the Straits to aid Rumania in wartime, and Russia wanted to keep 
any European war as far from the Soviet Union as possible.323 
When the European war broke out on September 1, 1939, Turkey's policy 
was to keep clear of the fray, but the various means it took to this end were 
inevitably shaped by its everpresent fear and distrust of Russia. Turkey's only 
major move during the early part of the war was closure of the Straits to foreign 
warships, 324 a move taken in accord with the policy set out in the Montreaux 
Convention of 1936 that regulated the use of the Straits. But matters became 
complicated when Italy entered the war against Britain and France and therefore 
theoretically requiring Turkey to take action against Italy· in accordance with the 
Tripartite Treaty it had signed with France and Great Britain on October 19, 1939, a 
treaty that had been a kind of reward to France for its forbearance in the Hatay 
controversy involving the Sanjak of Alexandretta, Turkey's only irredentist claim 
since the establishment of the post-Ottoman republic.325 
~George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Ithaca, 1962, 135-
137. 
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But by the spring of 1940 the European military situation had changed so 
much from that in effect when the treaty was negotiated that Turkey decided to stay 
neutral and to avoid repeating its error of the First World War,326 foreseeing co-
belligerency with the Allies bringing only German invasion and destruction to its 
own shores. Although Turkey was diplomatically bound by this treaty to enter the 
war on the Allied side against Italy after the latter became involved in June 1940, 
Britain did not press Ankara to honor its obligation. Turkey was militarily relatively 
weak in terms of armor and artillery, and for it to have declared war on an Axis 
partner might well have had the effect of turning Nazi armies into the Middle East 
through Turkey in the pursuit of Hitler's aim to close the Suez Canal. The British at 
this point principally desired that the Turks maintain friendly neutrality against the 
day when the coun~ry's help might be vitally needed. As long as Germany wished 
to stay friendly with a Soviet Union which would be antagonized at any German 
advance through Turkey and the Middle East, Ankara's concurrence in this policy 
held. 
But Hitler's real diplomatic objective regarding Turkey was to assure its 
neutrality after his planned attack on Russia. After Turkey was assured by the 
German chancellor in March 1941 that he had no designs on it, and that his troops, 
which had just invaded Bulgaria, would be kept 60 kilometers back from the 
Turkish frontier, President lsmet Inonu responded to Hitler that Turkey would also 
remain neutral as regarded the Axis, a signal that German troops could proceed 
consult with them and maintain benevolent neutrality; and, finally, that if any 
European country attacked any nation in such a way to threaten the others, all 
would consult with view to common action. Quoted from Chester M. Tobin, Turkey 
- Key to the East, New York, 1944, 143-144. The treaty, incidentally, in no way 
required Turkey to become involved with the Soviet Union, even if Britain and/or 
France and the USSR should become allies - except to allow Soviet naval vessels 
through the Straits. Eren, Turkey Today, 223. 
326 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London, 1961, 289. 
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into Yugoslavia and Greece without having to worry about Turkey's reaction. The 
cautious Turks did, however, blow up the bridges over the Maritsa River - the 
Turco-Bulgarian frontier - as a defensive measure. 
Not knowing, of course, that Germany was soon to be at war with Russia, 
the Turks believed a peaceable relationship was a necessity with the power that 
was now in a position to immediately attack its whole western seaboard, including 
its two chief commercial cities of Istanbul and Izmir. 327 Papen had been urging a 
non-aggression pact on Ankara, and when in June 1941 Turkey became nearly 
surrounded by German-occupied countries or countries in political accordance 
with Germany, Ankara felt it had to give the Germans what they wanted.328 Hitler's 
lightning conquest of the Balkans and subsequent concentration of forces in 
Bulgaria so impressed Ankara that it yielded to Papen's pressure to sign a treaty of 
friendship and non-aggression329 (which treaty nonetheless "allowed" it to reserve 
its obligations to Britain under the Tripartite treaty330). On June 14, Papen wrote to 
the Foreign Ministry in Berlin: 
As a consequence of Italy's entry into the war and upon requests by 
the English and French Ambassadors the Turkish Government has 
examined the situation and decided: Turkey's entry into the war in the 
present situation might possibly help her in a war with the USSR. The 
Government has therefore decided to invoke Protocol No. 2 of the 
~Toynbee, The War & the Neutrals, 350. 
328 Lenczowski, The Middle East, 140-141. 
329 Article 1 - The German Reich and the Turkish Republic undertake 
mutually to respect the integrity and inviolability of their territories, and not to take 
measures of any sort aimed directly or indirectly against the other contracting 
party. Article 2 - The German Reich and the Turkish Republic undertake in the 
future to consult with one another in a friendly spirit on all questions affecting their 
common interests in order to reach an understanding regarding the treatment of 
such questions. Such were the substantive passages of the treaty. Hans Adolf 
Jacobsen, World War II Select Documents with Commentary, Strategy & Policy, 
Santa Barbara, 1979, 115-116. 
330 Langer, The Undeclared War, 798. 
English-French-Turkish Pact and to maintain its neutrality in the new 
conflict accordingly.331 
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Hitler would have, of course, preferred an active ally of Turkey, but was willing to 
settle with its "friendship" rather than risk the Russian campaign by diverting forces 
to conquer a Turkey militarily allied with Britain. 
When Germany attacked Russia on June 21, 1941, the revised state of 
affairs made the question of passage for Russian vessels - guaranteed to an Allied 
partner in the 1939 pact with Britain and France - a matter that Ambassador von 
Papen discussed with some urgency with the Turkish authorities. In a telegram to 
Ribbentrop two days after the Russo-German war began, Papen outlined the 
Turkish response. 
Today I discussed with Saracoglu [the Turkish Foreign Minister] the 
question of Russian shipping. Passage of Russian naval vessels is 
completely out of the question. The Bosporus and the Dardanelles 
are closed by net defenses and sown with mines. Passage of Soviet 
merchant vessels appears to the Foreign Minister not very likely at 
this time because in the initial phase of the war Russia would 
undoubtedly not want to divest herself of her merchant tonnage for 
the benefit of England. In any event, he is apparently willing to 
cooperate with us in this matter also, and he gromised that he would 
promptly inform me of any Russian demarche in that regard.332 
Turkey justified refusing passage to Soviet naval vessels through the Straits by the 
prior constraints of the Montreaux Convention of 1936, but Germany wanted 
Turkey to cooperate in the immediate denial of passage to Russian merchant 
shipping as well, primarily so the Germans could capture the 400,000 tons of 
merchant vessels in the Black Sea. A secondary reason for Germany's urgency in 
this regard was to prevent Britain's use of Russian tonnage in the Mediterranean, a 
331 DGFP, v. IX, 566. 
332 Ibid, v. XIII, 3. 
highly likely Anglo-Russian arrangement in light of Britain's dearth of merchant 
ships in the Mediterranean.333 
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Because of the rapid advance of the Wehrmacht in Russia after June 22, 
German demands on Turkey's freedom of action became increasingly bolder, and 
Turkey conversely less willing to resist those demands. Although Turkey stood by 
her agreement with Britain regarding the preemptive buying of chromite, it still 
couldn't ignore the inescapable fact that the German armies were within 100 miles 
of Istanbul. 334 Another consideration in Turkish politics was the fact that because it 
was the Soviets who were getting butchered by the Wehrmacht, Germany was 
gaining sympathy from the right-wing segment of Turkey's political elite. The 
Germans were helped further in their psychological position by revealing to the 
Turks the Soviets' long-term goals of controlling outright the Straits, information 
which Molotov had revealed to Ribbentrop during the period of the Nazi-Soviet 
collaboration. 335 
In the months following Germany's attack on Russia, it was the German 
contention that in the event of an Allied victory Turkey would have nothing to gain 
and a great deal to lose. Germany furthered its propaganda war in Turkey by 
promising German assistance to the right-wing in supporting the Pan-Turkic 
movement, especially in the reversion to Turkey of Moslem-speaking areas of the 
Soviet Caucasus. While many Turks would have appreciated adding these Soviet 
lands to their own territory, not even the Pan-Turkists, however, wanted to give 
Stalin or his armies the slightest pretext to slaughter the Turko-Mongol minorities 
then still firmly under Soviet control. Turkey continued to remain officially neutral, 
333 Ibid, v. XIII, n 3. 
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and Ribbentrop ordered Papen to discontinue any further inducements of German-
abetted Pan-Turkism. By this time - mid-1942 - it was becoming apparent to the 
Turks that the German ability to back either promises or threats in regard to Turkey 
were becoming increasingly limited. 336 
After June 1941, Turkish knowledge of Soviet designs on the Straits was a 
major factor in hindering a closer relationship between Turkey and the Allies. 337 
When Stalingrad fell in February 1943, the Soviets tried to bring Turkey into the war, 
tactically to draw German divisions off the Russian front and thus to permit more 
rapid Russian progress in the East, but strategically to create a situation which 
could later be exploited to allow Soviet armies to enter Turkey. Soviet insistence 
after 1943 that Turkey enter the war - in contradiction to its British and American 
allies' stand that Turkey could legitimately follow a less drastic, albeit pro-Allies, 
course of action - seemed proof to Ankara that Russia's primary motivation was to 
find an excuse to make an occupation possible, and, more importantly, to 
legitimize Soviet claims to control over the Straits in the postwar world.338 
But increased non-Soviet Allied pressure on Turkey in late 1942 to bring the 
country into the war did begin to be exerted, although it was relatively low-key and 
with no ultimatum being issued to force Turkey's hand: neither London nor 
Washington wanted Turkey to refuse "future" belligerency outright, which might 
have led the Germans to better use the 26 divisions they had sitting virtually 
immobilized on the Bulgarian frontier. The Turks in any case procrastinated, as 
~Ibid, 142. 
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was their wont, requesting more weapons and supplies before thinking seriously of 
coming into active co-belligerency.339 
There was another major issue, separate from this political see-sawing, but 
one which gives an insight to the domestic political scene in wartime Turkey. In 
1942 and 1943, Turkey became embroiled in a controversy that has become one of 
the most infamous episodes in its modern history: the Varlik Vergisi, or Capital Tax. 
This levy emulated some of the worst features of Nazi Germany's racialism mixed 
with the old Ottoman Empire's fanaticism, and is adjudged the most shameful 
episode of Turkey's domestic government policies during this period. 340 
Approved by the Grand National Assembly, the tax was a seemingly 
reasonable measure to raise money in an economy mired in constant war-induced 
fiscal crises. The target of the tax was the great fortunes that had hitherto been 
pretty much free from taxation as a result of the ease of tax evasion then common 
in Turkey. In reality, the levy was undisguisedly aimed at three "alien", minority 
communities: the Greeks, the Jews, and the Armenians. Failure to pay the 
assessments - in many cases, the amounts levied were considerably higher than 
the victims' total assets - led to confiscations and even to imprisonment at hard 
labor. 
The measure's preamble stated that it was "aimed at those who have 
amassed inflated profits by exploiting the difficult economic situation but do not pay 
commensurate taxes" - clearly meaning Turkey's overly-successful alien 
minorities.341 The remissions that the Finance Ministry did finally allow late in 1943, 
essentially because of Allied pressure in the matter that had been prompted by 
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outrage in the American Armenian community, were too late to save the victims, 
almost all of whom were non-Muslim. In March 1944 the Assembly finally canceled 
all amounts still unpaid, but added insult to injury by "penalizing those who had 
made payment and rewarding those who had somehow managed to avoid it". 342 
The legacy of the Capital Tax was the damage done to Turkey's reputation in the 
West. The German press hailed the tax as a "justified" measure against "alien 
blood." 
When Turkey was of greatest importance to the non-Axis cause by serving 
as a buffer to Axis expansion into the Middle East - which is to say before the 
United States became a belligerent - relations between Ankara and Washington 
were relatively low-key, the greatest American emphasis in Turkey being on 
persuading the Turks to remain neutral, and using economic assistance as its 
primary tool to ensure such neutrality. The ever-sanguine (except where de Valera 
was concerned) Churchill assured Roosevelt that Turkey was doing as little for the 
Nazi cause as could be expected of it under the circumstances. 
Even after the American entry into the war and the subsequent lessening of 
Turkey's strategic geographical importance to the Axis, the Allies still decided in 
December 1942 they wanted to bring Turkey and its two-million man army into the 
war "in principle. "343 Two months later, Churchill met with President Inonu at 
Adana, in southern Turkey, to try to bring this about. But Inonu told Churchill that 
before his country could come in on the Allied side, Turkey would have to have 
more military supplies, a demand to which the British leader reluctantly agreed. 
While these Allied-Turkish negotiations were taking place, Germany still had the 
strength to force a withdrawal of the British landing on the Dodecanese Islands, 
342 Lewis, The Emergence, 294. 
343 Lenczowski, The Middle East, 144. 
German-held Greek islands immediately off Turkey's west coast. It served as a 
pointed reminder to Ankara that it had still better proceed with caution where an 
open declaration of belligerency against the Reich was concerned. 344 
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In mid-1944, the United States finally demanded that Turkey break relations 
with Germany, that the Straits be barred to German shipping, and that all 
shipments of chromite ore to the Axis be stopped - the threat being backed up with 
an immediate and complete cut-off of further arms to Turkey.345 The Turks yielded, 
knowing that little danger from Germany now existed and that their country had 
become - gratefully- not much more than a backwater in the war. Furthermore, 
they wanted the American arms for the postwar fight they expected with Russia. 346 
On June 15, 1944 Turkey finally ceased to allow (at Allied urging) Germany secret 
passage of any naval craft through the Straits, and on August 25 diplomatic 
relations between Berlin and Ankara were suspended by the latter.347 On January 
12, 1945, Turkey opened the Straits to supply ships bound for Soviet ports, and 
two weeks later cut relations with Japan. Nonetheless, when in early 1945 Turkey's 
1935 ten-year friendship pact with the Soviet Union expired, the Soviets gave notice 
to Ankara that the treaty wouldn't be renewed unless the Turkish provinces of Kars 
and Ardahan were handed over to the Soviet Union, along with an agreement to 
Soviet "participation" in the defense of the Straits. All the demands were instantly 
rejected by the Turkish government. 348 
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informed Turkey that the USSR endorsed "border rectifications" on the Soviet-
Turkish northeastern border (in the Soviets favor, of course), and that Soviet bases 
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Finally, on February 22, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany so it could 
become a charter member of the new United Nations Organization, and thus have 
a place at the victors' table to better protect its sovereignty on the Straits against 
Russian expansionism. Even this pro forma declaration didn't engender much 
enthusiasm in the government, however, the country's leadership feeling the move 
too closely paralleled Mussolini's despised declaration of war on the West in June 
1940. Though the Allies had by this time become heartily sick of Turkey's foot-
dragging on the issue of co-belligerency, it was nonetheless important to Western 
interests that Turkey secure a respectable place in the United Nations to better 
"uphold her sovereignty over the Straits."349 On March 21, a month after the 
declaration of war by Turkey, Moscow formally confirmed that the Soviet-Turkish 
Friendship Pact would not be renewed, signaling the beginning of an increasingly 
dangerous period of relations between the neighboring countries. 350 
In summary, perhaps Turkey's behavior in World War II can best be 
explained by its unwillingness to dissipate its strength in any fight against the Axis, 
when it believed that strength would eventually be needed to defend itself against 
the Russians. In light of Soviet demands on Turkish sovereignty at the war's end, 
and the knowledge of Molotov's designs on the Straits, the country's course can at 
least be understood in a framework of self-preservation. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Swedish diplomat Gunnar Haeggloef wrote that 
neutrality has to be supported by a reasonably efficient defense 
system; politics of neutrality require steady support from all the 
important political groups of the country; and, most important of all, 
the basic condition of neutrality is a balance of power. 1 
This was largely the underlying formula that allowed six countries to stay out of the 
European catastrophe that was the Second World War. Many other factors 
contributed to the neutrals' removal from harm's way- geography, personalities, 
the fatigue following civil war, luck. But Mr. Haeggloef's first point - a strong 
defensive capability - was for four of the World War II European non-belligerents a 
major contributing factor in their neutrality: Germany calculated that Spain, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey represented nuts not worth cracking as long as 
they did the Axis little harm and continued to provide it with vital war materiel. Self-
defense capabilities were not primary guarantors of Portuguese and Irish 
neutrality, but these two states' promises to tenaciously defend their territory 
against any aggressor were known to and undoubtedly figured to some degree in 
the strategic planning of the belligerents. 
It should be noted that while the neutrals maintained military forces that 
were in most cases much larger than their normal peacetime defense 
establishments, all six were still very much less burdened in this regard than were 
the fighting nations. Even though inflated relative to the neutrals' pre-war defense 
1 M. Gunnar Haeggloef, "A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World 
War", International Affairs, 1960, 35 (2), 153-167. 
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budgets, the proportion of money, manpower and production facilities of the 
warring states dedicated to military-related purposes vastly exceeded in virtually all 
cases that which the neutrals were required to spend in this regard.2 
No one of the neutrals stayed out of World War II simply because it wanted 
to, or because the belligerents had any real regard for neutrality as such. Rather it 
was a matter of weighing the costs of overcoming armies, in the cases of 
Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey, or of supporting their participation in the case of 
Spain, or of fighting their protectors, as with Ireland and Portugal. Though the 
majority of Europe's states a/so wished in 1939 and 1940 to remain neutral, the 
balance in their regard came down on the other side, a fact which would seem to 
confirm that the concept of neutrality was in itself valueless in Europe during the 
Second World War. The chance of success was the real factor a potential 
aggressor weighed in determining whether to violate a state's neutrality. 
Though historians have tended to lump together the two Iberian 
dictatorships in terms of World War II policies, Spain and Portugal presented 
differing problems for the belligerents. Spain may very well have voluntarily joined 
the Axis as a co-belligerent had Franco considered that his country could have 
gotten more out of such a move than it would have cost it. But due to its own civil 
war Spain was a pauperized nation, and Hitler wasn't willing or able to meet the 
(admittedly high) material demands that were Franco's price for bringing his 
country into the conflict. Though the Germans considered the possibility of taking 
Spain against its will, such a move never became a serious option, primarily 
because Spain's military capacity to defend its sovereignty would have been too 
much for the Wehrmachtto overcome in light of Hitler's other, evidently more 
pressing, military obligations. Though a German-controlled Gibraltar would have 
2 Gordon, The Hidden Weapon, 213. 
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been of supreme military significance, in 1940 and 1941 Hitler must have 
calculated that the Axis could count on Franco's cooperation after his other 
enemies were beaten. But by 1942, it was becoming apparent that this scenario 
was no longer likely to play and that the over-extended Reich no longer had the 
capacity to impose its will on an unreceptive Spain. 
The Allies never had plans to militarily take Spain, and considering their 
ability to choke off the country's trade through embargo, they never had to - at 
least not as long as Spain kept the Germans out. The biggest Ally concern was 
whether Franco might in some way oppose the North African Torch campaign of 
1942, but it turned out that it was Franco who was concerned - that the Allies 
would use Spain as their access point to re-enter occupied Europe. 
Portugal could never be considered by the Germans separately from Spain: 
an invasion of a hostile Spain would have inevitably meant including Portugal, and, 
conversely, there was no realistic way to occupy Portugal without Spanish 
acquiescence or without Spanish hostility. That Portugal remained scrupulously 
neutral was all Germany could expect, and which was in fact very much to 
Germany's benefit. Though Hitler couldn't have Azores bases, Portugal saw to it 
that until late in the war neither could Britain or the United States. And while the 
Azores weren't all that critical to Germany's war effort, the islands would have 
been a tremendous tactical and strategic boon to the Allied cause had they been 
available earlier in the war. 
Portugal didn't have the wherewithal to make military might an important 
part of its neutrality policy, but it did have the political consensus for non-
interference that was necessary to successful neutrality, and it was fortunate that 
the power of the belligerent blocs balanced each other in respect to Portugal. Had 
Germany made the first move on the Azores, the still-neutral United States would 
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very likely have contested it as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine; and both 
sides knew that any attempted move against the Portuguese mainland would have 
meant taking on Spain as well. 
Switzerland and Sweden both used the threat of destruction of vitally-
important resources as primary barriers to German invasion. In both cases, these 
threats were importantly backed-up with the military capacity to cause any invader 
substantial losses while waging a holding action during which, in Switzerland's 
case, Alpine tunnels were destroyed, and, in Sweden's case, iron ore facilities put 
to the torch. It is clear that in neither of these countries' cases were their long-time 
professions of neutrality a factor in their safety. It came instead from the will to 
remain neutral by paying the substantial cost of arming themselves meaningfully 
and to destroy a large part of their infrastructures if the military shields were 
insufficient. 
Sweden also had to face the possibility of an Allied violation of its territorial 
sovereignty, one in conjunction with a move against occupied Norway or to assist 
Finland. Though neither Britain nor the United States coveted Sweden for the 
purpose of getting at its natural resources, which would have represented a 
primary German consideration, any such move against it or Norway would have 
very likely invoked a German response, 3 the effect of which would have been a 
devastated and/or occupied Sweden. Although the Allied threat was minimal and 
short-lived, Sweden's pledges to Berlin given in the name of its king to fight any 
invader were undoubtedly heard as unambiguously in London and Washington as 
they were in the German capital. 
3 This according to the Swedish ambassador in London during the war, 
Gunnar Haeggloef. Quoted in Ogley, Theory & Practice, 171. 
125 
Switzerland faced no physical threat to its territory from the Allies, suffering 
only material blockade from that quarter. Its military shield was aimed solely at the 
Wehrmacht (Mussolini never waved a sword in Switzerland's direction, even 
though Italy's entry into the war in June 1940 completely changed Switzerland's 
economic position.) In purely military terms, the Swiss defense shield played the 
most important part in the success of any of the six states' neutrality. Though like 
the other neutrals it can be said that Switzerland was fortunate in that Germany 
simply never had to have it for strategic purposes, the reverse is also true that 
Germany would have taken Switzerland if it had been easy enough. But the Swiss 
went to expensive lengths to convince Berlin that it wouldn't be anything like easy, 
and that the advantages Berlin could have from the Swiss for the asking (or, more 
precisely, for the paying) would be violently denied if its territorial sovereignty was 
threatened. 
Turkey walked as fine a line between the demands of the belligerents as 
any of the neutrals. The fact that it was at the juncture point of the great wartime 
blocs - the Axis dominating the Balkans to the west, the Russians to the north, and 
Britain and its allies preeminent in the Arab world to the south - meant that the 
country straddled the eye of the wartime hurricane. With its control of crucial 
communications lines between these blocs, and thus threatened by their needs 
(even though after June 1941 the latter two were allies, their reasons for wanting to 
control Turkey were not, of course, in harmony), never was Turkey as in need of 
diplomatic skills as during the war and never were those skills so successfully 
employed. 
Not all of Turkey's tightrope walking was seen as evenhanded, which is 
unsurprising. The Soviets used the matter of Ankara allowing minor German naval 
craft through the Straits during the war as a pretext for urging the "revision" of 
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control of the waterway in its favor after the war. There is, however, no evidence 
that Turkey's concessions in this regard contributed significantly to the Axis war 
effort. In any event, just as many concessions were made in the Allies' favor, the 
matter of allowing western preemption of chromite ore being one of the most 
important. Turkey was, after all, being forced to balance demands from all 
quarters to protect its neutrality, a neutrality which the Turks regarded as critical to 
their own well-being - a not unreasonable view in light of the condition of most of 
the rest of Europe in 1945. 
Ireland was, of the neutrals, odd man out. In addition to the usual contempt 
the warring nations felt for the non-belligerents, Britain deemed itself betrayed by 
the neutrality of a nation that had been for centuries a part of "its" world. Still 
legally an integral component of the political association of the United Kingdom 
(even though the Irish government held that its membership in the Commonwealth 
was essentially meaningless), the attitude of the Irish toward Britain was shaped 
mostly by simple hatred for having been bled white for all those centuries and for 
the fact that a good chunk of its national territory was still being denied it by the 
despised British. 
But Dublin's ability to remain neutral was partly predicated on the 
awareness that had Germany launched an invasion against Ireland, Britain would 
have had to repel it. In retrospect, Ireland never stood in any substantive danger 
of such an undertaking, although if an assault on Britain had been successfully 
carried out, Ulster would very likely have been eventually taken, which would have 
ended with the rest of the island coming under German domination even without 
the Twenty Six Counties being technically violated. 
It can't be said that Ireland's military defense capabilities would have been 
of any significant consideration in either side's decision to occupy all or part of the 
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island. As dearly as the Irish population may have held their neutrality and 
sovereignty, their military capacity to defend such were never highly developed. 
That Britain retained Ulster after the establishment of the rest of Ireland's 
independence accounts in largest part for the fact that Irish neutrality was not 
violated by the Allies: Ulster was available to serve as a forward base from which to 
protect Britain's sea lanes, and therefore taking the southern Treaty Ports never 
became absolutely necessary. Had it been, the ports would have become a 
legitimate German target, and Ireland might very well then have slid into the war on 
the Allied side on the basis of 'in for a penny, in for a pound.' Ironically, such a 
scenario may have had a profoundly important postwar effect: loyally orange 
Ulster became so antipathetic to the Twenty Six Counties between 1939 and 1945 
that the chances for ending the island's partitioned status after the war were 
greatly diminished, not to say unattainable. 
The lessons learned about European neutrality in the Second World War 
seem most clearly to indicate that neutrality was a failure. Of the 20 "neutrals" at 
war's outbreak, only six successfully maintained their outsiders' status. There 
were, as Gunnar Haeggloef put it, more Norways - and Hollands and Belgiums 
and Hungarys and Greeces - than there were Swedens. Following the war, almost 
all the European states joined one of the two Great Power blocs that re-jiggered 
the continent along all new lines of dialectic. 4 
It was doubted right after World War II that neutrality could any longer have 
much meaning. Major wars of the future were seen, ipso facto, as being 
potentially nuclear conflicts, thus making the idea of sitting them out meaningless. 
In truth, neutrality now has almost no meaning in terms of nuclear war. But as 
4 Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia are still theoretically aloof from such 
alliances, but few doubt in which direction their basic political orientations lie. 
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regards all the regular little wars, military capabilities would appear today to be the 
most popular guarantor of "neutrality", an observation borne out by the 
astronomical levels of military spending in virtually every country in the world. In 
fact, the endless procession of quite ordinary, if just as lethal, wars has gone on in 
the last forty-plus years quite unabated, and while most of the several dozen new 
states created in those decades have declared their total impartiality in struggles 
between the Powers, they've nonetheless continued the small-time slaughter of 
each other's citizens with something that has often approached abandon. 
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